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Under the Colombian Flag examines the Colombian state‘s efforts to incorporate the Afro-
Caribbean English-speaking Protestant islanders of San Andrés and Providence into the Spanish-
speaking Catholic nation. The project analyzes how those cultural struggles and political 
negotiations shaped the Colombian nation-building process. I illustrate how Colombian political 
elites largely spoke of islanders‘ ethnic differences in terms of cultural attributes such as 
language, religion, and customs. In their minds, these characteristics were malleable. The 
Colombian nation-builders‘ project thus ignored North American and European pseudo-scientific 
understandings of race in order to incorporate ethnically and racially diverse populations into 
their homogenizing agenda, which promoted the Spanish language, Hispanic culture, Roman 
Catholicism, gendered notions of morality, and racial views of health and modernity. San Andrés 
and Providence islanders had a different understanding of racial and national identities. They 
tended to formulate their Colombian identity in terms of loyalty, reciprocity, and rights. My 
work contributes to the growing body of historical scholarship on race and nation-building in 
Latin America and the Caribbean as well as scholarship investigating the experiences of black 
communities in the Atlantic world. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
San Andrés and its sister island Providence form a small archipelago in the western 
Caribbean that jurisdictionally belongs to the Republic of Colombia. Initially colonized by 
English Puritans in the 1600s, the islands became a Spanish, and later a Colombian, possession. 
By the late twentieth century, however, San Andrés and Providence islanders contested this 
national affiliation and identity. These contestations occasionally erupted onto the pages of the 
local, national, and even the foreign press. Present-day newspaper accounts often tell a story of 
conflict depicting the English-speaking, black and largely Protestant population of San Andrés 
and Providence as victims of an oppressive Spanish-speaking, Catholic nation.
1
 While these 
reports grab the attention of foreigners like me, they also raise several questions. Is this story of 
conflict the complete picture? Are islanders not ―real‖ Colombians, and when did this notion 
emerge? How have islanders responded over time to their status as Colombian nationals and 
citizens? 
 
                                                 
1
 Simon Romero, ―Talk of Independence in a Place Claimed By 2 Nations,‖ New York Times, 1 February 2008; ―San 
Andrés es y seguirá siendo de Colombia,‖ El Tiempo, 13 December 2007, Chris Kraul, ―Border Tensions Rise in 
Central and South America,‖ Los Angeles Times, 17 September 2007; Peter Espeut, ―A Jamaican Outpost,‖ 
Jamaican Gleaner, 13 September 2006; ―Trouble in Paradise,‖ The Guardian, 10 June 2002; ―El Grito de los 
Raizales,‖ El Tiempo, 29 July 1999; Alfonso López Michelsen, ―San Andrés y Providencia. El Problema no es 
limítrofe,‖ El Tiempo, 26 September 1999; James Brooke, ―San Andres Journal; On English-speaking Isle, Tidal 
Wave of Spanish,‖ New York Times, 1 July 1991; Armando Neira y Arquimedes Súarez, ―Se integra la otra 
Colombia,‖ El Tiempo, 5 July 1991.  
 
 2 
This dissertation shows how islanders‘ attempts to insert themselves into national politics 
have a long and rich history, first under departmental rule (1887-1912) and then under federal 
rule (1913-1991). My study examines that period, concentrating on the nation-building project 
implemented on the islands between 1870 and 1930. I show how federal authorities proposed to 
incorporate the islands into the Colombian nation, and how their proposals were then carried out 
in practice. In particular, I focus on the interactions between islanders and state officials, and 
trace their challenging relationships over time. In doing so, I seek to understand the nature of 
islander politics and their impacts on the nation.  
Four central questions guide this dissertation. First, how did the Colombian state envision 
the incorporation of these Caribbean islands? Second, what specific policies were employed, 
how were they implemented, and with what consequences? Third, how did San Andrés and 
Providence islanders address Colombian authorities‘ efforts to incorporate them? Fourth and 
finally, in what ways did islanders define and articulate their collective interests? Did they 
present themselves as ―Colombians‖? What did a Colombian national identity mean to them? By 
answering these questions, my study seeks to offer a more complex understanding of the islands‘ 
relationship with Colombia by moving the discussion beyond a story of conflict. I describe and 
explain moments when islanders acquiesced in and appropriated, as well as opposed and resisted, 
the national agenda for San Andrés and Providence Islands.  
This dissertation has two central arguments. I contend that late 19
th-
 and early 20
th
 -
century political actors largely spoke of islanders as ethnically distinctive from mainland 
Colombians by focusing on cultural attributes like their English language, Protestant religion, 
and Anglophone Caribbean culture. Colombian elites portrayed San Andrés and Providence 
islanders as outside the nation due to the island population‘s inability to speak Spanish and non-
 3 
adherence to Roman Catholicism. This cultural gulf alarmed politicians and intellectuals, though 
both believed the situation could be corrected. In their minds, these characteristics were 
malleable. Perhaps this ideological view partially explains Colombian elites‘ refusal to comment 
on or speak of islanders‘ Afro-Caribbean ancestry or their blackness. The only way islanders 
could participate as Colombian citizens was through the adoption of Hispanic customs and 
language and the Catholic religion. Colombian nation-builders thus ignored European and North 
American pseudo-scientific understandings of race in order to incorporate their ethnically and 
racially diverse population into their homogenizing agenda.  
I argue that this impetus for the remaking of the national image crystallized as a state 
agenda in the years after Panamanian secession in 1903. The scarce literature on this topic 
understands Colombian policy towards the islands in the context of struggles with Nicaragua 
over territorial and maritime rights.
2
 Historians have overlooked the impact that the Panamanian 
secession had on Colombia‘s view of the islands.3 In contrast, I argue San Andrés and 
Providence islanders had a different understanding of racial and national identities. They tended 
to formulate their Colombian identity in terms of loyalty, reciprocity, and rights, while 
maintaining their Anglo-Caribbean heritage. Hence, islanders rejected the notion of a shared 
common culture as fundamental to the formation of a national body. 
                                                 
2
 César Bonilla Moyano, El Archipiélago de San Andrés y Providencia. Estudio-histórico-júridico a la luz del 
derecho internacional (Bogotá: Editorio Temis, 1983); David Uribe Vargas, El Meridiano 82. Frontera marítima 
entre Colombia y Nicaragua (Bogotá: Universidad de Jorge Tadeo Lozano, 1999); Juan Carlos Eastman Arango, 
―Colombia y el Archipiélago de San Andrés y Providencia, 1910-1920: un encuentro detrás de los Estados Unidos,‖ 
Boletín Historia Santafé de Bogotá 8 (1991):15-16:55-68; Juan Carlos Eastman Arango, ―Creación de la Intendencia 
de San Andrés y Providencia: la cuestión nacional en sus primeros años,‖ Revista Credencial Historia 36 (1992). 
Digital publication found at http://www.lablaa.org/blaavirtual/revistas/credencial/diciembre1992/diciembre2.htm. 
 
3
 One exception is Joseph Arbena, ―Colombian Reactions to the Independence of Panama, 1903-1904,‖ The 
Americas 33:1 (1976): 130-148. A Colombian historian offers an explanation of the nation‘s indifference towards 
Panamá; see Alfonso Múnera, ―Panamá: ¿La última frontera?,‖ Fronteras imaginadas: La construcción de las razas 
y de la geografía en el siglo XIX colombiano (Bogotá: Planeta, 2005), 89-127.  
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The second argument is that elite islanders played an important role in the process of 
nation- and state-building on San Andrés and Providence Islands. From the 1870s through the 
early 1900s, islanders occasionally expressed their interest in either seceding from Colombia or 
joining another nation such as the United States or Panama. These expressions included the 
poisoning and shooting of federal agents during their tenure as administrators on San Andrés, 
petitioning the United States to provide financial assistance in the wake of a hurricane, and 
inviting the newly-formed Panamanian government to annex the islands.
4
 Despite this proto-
nationalist sentiment among elements of the island population, island notables eventually 
abandoned the pursuit of independence in order to secure positions as regional elites within the 
Colombian government. At the same time, federal officials in Bogotá sought to use island 
notables to extend their state authority. They struck an alliance with a few elite San Andrés and 
Providence islanders who worked to have federal authorities in Bogotá manage the islands‘ 
governance. It is probable that island notables hoped to strengthen their positions as influential 
power brokers between the government and island population. When the national government 
transformed the islands into a national intendancy in 1912, it brought in mainland Colombian 
administrators to serve as its eyes and ears on the ground. San Andrés and Providence island 
notables had played an active role in this process; but by working to strengthen the islands‘ ties 
                                                 
4
 Shooting and murder of prefects, Polídoro Martínez to Secretary of the Interior and Foreign Relations, 28 March 
1870, AGN, Ministerio de lo Interior y Relaciones Exteriores, Tomo 78, Folios 492-293; ―South American News,‖ 
The New York Times, 5 December 1883. Prefect Richard J. Newball wrote on behalf of Providence islanders to the 
United States government for financial help in 1876 and 1877. Manuel R. de la Torre to Secretary of Interior and 
Foreign Relations, 15 September 1876, AGN, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Sección Primera, Diplómatica y 
Consular. Correspondencia con Gobernación de Bolívar, transferencia 10, caja 71, carpeta 540, folio 6; Manuel R. 
de la Torre to Prefect of San Andrés and Providence Islands, 29 November 1877, AGN, Ministerio de Relaciones 
Exteriores, Sección Primera, Diplómatica y Consular. Correspondencia con Gobernación de Bolívar, transferencia 
10, caja 71, carpeta 540, folio 7. Island attempts to join Panamanian secessionists, ―Islands May Revolt too,‖ New 
York Times, 10 January 1904; Eugenio Garnica, ―Nuestras islas misteriosas,‖ El Porvenir, Cartagena, 6 December 
1911.  
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with the federal government, local elites undercut their own bids for regional autonomy and once 
again faced a decision of whether, and how to appropriate, cooperate with, or oppose the state 
project.  
These arguments seek to contribute to historiographies on race and nation-state formation 
in Latin America, as well as on black history in Latin America generally and Colombia 
specifically.  
  
1.1  LATIN AMERICAN NATION AND STATE FORMATION 
Between 1870 and 1930, Latin American ruling elites sought to build modern, civilized nations. 
One aspect of this state-and-nation-building project was the ability to control their territory, 
especially through state-governing mechanisms. During the late nineteenth century, Latin 
American nation-builders sought to incorporate frontier areas formerly beyond the reach of state 
power: areas such as northern Mexico, the Argentine pampas, the Brazilian Amazon, the 
Colombian and Venezuelan llanos, the Nicaraguan Atlantic coast, and the Caribbean islands of 
San Andrés and Providence.
5
 
A second component of state-building was the transformation of allegedly backward, 
―uncivilized‖ inhabitants into modern citizens. Influenced by scientific racism, Latin American 
nation-builders sought to ―whiten‖ their racially diverse populations. A first wave of historical 
scholarship, in the 1980s, tended to focus on elite efforts to make their nations racially and 
                                                 
5
 Richard Slatta, Gauchos and the Vanishing Frontier (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press 1983); Jane Rausch, 
The Llanos Frontier in Colombian History, 1830-1930 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993); 
Charles A. Hale, Resistance and Contradiction. Miskitu Indians and the Nicaraguan State, 1894-1987 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1994); Jane Rausch, Colombia: Territorial Rule and the Llanos Frontier (Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press, 1999); Erick D. Langer, ―The Eastern Andean Frontier (Bolivia and Argentina) and 
Latin American Frontiers. Comparative Contexts (19
th
 and 20
th
 Centuries),‖ The Americas 59:1 (2002):33-63; 
Andrés Reséndez, Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
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culturally ―whiter.‖6 More recent scholarship, in the 1990s, investigated how Afro-descended 
populations responded to those efforts, looking mainly at race-based mobilization.
7
 Current 
scholarship has broadened the examination of black responses by looking at black and 
indigenous participation in multiracial movements and organizations such as national armies, 
labor unions, and political parties, and asks how those multiracial movements impacted the 
shaping of the nation.
8
 
These two components of state-and nation-building – territorial and racial – come 
together in what we might call black borderlands: areas distant from state control and populated 
by African-descended people.
9
 Available studies of black borderlands are mainly anthropological 
and focus on the present.
10
 Historical investigations of such areas and their incorporation into the 
                                                 
6
 Thomas Skidmore, Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1974); George Reid Andrews, The Afro-Argentines of Buenos Aires (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1980); Richard Graham, ed.,  The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870-1940 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1990); Winthrop R. Wright, Café con Leche: Race, Class, and National Image (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1990); Nancy Leys Stephan, The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991). 
 
7
 George Reid Andrews, Blacks and Whites in São Paulo,Brazil, 1888-1988 (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1991); Aline Helg, Our Rightful Share: The Afro-Cuban Struggle for Equality, 1886-1912 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Kim Butler, Freedoms Given, Freedoms Won: Afro-Brazilians in Post-
Abolition São Paulo and Salvador (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1998). 
 
8
 Gilbert Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds. Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of 
Rule in Modern Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994); Florencia Mallon, Peasant and Nation: The 
Making of a Postcolonial Mexico and Peru (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Ada Ferrer, Insurgent 
Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868-1878 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999; Alejandro 
de la Fuente, A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth Century Cuba (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2001); Nancy Appelbaum, Anne Macpherson, and Karin Rosemblatt, eds., Race and Nation in 
Modern Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); James Sanders, Contentious 
Republicans: Popular Politics, Race, and Class in Nineteenth Century Colombia (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2004); George Reid Andrews, Afro-Latin America, 1800-2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
 
9
 I am grateful to Lara Putnam for this concept.  
 
10
 Peter Wilson, Crab Antics: The Social Anthropology of English-Speaking Negro Societies in the Caribbean (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Norman Whitten, Black Frontiersman: A South American Case (New York: 
Knopf, 1974); Peter Wade, Blackness and Race Mixture: The Dynamics of Racial Identity in Colombia (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Hale, Resistance and Contradiction; Edmund T. Gordon, Disparate 
Diasporas: Identity and Politics in an African Nicaraguan Community (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998).  
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nation have only just begun.
11
 My dissertation contributes to this historical literature by 
examining how struggles over territorial incorporation shaped the nature of black mobilization 
and identity formation on the islands as well as islanders‘ dealings with the nation-state. 
1.2 AFRO-COLOMBIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Colombia has the third-largest black population in the Americas, yet only in the last few decades 
have Afro-Colombians begun to attract scholarly attention. Most of that attention focuses on 
slavery.
12
 The few post-emancipation studies barely go beyond 1870 and thereby leave an 
impression that Afro-Colombians disappeared into the national body as undistinguishable 
citizens.
13
 The rest of the scholarship centers on the contemporary life, experiences, and 
struggles of Afro-Colombians living in the Pacific and, to a lesser degree, Caribbean coasts. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
11
Jane Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999); Lara Putnam, The 
Company They Kept: Migrants and the Politics of Gender in Caribbean Costa Rica, 1870-1960 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Richard Turits, Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo 
Regime, and Modernity in Dominican History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).  
12
 Aquiles Escalante, El negro en Colombia (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1964); Ildefonso Gutiérrez 
Azopardo, História del negro: sumisión o rebeldía? (Bogotá: Nueva America, 1980); Germán Colmenares, História 
económica y social de Colombia, T.11: Popayán: una sociedad esclavista, 1680-1800  (Bogotá: La Correta Ineditos, 
1979); Dolcey Rodríguez Jaramillo, Esclavitud en la Provincia de Santa Marta, 1771-1851 (Santa Marta: Fondo de 
Publicaciones de Autores Magdalenses, Instituto de Cultura y Turismo de Magdalena, 1997); Alfonso Múnera 
Cavidia, El fracaso de la nación. Región, clase, y raza el Caribe Colombiano, 1717-1810 (Bogotá, El Ancora 
Editores, 1998); Rafael Díaz Díaz, Esclavitud, región y ciudad: El sistema esclavista urbano-regional de Santa Fé 
de Bogotá (Bogotá: Centro Editorial Javeriano, 2001); Luz Adriana Maya, Brujería y reconstrucción de identidades 
entre los africanos y sus descendientes en Nueva Granada siglo diecisiete (Bogotá, Ministerio de Cultura, 2005). 
English-speaking scholarship has unintentionally reproduced this unbalanced account; see Aline Helg. Liberty and 
Equality in the Colombian Caribbean, 1770-1835 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).  
 
13
 Exceptions are the following: Jason McGraw. ―Neither Slaves nor Tyrants: Race, Labor, and Citizenship in 
Caribbean Colombia, 1850-1930‖ (PhD thesis, University of Chicago, 2006); James Sanders, ―‗Citizens of a Free 
People‘: Popular Liberalism and Race in Nineteenth-Century Southwestern Colombia,‖ Hispanic American 
Historical Review 84.2 (2004): 277-313; Jorge Castellanos, La abolición de la esclavitud en Popayán, 1832-1852 
(Cali: Universidad del Valle, 1980). 
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Sociologists and anthropologists have taken the lead in producing critical scholarship on African 
cultural retentions, racial discrimination, and the politics of identity formation.
14
  
Most of these studies have concentrated on the black communities along the Pacific 
littoral. San Andrés and Providence islands have not generated the same attention from 
Colombian and foreign scholars, especially those engaged in Afro-Colombian research. This is 
largely due to the fact that the Colombian government and non-black Colombians have identified 
and constructed the region of the Chocó as unambiguously ―black.‖ The Caribbean coast has 
been viewed as racially mixed, in contrast to the ―black‖ Pacific, the indigenous Amazon, and 
the mestizo Andean highlands.
15
 While the islands are listed in the 1991 Colombian Constitution 
as one of the several Afro-Colombian communities, islanders‘ retention of their Anglo-
Caribbean culture has complicated the ways their racial and national identities are constituted. In 
his entry on Colombia in the Africana Encyclopedia, British anthropologist Peter Wade devotes 
only three sentences to the inhabitants of San Andrés and Providence. ―These people belong 
historically and culturally to a West Indian cultural complex formed under British colonial 
influence, but since the 1950s they have been subject to formal incorporation within the 
Colombian nation.‖ He admitted his entry would ―only make a passing reference to them.‖16 My 
work adds to this literature with a study on the state‘s attempts to assert its authority while at the 
                                                 
14
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same time incorporate an isolated black community into the nation-state. It stresses how 
territorial disputes impact the way race and national identities are formed and presented. 
Academic interest in the islands is relatively new and can be divided into two categories. 
The first is largely anthropological and focuses on island culture. Most of these investigations 
examine kinship patterns, oral traditions, and the local Creole language.
17
 These studies 
proliferated in the 1970s. Leading the pack of researchers was Australian sociologist Peter 
Wilson with his classic study, Crab Antics.
18
 His work focused on the role played by reputation 
and respectability in forming gendered and cultural identities on the island. Colombian 
anthropologist Nina de Friedemann—the pioneer of Afro-Colombian studies—also took interest 
in the islands.
19
 Although the bulk of her work dealt with black communities on the Pacific coast, 
she also conducted fieldwork on San Andrés, studying funeral rites as well as oral traditions such 
as the Anansi stories.
20
 More recent studies look at island political mobilization.
21
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The second category of research on the islands is historical and can be divided into three 
subcategories. The first is comprised by foreign academics that have privileged the islands‘ 
origins as a former Puritan colony as well as their economic and kinship ties to Jamaica, the 
United States, and the Mosquito Reserve in Nicaragua.
22
 The second looks at Colombia‘s 
jurisdictional ties to the archipelago as well as the Mosquito Coast and defends the nation‘s 
claims to the islands.
23
 Colombian historians and jurists postulate that the islands have always 
belonged to the Spanish Crown, as noted in early Spanish maps of the Americas. Their accounts 
play down English occupation, and later resettlement, of the islands by Jamaicans, Cayman 
Islanders, and other folk from the Caribbean, even though there never was a permanent 
settlement of Spanish subjects throughout the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. Finally, a third 
version of island history attempts to look at island history through geopolitical struggles and 
explain why Colombian federal authorities sought to incorporate the islands around the early 
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twentieth century.
24
 While this scholarship has greatly influenced my own thinking, it also 
privileges the motives and actions of non-island actors.  
While previous research has introduced us to and sought to broaden our understanding of 
island culture, society, and geopolitical history, there is still much for us to learn. The historical 
scholarship in particular tends to focus on the actions of nations and governments as opposed to 
elite and non-elite actors; islanders‘ opinions and actions are sometimes overlooked even in 
contemporary accounts of island politics.
25
 This dissertation seeks to correct this oversight by 
examining the role that San Andrés and Providence islanders played in their own history. In so 
doing, it explores the historical development of an island political culture and formation of an 
island identity. 
1.3 SOURCES AND METHODS 
This dissertation draws on primary sources located in archives and libraries in Bogotá, 
San Andrés, Cartagena, Baltimore, and London. The bulk of the source material came from the 
Archivo General de la Nación (AGN) in Bogotá, where I relied on a rich and varied document 
collection. My analysis of governmental policies drew on sources such as telegrams, officials‘ 
reports, islander complaints, and legislation published in the official government gazette. I 
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supplemented this material with foreign missionary accounts and official reports from the St. 
Joseph Society of the Sacred Heart, the Oblate Sisters of Providence, and the Seventh Day 
Adventists for the years 1900 to 1927. These sources were especially useful in my discussion of 
government efforts to acculturate the islanders through conversion to Catholicism, teaching of 
Spanish, and civic education.  
While it was easy to identify the efforts of the state, it was harder to hear the multiple 
islander voices and to detect patterns of islander political mobilization and identity formation. I 
attempted to reconstruct island political culture by drawing on rich but limited source material. 
Newspapers were particularly useful. After noting down the names of newspapers that I had 
repeatedly found in archival documents, I made a list and searched through old issues to find any 
new items about San Andrés and Providence Islands. I was fortunate to locate the following 
periodicals:  El Caribe (Cartagena), El Porvenir (Cartagena), La Época (Cartagena), and La 
Patria (Barranquilla) for the years prior to 1930. These particular newspapers frequently printed 
editorials on events happening on the islands and letters from islanders. I also combed through 
The Colon Telegram (Colón), Diario de la Costa (Barranquilla), El Tiempo (Bogotá), Estrella de 
Panamá (Panama), Gil Blas (Bogotá), and the Star & Herald (Panama). Especially important in 
recovering islander voices was The Searchlight, the archipelago‘s first newspaper. Francis A. 
Newball, an island notable and former departmental employee, created the newspaper in 1912 to 
provide a public venue for islanders and others to express their grievances regarding public 
administration. The publication had a short run—only two years—but is an incomparable source 
for this time period.  
Newspapers helped me to hypothesize the reasons for specific islander actions and 
responses. However, they do have limitations. The newspapers tend to privilege people and 
 13 
events deemed important to the elite sector and which may or may not have been significant to 
the lives of average islanders at the time. San Andrés and Providence island notables utilized the 
press as a tool to make claims on or negotiate with the state, and these elite voices cannot 
necessarily be seen as representative of the entire island community. In fact, there was no 
homogeneous island community. We must not disregard elite views and perceptions as irrelevant 
or not a true representation of on the ground events. I agree with other scholars that elite opinions 
and thoughts are essential to understanding the transformation of island life.
26
 Still, I 
acknowledge that, since ordinary islanders‘ voices are largely absent from the newspapers, my 
study is limited largely to the responses of islander elites. When possible, I do present occasional 
hypotheses or observations concerning non-elite actions and responses.  
Another source vital to my understanding of islander responses was the numerous island 
complaints, or memoriales. In these complaints, groups of elite islanders drafted specific 
grievances to send to the president and obtained signatures from hundreds of islanders. I located 
over fifty memoriales in the Colombian national archive, which informed much of my analysis 
on island-state relations between the years 1924 and 1930.
27
 Most of these complaints were 
translated into Spanish and occasionally accompanied by the original English text. As with any 
source, the memoriales must be read with caution. I encountered several cases in which officials 
accused the petitioners of acquiring signatures by fooling, coercing, or simply not accurately 
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informing signers of the true nature of the petition or affidavit.
28
 Such accusations sought to raise 
doubts in the minds of the president and other federal officials regarding the legitimacy of 
islander complaints. It is probable and even likely that island notables used unscrupulous 
methods to persuade their relatives, friends, neighbors, and fellow church members to sign these 
memoriales. However, we should be careful not to relegate non-elite islanders to the status of 
passive victims. Is it not just as likely that ordinary islanders assisted, sided with, and agreed to 
lend their support to these local notables for their own reasons, even if we are unable to identify 
the signers‘ motives? Perhaps these memoriales serve to highlight those elusive ties of kinship, 
friendship, religious and commercial interests not otherwise seen in the source material. By 
combining the petitions with the periodicals, we are better able to identify, track, and explain the 
shifting perspectives of elite islanders and their attempts to represent the entire community.  
The dissertation is organized into four chapters. Chapter 1 provides a historical overview 
of the development of San Andrés and Providence Islands from a contested place in the Anglo-
Spanish struggle over the Caribbean during the colonial era to a premiere coconut producer by 
the early 20
th
 century. I argue that these distinctive economic and political circumstances led to 
the emergence of a consolidated island identity by the late 1800s. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
political situation of the islands as a province under the Department of Bolívar in 1887 and the 
factors that led to their return to federal governance in 1913. This chapter highlights the active 
role that elite islanders played in this process. Chapter 3 analyzes the efforts of federal authorities 
in Bogotá to incorporate the islands into the nation. It focuses on specific administrative policies 
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and their outcomes and, on the political struggles between appointed officials and island 
notables. Chapter 4 explores the contested meaning of Colombian nationhood and citizenship as 
federal officials attempted to turn the islanders into proper Colombian citizens. I contend that 
contestations and negotiations over language and religion pushed islanders to cling to their 
Anglo-Caribbean institutions and consolidate a more local identity vis-à-vis Colombian 
nationalism.  
 16 
2.0  A PORTRAIT OF SAN ANDRÉS AND PROVIDENCE ISLANDS 
This chapter offers an overview of the islands‘ history from the seventeenth to nineteenth 
centuries, of the formation of island society and economy in the 1800s, and of life on San Andrés 
and Providence on the eve of the twentieth century.  
2.1 PURITAN COLONIZATION OF PROVIDENCE ISLAND, 1630-1641 
On December 24, 1629, English Captains Sussex Cammock and Daniel Elfrich landed on 
Henrietta and Providence Islands.
29
 They were pleased with their new ―discovery‖ and made 
plans to settle on these seemingly unoccupied islands. Elfrich decided to return to England to 
inform his patron, Robert Rich, the second Earl of Warwick, known for his investment in the 
Plymouth and Bermuda (Somers Island) colonies.
30
 Cammock stayed on San Andrés with 31 
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men, while Elfrich returned home to ask for permission to occupy the islands.
31
 En route to 
England, he stopped at Bermuda and informed his brother-in-law, Governor Richard Bell, of 
these unoccupied islands strategically located near Panama.
32
  
Despite Bell‘s enthusiasm for the venture, the islands also presented a problem. They 
were located ―in the heart of the Indies & the mouth of the Spaniards,‖ explained Bell to Sir 
Nathaniel Rich, cousin to the Earl of Warwick.
33
 The Dutch had already arrived on the islands 
before the English Puritans and had established trade relations with the Indians on the coast of 
Nicaragua.
34
 Although settling on the islands appeared to be difficult, Bell insisted on pursuing a 
colony on Providence Island. He argued that if the island were secured with forts it would 
become ―invincible‖ to attacks. He promised Rich and other potential investors that the islands 
could produce double or triple the amount of tobacco being farmed in Bermuda. Bell excited his 
investors with promises of large profits and they eagerly signed on.
35
 
In 1630, a royal patent issued the charter for The Providence Island Company. That same 
year, the first settlers arrived from Bermuda. These men came with Phillip Bell and Daniel 
Elfrich, who had been rewarded with the posts of governor and admiral, respectively. Captain 
Samuel Axe, a fortifications expert, joined them in helping to build Warwick Fort and the town 
of New Westminster. On February 11, 1631, 100 more men arrived on the Seaflower from 
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England. These emigrants would eventually be joined by men and women from England and 
nearby Caribbean islands such as Barbados, St. Christopher (Kitts), and Tortuga.  
The colonists were divided into four types of settlers: planters with plots of 30 to 50 
acres; artisan wage laborers; indentured servants who worked for the planters; and the military 
men or privateers who protected the colony from foreign attacks. Unlike the Massachusetts Bay 
colony, the Providence Puritans failed to offer sufficient wages or to honor the contract terms for 
indentured servants. Artisans demanded higher wages, while Providence Puritans refused to 
recompense indentured servants for their labor in public works projects on the island.
36
 When 
more labor was needed, the Puritan colonists sought out new sources of labor: African slaves.  
Although Governor Phillip Bell brought his slaves from Bermuda in 1633, the 
Providence Island Company was initially reluctant to introduce slavery to the Providence colony. 
This was not due to any moral objection to the institution. On the contrary, the Providence 
Puritans saw slavery as necessary to the success of their tropical plantations and many had slaves 
in Bermuda. ―They conceive English bodies as not fit for that work,‖ explained an investor of the 
Providence Island Company. However, the company hoped to turn the Providence colony into ―a 
godly settlement replicating the best features of English communities.‖ The settlers also feared 
that too many slaves would threaten the stability of their economic venture through slave 
uprisings, runaway slaves, and disgruntled slaves allying with foreign invaders.
37
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Despite these concerns, Providence Puritans did begin to use African slaves in place of 
their English indentured servants.
38
 The company largely purchased their slaves from Dutch 
slave traders, though some were possibly captured in privateer raids of Spanish ships.
39
 Their 
labor was used for public works projects such as the construction of forts, bridges, and roads. By 
1635, Providence Island had some 500 white men, 40 women, and 90 enslaved Africans. Two 
years later, the African slave population nearly matched the number of English settlers on the 
island.
40
 In 1641, the Spanish forcibly took Providence Island and expelled the colonists. Among 
the population, they found 350 Englishmen and 381 African slaves; the company claimed to 
have lost 600 slaves.
41
  
The Providence Island colony failed for economic and military reasons. Colonists never 
saw high profits in their tobacco and cotton exports nor produced a commodity of greater 
importance. The tobacco boom ended six years before the arrival of the first colonists to 
Providence. By 1633, company investors encouraged Providence colonists to cultivate cotton 
―till better things can be obtained.‖ Moreover, planters refused to pay fair wages to artisans and 
to allocate land to indentured servants. This forced the colonists to recruit enslaved Africans, 
who brought their own set of problems. Slaves ran away and occasionally sought refuge among 
the Indian communities along the Mosquito Coast.
42
 Sometimes slaves assisted Spanish invaders 
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in trying to destroy the colony during foreign attacks. Finally, despite their best efforts to combat 
Spanish incursions in 1635 and 1640, the colonists proved unable to defend the island.  
2.2  THE RESETTLEMENT OF SAN ANDRÉS AND PROVIDENCE ISLANDS 
 
The initial settlement of San Andrés and Providence islands was part of a larger process of 
informal migration taking place to the Spanish Main and adjacent Caribbean islands in the mid to 
late seventeenth century. This movement was mostly led by British men seeking land on which 
to grow their own crops and make an independent livelihood. As early as 1698, Anglo settlers 
established a town at Campeche in present-day Belize. Soon, new arrivals swarmed the town, 
absorbing the buccaneer population that resided there. A year later, Bermudan emigrant William 
Pitt relocated to and settled at Black River in Nicaragua where he facilitated trade relations 
between the Miskitu and Jamaican traders in sarsaparilla, cacao, and logwood.
43
 By the 
eighteenth century, several additional British settlements existed at Bragmans, Rio Grande, Pearl 
Lagoon, Punta Gorda, Corn Island, and San Andrés Island. Most settlements had no more than a 
hundred people and were largely populated by white male settlers, free people of color, enslaved 
Africans, and Amerindians.
44
 A few larger settlements, such as Black River, Bluefields, and 
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Cape Gracias a Dios, reportedly had a thousand or more inhabitants by the middle of the 
eighteenth century.
45
  
By 1780, Anglo settlers had arrived in San Andrés, joining a small remnant population 
from the Puritan settlement and a few English buccaneers.
46
Although scholars have spoken of 
these settlers as uniformly English, evidence shows they were a diverse lot.
47
 While the majority 
of them were Englishmen hailing from Jamaica or the British Isles, others came from the Dutch 
Caribbean and the Spanish empire.
48
 Many were traders who learned of these remote islands 
through their travels to trading stations dotted along the coast of Central America.  
What is known of San Andrés and Providence settlers at this time is largely drawn from 
travel accounts by visitors to the islands. One of the most telling comes from Lieutenant Stephen 
Kemble who in 1780, along with some British troops, blew off course en route to Nicaragua. The 
American commander noted some 12 families residing on San Andrés, who he described as 
―chiefly mustees who settled there without any authority.‖ These settlers lived in relative 
comfort. Kemble counted 100 head of cattle and a small cultivation of cotton. He also observed a 
small sloop docked at the beach, which indicated that woodcutters were attracted to the island‘s 
fine cedars. In addition to lumber, Kemble found San Andrés to be ripe for other agricultural 
pursuits. ―Good sugars might be raised on it though the present inhabitants make no more than 
serve their own use,‖ he wrote.49 
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Kemble‘s description of San Andrés settlers as ―mustees‖ offers us insight into the social 
formation of this community and similar British frontier settlements. While there were almost 
certainly white male settlers in San Andrés, the island also attracted men and women of mixed 
Amerindian, European, and African ancestry seeking a new life away from communities based 
on racial, class, and gender hierarchies that might have constrained their freedom. It is likely that 
these settlers came from other British settlements along the Mosquito Shore that had witnessed 
an increase of free people of color by the middle of the eighteenth century. Although the 
scholarship credits the growth of this population to an absence of white women, one scholar 
warns us that white female presence in slave societies of the eastern Caribbean did not impede an 
emergence of the colored population.
50
 
The status of Providence is unclear for these years. In 1782, Spanish authorities reported 
that the English had placed military supplies on the island, which they planned to use for a base 
of operations in a second attempt to take San Juan from the Spanish.
51
 Existing evidence makes 
no further reference to this incident or settlement at Providence around this time; sources suggest 
that most settlers bypassed the island for San Andrés. Settlers came to Providence later in the 
1790s, some with permission from Spanish officials. It was the collusion of this diverse set of 
individuals seeking out an independent form of living that shaped settler existence on these 
islands. In fact, contemporary islanders trace their origins to these settlers.
52
 
British settlement of San Andrés played an important part in the Anglo-Spanish struggle 
for domination over the Caribbean. This informal and gradual migration of Anglo emigrants to 
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the Spanish Main and offshore Caribbean islands unintentionally extended British influence and 
interest in the region. San Andrés and Providence settlers established kinship ties and strong 
trade relations with other nearby British settlements encompassing Jamaica and London as 
principal trading centers. The emergence of these communities alarmed Spanish authorities who 
sought to rid the region of English interlopers once and for all. 
2.3 ENGLISH SUBJECTS UNDER SPANISH RULE 
On July 14, 1786, the English and Spanish monarchies agreed to end over a half-century of 
conflict by signing the Convention of 1786. This treaty called for the evacuation of English 
subjects residing in small communities along the Mosquito Shore, now officially recognized as 
Spanish territories. Article 1 describes these settlements as ―extending from sixty miles east of 
Trujillo in what is now Honduras along some 550 miles of coast to Cape Gracias a Dios, and 
then south and east to Nicaragua‘s San Juan River.‖53  
The description of the evacuated areas did not mention San Andrés or Providence Islands, 
but there is no doubt that the Spanish intended to rid the islands of every English settlement. 
English and Spanish vessels stopped at the island to remove a number of settlers who relocated 
to Jamaica, Grand Cayman, and the Bahamas. A group of remaining settlers petitioned the 
Governor of Cartagena and the Viceroy of New Granada asking not to be evacuated and offering 
their submission to the Spanish king. Viceroy Antonio Caballero y Góngora supported their 
request; however, the Spanish royal court denied it and sent a ship to evacuate the remaining 
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English subjects. In December 1789, Captain Juan Castelú and his interpreter Lieutenant Tomás 
O‘Neille arrived to enforce the expulsion. Although Irish-born, O‘Neille grew up on the Canary 
Islands with his aunt and had already been living in Spanish America for nine years before his 
arrival at San Andrés.
54
  
Upon their arrival, Castelú and O‘Neille met with settlers regarding their orders to 
evacuate them; the latter refused to go. The settlers found an ally in Tomás O‘Neille, who 
encouraged the settlers to appeal again to the Spanish Crown and helped them draft another 
petition.
55
 In addition to their submission to Spanish authority, they also promised to convert to 
Catholicism and to cease trade relations with Jamaica. ―I think they would have promised much 
more rather than to have been dispossessed of their lands,‖ wrote O‘Neille in a later petition to 
the Minister of War.
56
 The settlers were allowed to remain on the island until the Spanish Crown 
had come to a decision concerning their request.
57
 In 1792, an affirmative reply reached the San 
Andrés settlers, who were allowed to remain on the islands. The Crown instructed the governor 
of Cartagena to turn San Andrés into a minor port free from all import and export duties. Soon 
thereafter, the Crown placed the islands under the jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Guatemala and 
named Tomás O‘Neille to act as governor. The islands were eventually returned to Cartagena in 
1803.
58
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San Andrés and Providence grew in those intervening years. In 1793, a Spanish official 
estimated the population at about 35 free people and 285 slaves. There were also a few Miskitu 
concubines of some mainland settlers who had relocated to the island. That same year, the 
viceroy of New Granada ordered a census for San Andrés which counted 291 total inhabitants.
59
 
Enslaved people made up the majority of the population, with a count of 207 slaves. The largest 
slave owners were William Lever with 50 slaves; John McNish with 41 slaves; Diego Anderson 
with 42 slaves; John Taylor with 30 slaves; Torquiel Bowie with 16 slaves and John Pratt with 
12 slaves. Most free island residents, however, held five or fewer slaves.
60
 
San Andrés settlers lived on their properties at the northern and eastern portions of the 
island, where land was most fertile. There was no central village. Cotton was the principal cash 
crop, which settlers cultivated through the importation of enslaved Africans who worked on their 
plantations. Settlers also grew provision crops such as yucca, sweet potatoes, avocado, corn, 
oranges, and some coconuts. However, roasted plantains were ―their daily bread.‖ Small amounts 
of coffee, sugarcane, indigo, and tobacco were also grown for local consumption. In addition to 
these crops, settlers had plenty of pigs, chickens, and turkeys. Although the cedar forests were 
depleted, there was still sufficient wood to build homes, sloops, and schooners.
61
  
By the late 1700s, there were also a number of settlers on Providence Island. Some, like 
Jamaican Francis Archbold, received permission from the Spanish Crown to settle on the island. 
He came along with his family and slaves to settle on the fertile land located at the southern end 
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of the island, later called Bottom House. There the Archbold family cultivated cotton.
62
 After his 
arrival, Providence‘s population steadily grew. In 1789, the island reportedly had ten settlers of 
both sexes living on the adjacent island of Santa Catalina along with their 12 slaves.
63
 Four years 
later, first Lieutenant Don José del Rio of the Royal Navy identified four patriarchs heading the 
principal island families: Francis Archbold, Juan John, Andrés Brown, and José Hygges. 
Archbold was the wealthiest and the only Catholic.
64
 He had 21 slaves working on his cotton 
plantation.
65
 In addition to cotton, settlers raised livestock, cut wood, and fished for turtles.  
Although San Andrés and Providence islanders were under Spanish rule, officials in 
Madrid and on the Spanish Main knew only vaguely what was taking place on the islands. The 
Spanish Crown initially turned the islands, as well as the Mosquito Shore, over to the Kingdom 
of Guatemala, Spanish naval officer Tomás O‘Neille served as the governor of both islands. 
After O‘Neille had served only six months, the president of Guatemala called him to the 
mainland to fill various positions, as Spain and England were again at war. San Andrés islander 
Torquiel Bowie replaced him as governor and was instructed to defend the island from a possible 
English attack. O‘Neille returned to San Andrés in 1801 as governor. Three years later, he 
orchestrated, with the help of the islanders, the return of the islands to the viceroyalty of New 
Granada under the government of Cartagena in 1803.  
Despite their good relations with O‘Neille, San Andrés islanders were not entirely 
wedded to the idea of being under Spanish rule. Spanish authorities seemed uninterested in 
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defending them from foreign attack or promoting their commercial interests. In 1802, Roberto 
Clark, Isaac Brooks, Solomon Taylor, Juan Taylor, and George Ellis spoke of an attack they had 
faced by Jamaican pirates who arrived with ―fifty men with the purpose of stealing negroes 
[slaves] and sacking our homes.‖ While they did not succeed in this pursuit, the buccaneers 
managed to seize ―at various times six vessels loaded with cotton‖ destined to Cartagena. 
Islanders also worried about trade restrictions placed on them by Guatemalan merchants and 
reminded the viceroy that Spanish funds paid only for the salaries of the governor and the small 
garrison; no monies had been sent for developing the island.
66
 
San Andrés islanders appeared not to have adopted an identity as Spanish subjects. Years 
after the Spanish Crown gave the settlers permission to stay on San Andrés, many still spoke no 
Spanish and had not yet converted to Catholicism as they had promised.
67
 Existing evidence 
suggests that these Anglo settlers maintained a strong sense of their British identity. In 1806, 
Captain John Bligh reportedly took San Andrés ―amidst the rejoicing of the inhabitants.‖ Their 
high hopes were squashed when Bligh left two months later with Governor O‘Neille and the 
Spanish garrison whom they dumped on the beach at Cartagena. Captain Bligh only left behind a 
small case of ammunition for the islanders to use for their defense.
68
  
Spanish officials were bruised by the ―disloyalty‖ of San Andrés islanders and debated 
whether or not the islands should be reoccupied. They decided to do so, with Tomás O‘Neille 
again in command. Although some New Granada officials feared island uprisings upon their 
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return, none took place. O‘Neille resumed his position as governor until poor health forced him 
into retirement in 1810. A Cartagena captain briefly succeeded him. In 1811, New Granada 
officials, embroiled in independence wars on the mainland, forewent sending a governor to San 
Andrés, where the local municipal council took power.
69
 In the years to follow, San Andrés and 
Providence Islands were again left vulnerable to foreign interlopers.  
2.4 FROM SPANISH SUBJECTS TO GRAN COLOMBIANS 
In 1818, a French corsair occupied Providence Island along with his diverse crew of English, 
French, American, and Haitian nationals. Louis Michel Aury was a privateer who had given his 
support to Spanish American leaders in their campaign for independence from Spain. His 
occupation transformed Providence into a privateer base that helped finance wars on the 
mainland. A year later, Aury brought more troops from Jamaica, led by Scotttish adventurer 
Gregor MacGregor, to occupy the island of San Andrés.
70
 Although Aury and his officers 
initially focused on Spanish vessels, they eventually turned to ravaging all brigs, ships, sloops, 
and schooners that happened to pass by.
71
 In 1819, American trader Captain Jacob Dunham 
stopped by the island to resume trade relations with islanders only to find it occupied by men 
who ―pretended to hold some commission under General Bolívar.‖72 Aury and his officers 
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received eighteen percent of all prizes earned from these raids; the rest was shared among the 
lower officers and crew. A need for more profits to share forced Aury and his officers to 
encourage the plundering of nearby ports like Trujillo and Santa Ysabel. Aury resumed trade 
relations with Jamaican traders. Reports in Kingston spoke of prize goods for sale at Providence 
Island ―worth a quarter of a million dollars.‖73 Islanders‘ responses to foreign occupation and 
reactions to Spanish American independence struggles remain unclear. A San Andrés historian 
suggests that some islanders supported the royalists and others the patriots; he stresses their 
astuteness in navigating changes in imperial interests while pursuing their own self-interest. In 
any case, islanders dutifully complied with Louis Aury‘s rule.74 Perhaps they enjoyed receiving 
English goods from Jamaican traders who bought plundered goods from Aury and his men.  
Louis Aury‘s privateering enabled him to funnel aid to Simón Bolívar; despite this 
support, Bolívar snubbed him. Writing to Aury in 1821, Bolívar explained that he ―no longer has 
use for the support of corsairs, who only degrade his flag before all the world‖ and demanded 
that Aury leave Colombian waters.
75
 The year before, Aury had submitted a petition from a 
group of island leaders who asked to become formally integrated into the Republic of New 
Granada in 1820. Aury never received a response and died the following year from injuries 
sustained after he fell from his horse. Most of his men dispersed for other parts; two of his 
French officers briefly governed Providence Island. In July, 1822, San Andrés and Providence 
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islanders held public meetings in which they voted to recognize the Constitution of Cúcuta and 
join the Republic of Gran Colombia.
76
  
Like the Spanish, Gran Colombian officials benignly neglected San Andrés and 
Providence Islands for more critical issues. Struggling to build a confederacy out of the former 
Spanish American colonies, mainland officials paid little attention to the needs of a remote island 
population. The Gran Colombian government initially appointed Antonio Cárdenas as military 
commander to govern the islands; he served in this capacity until 1833, when a civilian jefe 
politico, Antonio Escalona, replaced him. Two years later, the seat of government was located on 
San Andrés, the more populous of the two islands. The government presence on Providence 
Island included a tax collector, a civil magistrate, and two assistants. There also was a military 
garrison on San Andrés.
77
  
The islands remained a canton administered by the government of Cartagena until 1868, 
when the islands were named one of six ―national territories‖ under direct federal rule.78 This 
designation acknowledged the islands‘ strategic importance. In 1867, Colombian intellectual and 
journalist José María Samper had argued that the islands ―are of the greatest importance by 
virtue of their position in the middle of the Panama Isthmus, the islands of Cuba and Jamaica, 
and the coasts of Central America. They need the presence of the federal authority, making itself 
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felt directly and energetically.‖79 Under the territorial system, prefects were appointed by the 
president and served two-year terms. Prefects enforced laws, settled disputes, established towns, 
civilized Indians (if there were any in the region), and protected Colombian sovereignty from 
foreign encroachment.
80
 Municipal councils handled local government affairs. The central 
government paid the salaries of the prefects, missionaries, and school teachers and was 
responsible for the construction of primary schools, provision of postal service and public 
protection.
81
 Prefect Eduardo Mamby arrived in 1869 to administer the islands but we know little 
about his activities there.
82
 
This institutional arrangement did not last long. Under the Constitution of 1886, all 
national territories were transferred back to their original departments—in the case of San 
Andrés and Providence, to the Department of Bolívar.
83
  Under the new charter, departments 
were divided into provinces and municipal districts. The president appointed the governor, who 
served a three-year term. Departmental governors acted as representatives of the federal 
government and were responsible for the fiscal system, primary schools, economic development, 
promotion of foreign immigration and national colonization, construction of public roads and 
buildings, and police protection.
84
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2.5 THE END OF SLAVERY 
The eighteenth-century resettlement of the islands reintroduced the institution of slavery. 
In the 1810s, a US trader noted that on Providence, there were ―thirty families of free people of 
different nations and colors, and from five to thirty slaves to every free person in the island.‖  
The enslaved population was larger on San Andrés, somewhere between eight and twelve 
hundred slaves.
85
 Most of these slaves came from Jamaica.
86
 By the 1840s, nearly half of the 
total population on both islands was enslaved; James Parsons estimated no more than 1,000 
slaves on San Andrés and Providence. The white and colored slave owners forced slaves to work 
on their cotton plantations. Enslaved blacks planted cotton in December and harvested it from 
December to March. Slaveholders permitted slaves to keep provision grounds and to fish on 
Sundays and alternate Saturdays for their own subsistence.
87
 In the British Caribbean, slaves 
often sold their surplus crops from their provision grounds to earn cash incomes.
88
 This was 
especially true for enslaved women, who took an active role in developing an informal market 
based on surplus provision goods. This economic opportunity gave enslaved black women 
independence from slaveholders as well as enslaved men.
89
  
While the existing evidence regarding slavery on San Andrés and Providence is murky, it 
is clear that slave owners faced resistance from the enslaved population. In October 1799, a slave 
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insurrection occurred that was only suppressed through the arrival of a Spanish naval sloop.
90
 In 
May 1841, slaves of Torquiel Bowie Sr. and James Archbold revolted against their owners, who 
had used them to fight in a land dispute over an adjoining piece of property. Bowie severely 
punished the organizers of the revolt, but others managed to escape to the Mosquito Shore. These 
escapees were warmly received by the Miskitu King, who refused to return them to the jefe 
político.
91
 Runaway slaves from San Andrés routinely sought refuge along the Mosquito Coast 
and continued to do so until slavery was finally ended on the islands.
92
 Escapees also formed 
fragile maroon communities on both islands such as Palmeto Grove in Providence and Battle 
Alley in San Andrés.
93
 
Slave emancipation arrived to the islands in 1853 even though the New Granada 
government had officially abolished the institution two years earlier.
94
 The continuation of slave 
ownership on San Andrés was partially the result of poor communications between island 
authorities and central officials in Bogotá as well as of slaveholders‘ refusal to let go of their 
slaves.
95
 Although slave owners resisted manumitting their slaves, San Andrés and Providence 
slaveholders had often bequeathed freedom to individual slaves or allowed them to self-
manumit. In 1799, a French slave owner on San Andrés emancipated his slaves, who relocated to 
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Jamaica after other slaveholders feared the presence of freedmen might stir unrest among their 
own slaves.
96
 There were also cases of slave owners giving freedom to their children, as oral 
historical accounts recall.
97
 
Philip Beekman Livingston Jr. offers the best example of an islander voluntarily 
manumitting slaves. In 1834, Livingston returned to Providence Island at the request of his 
mother, Mary Archbold, who had moved to Jamaica. She asked him to grant freedom to her 
slaves as well as divide up the land between himself and the slaves. While the reasons for her 
decision are not altogether clear, it is probable that the Jamaican-born woman sought to follow 
the British decision to abolish slavery throughout the British Caribbean. Livingston freed his 
mother‘s slaves, giving them land plots while keeping some property for hiself. Four years later, 
he traveled to San Andrés, where his family also had property, and granted freedom to those 
slaves, too.
98
 However, their freedom was tenuous: an elderly islander explained that 
Livingston‘s freed slaves had a curfew and after six in the afternoon could not travel to the 
northern portion of the island.
99
 
Livingston‘s desire to emancipate his slaves was not shared by many of the San Andrés 
slave owners, who were particularly alarmed by his teaching the children of ex slaves how to 
read and to write. On Sundays, Livingston gave religious instruction to his former slaves, who in 
turn regarded him as their ―Pa fader.‖100 His desire to rid the island of slavery and to promote 
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evangelization on the islands was strengthened after a brief stint in the United States. Livingston 
became baptized in Ohio and later joined the Laight Street Baptist Church in New York City, 
where he was ordained a missionary and given permission to begin evangelization on San 
Andrés. In 1847, Philip Beekman Livingston Jr. established the first Baptist chapel on the islands 
and made many converts.
101
  
2.6 FROM COTTON TO COCONUTS 
Coconut agriculture replaced cotton as the leading cash crop in the aftermath of slavery. The 
reasons behind this shift remain unclear. One North American scholar argued that emancipation 
and the loss of slaves provoked this economic transformation.
102
 Oral history accounts offer 
different explanations. One account explained the transition to coconuts as the result of a 
hurricane that nearly destroyed the entire cotton crop and one slaveholder‘s forethought to plant 
coconut seeds imported from the San Blas islands off the coast of Panama on the eve of 
emancipation.
103
 Another popular explanation credited the first jefe politico, Antonio Escalona, 
with introducing the crop.
104
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While these reasons are certainly plausible, it is more likely that San Andrés islanders 
sought to capitalize on the growing demand for coconuts in US and European markets. During 
the second half of the 1800s, the populations of the United States and Great Britain increasingly 
incorporated coconut into their many confections, which explained the frequent visits of 
American and British ships to the islands. By 1900, European and U.S markets sought coconut 
for its oil, which was used to replace vegetable oil and margarine.
105
 A contemporary observer 
reported that ―more than half of all cocoanuts imported are bought by the confectioners, a single 
firm in New York using as many as forty thousand a month, and it is possible to fill this large 
standing order because importations are made all year round.‖106 However, coconuts had a 
variety of uses. ―Nothing that grows on earth has so many uses for humanity as this wonderful 
tree. To the native it is food, drink, clothes, houses, and many other important necessaries of 
life,‖ explained two agro-export industrialists.107  
The emergence of coconut enclaves along the Atlantic coast of Central America occurred 
in the first decades of the nineteenth century. In 1817, US trader Captain Jacob Dunham 
purchased several thousand coconuts for export to New York from indigenous traders on the San 
Blas islands.
108
 Indigenous and Creole traders in the off-shore island of Bocas del Toro near 
northern Panama also carried on a thriving coconut trade. It peaked in the 1840s and became 
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threatened by migrants from New Granada who, eager to earn high profits, started to cut down 
trees for the hard to reach nuts.
109
 In 1841, it was reported that four or five ships came to San 
Andrés each year in search of coconuts.
110
 That same year slavery ended on Corn Island and the 
inhabitants also shifted from cotton to coconut agriculture.
111
 Coconut production grew similarly 
in Ambergris Cay (Belize) and the Bay Islands (Honduras).
112
  
By the late nineteenth century, a coconut boom had overtaken San Andrés. In 1873, a US 
commercial agent described San Andrés as a coconut island.
113
 Alfred Tremble, an American 
writer, traveled to San Andrés in 1877 and deemed it ―the greatest cocoanut-producing island in 
the Caribbean, and from it almost all American fruit merchants, en gross, draw the greater part of 
their supplies of fruit.‖114 The coconut trade at San Andrés created a robust economy that was 
outdone in production and quality only by Cuban and San Blas coconut farmers.
115
 During the 
1880s, the United States and Great Britain sent nearly 100 ships to the port of San Andrés 
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annually in search of coconuts and about twelve Americans traded solely in this product.
116
 By 
1900, San Andrés had consolidated its position as a coconut-producing island. ―The whole 
[island] is covered with tropical vegetation, consisting chiefly of coconut trees. The nuts from 
these trees constitute the chief wealth of the island,‖ reported an American missionary.117   
The cultivation of coconuts was a relatively simple process. After clearing and preparing 
the land, farmers planted the seedlings and waited between six and eight years for the trees to 
reach full maturity. At that point, a tree bears anywhere from 80 to 150 nuts per year.
118
 On San 
Andrés and other coconut enclaves in the Caribbean, younger, agile men climbed the trees with a 
knife in hand and made ―the thump, thump, thump of the fruit tree, as it was severed from the 
parent stem and fell into the sand.‖119 Some coconut exporters considered this method 
―undoubtedly the best‖ for picking coconuts. ―The native climbs the tree, supported at the waist 
by a rope loop, which leaves both hands free to pick the nuts, and, at the same time, it enables 
him to remove the moss and lichen from the tree.‖ A good coconut picker gathered ―as many as 
1200 a day.‖120  
Both men and women husked and loaded coconuts. ―Before them, between their legs, 
was an instrument, simply a piece of iron, perhaps nine inches long, slightly sharpened at the 
edge, and inserted firmly in a vertical position in a block of wood. Raising the nut with both 
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hands, a single blow on this primitive instrument penetrates the husk to the hard shell, which a 
dexterous twist then lays bare.‖ Other times, islanders drove ―a pointed stake into the end of the 
nut by which it is attached to the tree‖ and split the husk into halves and out appeared the nut.121 
It was not uncommon to find young boys and women carrying loads of coconuts to the docks 
where the merchants stored the coconuts. Coconut industrialists applauded this Caribbean 
practice, which gave unripe coconuts an opportunity to mature in a cool shed for one to two 
months.
122
The coconut trade consisted mostly of smallholders and several large landowners who 
sold their coconuts to US and British traders, who in turn scoured the circum-Caribbean for 
coconuts to sell to companies in Baltimore and New York. By 1900, several of these North 
American merchant-traders took up residence at San Andrés. Fred Wright, John A. Matheson, 
and the Bradley brothers (Ambrose and Henry) collected and stored the coconuts in warehouses 
located in the nearby cays before sending them to Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York. These 
men represented retail firms in the United States.
123
 Dropping off cargos of coconuts at US ports, 
they returned to San Andrés with imported goods like liquor, foodstuff, furniture, and other 
household items.
124
 
With the introduction of coconuts, power dynamics shifted somewhat between former 
masters and slaves as some ex-slaves and their families managed to achieve economic 
independence and a comfortable existence. In 1873, US Commercial Agent Philip Beekman 
Livingston Jr. reported that ex-slaves had benefited greatly from the coconut trade. ―Their houses 
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are all shingled, boarded round and painted, much nicer and more expensive than were their 
owners‘ houses.‖ They also had the cash to buy ―broadcloths, muslins, costly, and fashionable 
dresses and hats.‖ In stark contrast, the children of their former white and colored masters ―had 
to beg and wait as well as pray to get their coconuts prepared for shipment, being obliged to 
carry loads on their heads and do all kinds of work themselves.‖125 Four years later, a North 
American visitor made a similar observation. San Andrés islanders, ―without exception people of 
color…have in the course of years, thanks to the productiveness of their cocoanut walks, 
become, beyond a doubt, the wealthiest community among the smaller islands of the Caribbean.‖ 
He added, ―They have kept adding to their accumulations year by year, until the island is literally 
a mine of coined gold.‖126  
This depiction of ex slaves and their children as beneficiaries of the coconut industry was 
short-lived. In 1877, white and colored landowners succeeded in preventing an emancipated 
black from acquiring a desirable piece of land in the sector of Orange Hill. A bloody altercation 
ensued, leaving the man dead and his son fleeing to Costa Rica, never to return to San Andrés. 
The property he intended to purchase was eventually sold to Philip Livingston.
127
 Thereafter, 
white and colored elites colluded to thwart the economic advance of black islanders and to 
monopolize opportunities for landownership.
128
  
Most San Andrés islanders were smallholders who had to divide their meager properties 
between provision grounds and a few coconut trees. In contrast, larger landowners possessed 
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extensive pieces of land, known as coconut walks, almost entirely covered with trees. The money 
that smallholders received for their nuts was sometimes insufficient for their needs, leading them 
to rely on island shopkeepers for credit.
129
 Landless islanders obtained work cutting, husking, 
and transporting coconuts to the docks.
130
 In the 1860s, a day worker usually received 50 cents 
per day; by comparison, a sailor earned one peso.
131
  
San Andrés‘s larger landowners received between $25 and $36 per thousand from US 
merchants before the turn of the twentieth century.
132
 The same coconuts sold for $50 to $100 
per thousand in the United States, depending on their quality.
133
 By 1912, San Andrés coconut 
growers regularly received $20 per thousand and the going rate in New York was between $30 
and $40.
134
   
2.7 SOCIAL RELATIONS ON SAN ANDRÉS AND PROVIDENCE 
By the late 1800s, San Andrés and Providence were noticeably stratified in terms of 
color, class, culture, and gender. The elite on both islands consisted mostly of colored sea 
captains of small trading and turtle vessels, landowners of large coconut walks, and merchant-
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traders. These merchant-traders also served as middlemen, selling coconuts, turtle shell, and 
other raw materials to North American and Jamaican traders in exchange for goods that in turn 
they sold to local consumers. They maintained a vibrant regional trade with English-speaking 
settlements along the Mosquito Coast as well as Jamaica, the Cayman Islands, and the United 
States. The rest of the inhabitants were mostly black smallholders who earned cash from selling 
coconuts and other agricultural crops, as well as turtle fishing. While these economic activities 
afforded them some protection against labor coercion, most islanders found themselves indebted 
to the elite sector that controlled the terms of commerce. 
Broadly speaking, the elites were composed of descendants of the leading white and 
colored families who settled on the island in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
On San Andrés, these families included the Bents, Bowies, Corpuses, Forbes, Livingstons, and 
Mays; on Providence, it was the Archbolds, Newballs, Robinsons, and Howards.
135
 While some 
familes had formed strategic unions by marrying across racial lines, others kept strict codes of 
color segregation. In 1810s, American trader Jacob Dunham observed bad feelings between the 
white and free colored residents on San Andrés, noting that white islanders took great pain to 
keep social events segregated. None of the colored families had been invited to a ball ―except an 
old man, by the name of Bent, the wealthiest man on the Island, owning about ninety slaves, 
whom the whites dare not overlook.‖136 These racial tensions remained in post-emancipation San 
Andrés. In 1862, white residents strongly criticized Philip Beekman Livingston Jr., the Baptist 
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minister, for marrying Josephine Pomare, a black woman who had served as domestic servant 
and caretaker to Livingston‘s first wife until the latter‘s death three years earlier.137  
This color schism among the elite sector persisted into the twentieth century. In 1915, 
San Andrés physician Zelotes Pusey was distraught when Florence Robinson, a member of an 
affluent colored family, rejected his offer of marriage because of her family‘s disapproval of his 
dark skin color. Pusey eventually snapped and shot and killed Florence as well as her father, 
Captain Tim Robinson.
138
 In the 1940s and 1950s, colored and so-called white elites made every 
effort to separate themselves from black islanders at public events. Prior to such gatherings, elite 
young women arranged with their male cousins and friends to be chosen as dance partners in the 
event that black, non-elite boys attempted to ask them for a dance.
139
 Similar social exclusion 
occurred on Providence Island. In preparation for private parties, elite families passed around an 
invitation list requesting the agreement of all potential attendees before confirming the event. 
This act allowed prominent islanders to exclude from the inner circle of elites upwardly mobile 
islanders deemed undesirable.
140
  
Elite islanders accumulated wealth through their participation in the coconut industry, 
seafaring, and professional careers. As one of the largest landowners on San Andrés, David L. 
May used his earnings to send his son Arthur to the Tuskegee Institute in the United States. 
Arthur returned to the island and opened one of the largest merchant houses transporting 
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coconuts and other exports, and selling imported goods on San Andrés.
141
 David L. May also had 
a daughter named Sarah who married Milciades P. Martínez, the son of Polídoro Martínez and 
Rebecca Bowie. This union joined together two of the largest landowning families on San 
Andrés in that period.
142
  
The largest landowner on Providence was Captain Frederick Robinson, who murdered a 
man in order to get his property and was imprisoned in Cartagena for a number of years. In 
addition to his extensive landholdings, he also owned several schooners and transported cargo to 
neighboring ports.
143
 Robinson‘s wealth extended to members of his family. His brother Tim 
resided on San Andrés and was also quite affluent. ―He had over 100 acres of coconut plantation 
that his wife, Jane Bowie, inherited, he had his own boat, he sold provisions, he was president of 
the municipal council, and his brother Frederick Robinson was the richest person in Old 
Providence,‖ one islander explained.144  
Caribbean and North American immigrants also entered the ranks of the upper echelon as 
shopkeepers, sea captains, and merchant-traders. In several cases, marital ties with established 
families solidified their position. Alexander Abrahams, a Jamaican Jew, arrived in the 1850s and 
formed an important alliance through his marriage with Catherine Bernard, a daughter of a 
wealthy Afro-Caribbean landowner.
145
 His literacy and fluency in Spanish and English enabled 
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him to take on government jobs and, later, he accumulated wealth from his wife‘s property. 
Isidore E. Rubenstein, a Russian-American Jew, and his son Luís became the owners of the most 
important merchant house on San Andrés. Called the Stanco, it was stocked with American 
books, clothes, food, and other goods.
146
 Rubenstein earned much of his wealth through 
extending credit to islanders who mortgaged their properties to him. He quickly became a large 
property owner.
147
 Mr. Rubenstein had a reputation for his charity, including occasional 
donations to First Baptist Church.
148
 Finally, brothers and merchants Ambrose and Henry 
Bradley, and William and John A. Matheson became prominent San Andrés residents.
149
 San 
Andrés smallholders occasionally lashed out at these foreign merchant-traders who benefited 
most from the export trade in coconuts.
150
 
Especially on San Andrés, island elites adopted cultural behavior and values that sought 
to distinguish them from the majority of islanders. They took great pride in speaking standard 
English; elites never spoke Creole to each other or with foreigners.
151
 The island elite assumed, 
correctly, that North American visitors disliked the localized language. During the 1840s, North 
American Charles Bell spent his childhood in Bluefields and wrote disparagingly about the 
Creolized language they spoke. ―It was a jargon of English, which left to itself, would soon have 
become a distinct language. As a boy I learned it in no time, and for years after my sister had a 
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hard task in bringing me back to pure English.‖152 Colombian visitors also characterized Creole 
as broken or ―corrupted‖ English.153 Accordingly, elite islanders took great measures to ensure 
that their children learned standard English and received an American or British education. The 
wealthiest families sent their children to schools in Jamaica and a few attended colleges in the 
United States such as Tuskegee, Howard, and Fiske.
154
 The coconut trade was indeed generous 
to a number of San Andrés and Providence islanders. 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
By the end of the nineteenth century, San Andrés and Providence had witnessed profound 
changes. Slavery had ended. Former masters and slaves struggled to find new ways of dealing 
and interacting with each other. Emancipated blacks sought out labor situations suitable to their 
needs, which infuriated former slave owners. While the introduction of coconut agriculture 
opened up avenues of social mobility previously closed to former slaves, San Andrés elites 
refused to allow emancipated blacks to benefit from this fledgling economy and targeted black 
smallholders and the landless poor. By the twentieth century, San Andrés elites, most of whom 
were colored, had consolidated their control over the coconut industry and succeeded in 
thwarting black islanders‘ attempts to acquire an independent livelihood.  
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Beyond these restrictions, the coconut industry solidified islanders‘ commercial ties with 
the British Caribbean and introduced them to North American markets. Their contact with US 
traders also elevated them into a small yet profitable coconut enclave. Yet in spite of these social 
and economical changes, islanders were still governed by officials seemingly uninterested in 
their concerns or wellbeing. In the years to come, island elites pondered how to achieve political 
influence consonant with their social and economic position. 
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3.0        THE PROVINCE OF PROVIDENCE, 1887-1912 
From 1887 to 1912, the islands of San Andrés and Providence were administered by the 
Department of Bolívar, with its capital in Cartagena. During those years, islanders repeatedly 
complained to federal authorities in Bogotá about the abuses and malfeasance of departmental 
administrators. When Panama seceded from Colombia in 1903, some islanders pushed for the 
archipelago to do the same. Those proposals were ultimately rejected; but in the years 1903 to 
1912, elite islanders continued to complain and agitate against departmental rule. They drafted 
and distributed community petitions as well as wrote and published editorials demanding a 
change in government. In doing so, island elites participated in the national debates over the 
future of these Caribbean islands.  
 Those debates were prompted by the Colombian government‘s fears of losing the islands 
just as they lost Panama. Given their proximity to Caribbean ports and the Panama Canal, the 
islands became viewed as a strategic territory. As part of a larger project of securing national 
borders and rebuilding the Colombian nation, during the first decade of the 1900s politicians and 
the federal government became increasingly concerned with the islands. That concern provided 
islanders with a political opening, which they did not hesitate to seize, to escape departmental 
rule and obtain direct access to the federal government in Bogotá. Petitions, appeals, and claims-
making by island elites played a central role in that process.   
 49 
3.1     DEPARTMENTAL RULE 
In the 1880s, Conservatives and Independent Liberals united to counteract the federalist policies 
promoted in previous decades by Liberal politicians. Their criticisms centered on the weakening 
of the executive branch and worries that federalism granted too much power to regional elites.
155
 
This rising opposition culminated in a transfer of power to a coalition led by Rafael Núñez, 
which proceeded to enact a program of reforms known collectively as the ―Regeneración‖. This 
program focused on administrative centralization, capitalist modernization, a strong presidency, 
and a renewed alliance between the state and the Catholic Church. In addition, proponents such 
as Miguel Antonio Caro promoted a Colombian national identity based on Hispanic culture, 
Spanish language, and moral and Catholic teachings.
156
 
This program was realized in the Constitution of 1886, the central objective of which was 
to ―guarantee order in the country.‖157 It extended the presidential term to six years and granted 
presidents the right to appoint governors, who in turn selected the mayors. The constitution thus 
sought to reduce the power of regional elites and strengthen that of the central government. 
States were renamed and called departments. These new territorial units retained some taxes; 
others passed to the central government under a new elective administrative branch called the 
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Departmental Assembly. The constitution also limited individual rights, censored the press, 
reinstated the death penalty, and restricted voting rights to propertied and literate men.
158
  
The 1886 Constitution returned island administration to the Department of Bolívar, with 
its capital in Cartagena.
159
 Island elites initially welcomed their new departmental administrators. 
On January 23, 1887, San Andrés municipal councilmen praised President Rafael Núñez and the 
departmental authorities, who they hoped would guarantee their ―constitutional rights‖ in the 
―interest of citizens.‖160 The governor of Bolívar converted the territory of San Andrés and 
Providence into the Province of Providence, composed of three districts: San Andrés, San Luís, 
and Providence, with San Andrés as the capital, located near the principal port of San Luís.
161
 
Initially, the province only had a few administrators which included a prefect, an official 
interpreter, and a portero.
162
 A year later, the prefecture grew to include additional officials: a 
circuit judge and his secretary, two municipal judges, two public notaries, two schoolteachers, a 
fiscal agent, tax collectors, an alcalde, and a corregidor.
163
 The police force consisted of four 
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officers.
164
 The districts of San Andrés and Providence each had a municipal council made of 
five elected members to manage local issues such as roadway repair and public works.
165
  
In 1890 Prefect Juan C. Ramírez in his annual report offered insight into public 
administration on the islands. He called his superiors‘ attention to the fact that the islands‘ 3,000 
inhabitants were English-speaking Protestants and urged the government to take the necessary 
steps to incorporate them into the nation. ―It can be said that these people are foreigners in their 
[own] country‖, stressed Ramírez. ―These circumstances‖, he explained, ―in addition to the 
commercial ties that they have with the United States, easily explain the desire they have to 
belong to that nation. Only by force do they accept the title Colombian.‖166 Colombian 
cartographer Francisco Vergara had documented similar attitudes two years earlier. The 
islanders‘ ―ambition is to call themselves British subjects or American citizens and not 
Colombians, since they believe these countries would offer them a better government and more 
effective protection.‖167  
Ramírez informed his superiors that departmental officials were trying to eradicate these 
ethnic differences. They had opened a public school in the district of San Andrés but were unable 
to find competent English-speaking teachers. For this reason, many departmental officials in 
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Cartagena mistakenly believed no schools existed in San Andrés and Providence. Ramírez 
corrected them. There were ten private schools, one of which was the primary school at First 
Baptist Church administered by a ―competent Jamaican‖ and enrolling some 50 island boys and 
girls.
168
 Prefect Ramírez explained that these schools taught neither ―our language nor our 
religion nor our history.‖169 He believed that the issue of public schools contributed to the 
antipathy islanders felt toward local officials.  
There were few tangible indications of departmental authority on San Andrés and 
Providence. There was a total of eight office buildings, all made of wood at an estimated value of 
two thousand pesos. The department rented offices for the provincial government and the circuit 
court. The local administration did not even have a jail and had to lease ―a small wooden house 
only ten feet long by five feet wide.‖ Consequently, Ramírez requested that the departmental 
assembly allocate funds to purchase an office building. Two roadways facilitated communication 
among the different island settlements, as well as two ―magnificent ports‖ visited regularly by 
foreign ships.
170
 
Examining the problems associated with the administration of San Andrés and 
Providence, Ramírez urged his superiors to reconsider his 1888 proposal to transfer the islands to 
another department. The impoverished islanders tended to emigrate elsewhere in search of better 
employment opportunities, and produced too little revenue to cover the expenses of the 
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administration. The Department of Panama, Ramírez suggested, should administer the islands. 
Besides stressing the physical proximity, he argued that Panamanians were more familiar with 
commercial transactions involving the United States and other countries in the circum-
Caribbean. Ramírez pointed out that they even used the same money, most likely US currency 
that circulated in Panama and San Andrés at that time. ―The special laws that govern that 
department are more in line with the needs of this region.‖ The Department of Bolívar, 
moreover, had difficulties even maintaining regular contact with the islands via a postal 
service.
171
 Nevertheless, departmental officials in Cartagena did not pursue Ramirez‘s proposal.  
The problems Ramírez raised in his 1890 report continued to plague departmental 
administrators. Fiscal penury, poor communications, inadequate schools, and a cultural rift 
between mainland officials and islanders characterized public life in the years from 1890 to 
1910. A sparse written record has concealed much about these years of departmental rule. It is 
clear, however, that administrative deficiencies worsened in the aftermath of a hurricane that 
devastated San Andrés in October 1908. The storm destroyed one hundred homes and about a 
million palm trees and coconuts, the principal wealth of the island. Maximiliano Vélez, a former 
prefect and resident, estimated that seventy percent of the palm trees were completely destroyed, 
representing a loss of two hundred thousand pesos in gold.
172
 This natural disaster impoverished 
many San Andrés farmers and landowners, who sought refuge and charity from their neighbors. 
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On behalf of the island population, Vélez requested that the Department of Bolívar send disaster 
relief funds and suspend the export tax on coconuts.  
The first measure, he said, would show the islanders that departmental officials cared for 
their welfare. ―Because the inhabitants of this archipelago differ from us in their religion, 
language, and customs, they believe that they cannot count on anything from the Colombian 
government,‖ wrote Vélez. ―That belief,‖ he explained was rooted in ―various petitions directed 
to [the Colombian] government in previous years referring to analogous cases that have never 
been answered.‖ With regard to the suspension of the tax on coconuts, Vélez pointed out that the 
tax forced local producers to lower their prices considerably in order to compete in the 
international market. With a tax suspension, San Andrés farmers would have the opportunity to 
improve their livelihood and pull themselves out of debt.
173
 Governor Gerónimo Martínez 
informed President Rafael Reyes of the hurricane and requested that the federal government 
grant Vélez‘s request for disaster relief funds.174 In December 1908, President Reyes informed 
the Department of Bolívar that the central government agreed to send relief funds and to suspend 
the export tax for an undisclosed period of time.
175
  
Two years later, departmental authorities in Cartagena once again turned their attention 
toward the islands. Governor José María de la Vega appointed Eugenio Garnica, a former 
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general in the Thousand Days‘ War (1900-1903), as the new prefect and instructed him to 
conduct a thorough investigation of public administration and life on the islands. Garnica painted 
a gloomy portrait. There were no telegraphs or other forms of communication to connect the 
islands to the mainland. The postal service was unreliable. Barely any progress had been made 
toward public works.
176
 Roadways were in poor condition with limited funds to start or even to 
finish projects. The school lacked competent teachers, or even blackboards, tables, and chairs.
177
 
Governor de la Vega sought to address these issues and several others. On January 18, 
1910, he granted the request of Archbishop Adam Pedro Brioschi to allocate one hundred pesos 
in gold monthly to the Catholic mission on San Andrés and Providence supervised by an 
American missionary.
178
 The priest gratefully accepted the governor‘s generosity, since for years 
he had begged the local authorities to assist the apostolic mission to no avail.
179
 The governor 
also appointed a principal for the girls‘ school on San Andrés, though it is unclear whether the 
woman ever took up her responsibilities.
180
 Sanitation and hygiene issues were addressed by 
convening a Board of Public Health that included the prefect and two island residents.
181
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Most importantly, the governor raised taxes. On February 24, 1910, he increased the 
coconut export tax to $2.00 pesos in gold per thousand exported coconuts, with half the revenue 
devoted to public works and the other half to purchase an office building.
182
 The governor also 
raised import duties to twenty-five percent on all goods with the exception of tobacco, cigarettes, 
and liquor, which paid a fifty-percent tax.
183
 Some elite islanders praised the Department of 
Bolívar for showing interest in their welfare. The Board of Public Works in Providence 
commended Eugenio Garnica, who had assured the men that departmental authorities would 
address their concerns. Others, however, opposed the tax increase and began to mobilize in 
opposition.  
On March 1, 1911, Francis A. Newball entered the departmental assembly as an elected 
deputy for the islands of San Andrés and Providence.
184
 Never had the assembly hosted an 
islander representative. Gabriel O‘Byrne, editor of the Cartagena newspaper El Porvenir, 
sarcastically suggested that islanders had only voted for Newball because the other candidates 
were unknown.
185
 Newball came from a prominent Providence family with a long history of 
participating in local politics. His grandfather and father held posts as prefect and circuit judge in 
previous governments. Francis Newball had attended law school at the University of Cartagena 
and returned to work in various administrative positions in San Andrés. During the Thousand 
Days‘ War he served as the official interpreter, being paid fifty pesos in paper currency per 
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month.
186
 Later, he served as circuit judge on San Andrés and now, in 1911, as assembly deputy 
for San Andrés and Providence.  
At the assembly sessions, Newball carried a heavy burden. His mission was to advocate 
for policies that favored islanders. Of all the issues pertaining to the islands, Newball argued 
most fiercely for a reduction on the export tax on coconuts. Before the hurricane of 1908, the 
island of San Andrés exported between twelve and fourteen million coconuts annually.
187
 By 
1911, exports had fallen to eight million per year.
188
 San Andrés exporters and farmers believed 
the tax adversely impacted their position in an increasingly competitive international coconut 
market.
189
  
The assembly debate over taxation on coconuts caught the attention of assembly 
president and soon-to-be senator Lácides Segovia, who used his own newspaper, La Época, to 
cover the debate. He supported Newball‘s efforts to suspend the export tax, which Segovia called 
illegal and arbitrarily imposed. He contended that the tax on coconuts came out of a national 
decree to raise funds for the Thousand Days‘ War, which was then annulled by Law 30 of 1903. 
Article six of Law 30 stated that, with the exception of cattle, pigs, tagua, and forest products, no 
product could be taxed for either national or departmental revenue. The departmental governor 
had ignored this legislation and in departmental Decree 15, on October 22, 1903, had imposed a 
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tax of $1.00 silver per thousand coconuts exported from the Province of Providence. Segovia 
contended that this measure was illegal.
190
 
Newball partially succeeded. The departmental assembly tabled the discussion of the 
coconut export tax but shortly thereafter reduced the tax from $2.00 to $0.60 in silver per 
thousand coconuts. The assembly also approved measures to open additional schools on the 
islands and to provide scholarships to island youth to study in mainland Colombia.
191
 There were 
also proposals to improve the postal service and public roads.
192
 Yet several months later, San 
Andrés and Providence islanders were still waiting for funds to implement these measures.
193
   
Meanwhile, departmental officials in Cartagena continued to impose new taxes on the 
island population. Only a few months after the assembly sessions ended, Germán Amador 
arrived as the province‘s new financial administrator and informed residents that the commercial 
duty on imported goods had been increased. A correspondent for El Porvenir reported that every 
man, woman, and child was ready to sign a petition begging the central government to remove 
them from the Department of Bolívar.
194
 Some islanders even boycotted local shops in response 
to the duty imposed on them.
195
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On October 10, 1911, Governor Rafael D. Calvo increased the tax on coconuts to $2.00 
gold per thousand, further enraging San Andrés merchants and farmers. Most egregious to 
islanders was that the departmental governor demanded that the increase be applied immediately. 
This measure destroyed any remnant of trust elite islanders had in the Department of Bolívar, 
and they began to look for ways to remove the islands from departmental rule.  
3.2 FEDERAL INTERVENTION 
At that very moment, after decades of bipartisan conflict the country‘s two principal political 
parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals, were reconciling and beginning to focus on their 
shattered nation. Leading them in this effort was President Carlos E. Restrepo, a Conservative, 
elected by the Colombian Congress in 1910. His agenda focused on rebuilding the economy, 
reaffirming Colombian nationalism, securing national borders, and incorporating frontier 
populations, such as the San Andrés and Providence islanders.
196
  
The presence of the United States in the circum-Caribbean increasingly alarmed federal 
authorities. In 1903 the United States had forcibly removed Panama from Colombia and, the 
following year, started construction of the inter-oceanic canal. American companies and 
individuals were also investing heavily in Colombia, which had not gone unnoticed by 
embittered Colombians. A growing number of Colombians, increasingly resentful of US political 
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and economic power, lashed out against political and religious figures seemingly in favor of the 
United States government.
197
 A concern for national security coincided with a change of 
government in Bogotá, which propelled federal interest in strengthening Colombia‘s economic, 
political, and military presence in the Caribbean.
198
  
Responding to these concerns, President Restrepo sent his nephew, Pedro Pablo Restrepo, 
and a fiscal administrator to San Andrés and Providence to gather information about the political 
situation on the islands. After five months of investigation, Restrepo presented a disturbing 
report on departmental rule in San Andrés and Providence. He described the political situation as 
dangerous.
199
 This was partly due to the corrupt departmental authorities, who were more 
interested in filling their own pockets than in public administration. ―San Andrés has been 
exploited in a cruel and barbaric manner for some time by authorities.‖200 For decades, Bolívar 
officials Maximiliano E. Vélez, Juan Arias, and Héctor Brid, acting as ―caciques,‖ had controlled 
the positions of prefect, secretary, and fiscal administrator. They alternated in these three 
positions and retained government power in their hands. This arrangement was left undisturbed 
by new arrivals Eugenio Garnica and later, Rafael de H. Morales, who came to replace them as 
prefects. The newly-appointed officials joined Vélez, Brid, and Arias in their corrupt 
                                                 
197
 In early 1910, a hostile mob attacked former minister to the United States, Enrique Cortés, and his wife in 
Barranquilla. That same year, a mob stoned an American school in Bogotá and the U.S. legation. See Stephen J. 
Randall, Colombia and the United States: Hegemony and Interdependence (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
1992), 91. In December 1910, Archbishop Adam Brioschi of Cartagena also was driven out of the city when an 
angry mob attacked him after he sold church property to Americans. See Román Vega Cantor, Gente muy rebelde, 
vol. 3, Mujeres, artesanos y protestas cívicas (Bogotá: Ediciones Pensamiento Crítico, 2002), 18-19.  
 
198
 Eastman Arango, ―Creación de la Intendencia.‖ 
  
199
 Pedro Pablo Restrepo to President Carlos E Restrepo, 25 August 1910, in Colombia, AGN, MG, SP, T. 650, 
F.238.  
 
200
  ―San Andres ha sido desde tiempo explotado por sus autoridades de una manera cruel y bárbara.‖ Ibid. 
 
 61 
activities.
201
 The consolidation of state power in the hands of a few officials allowed them to hire 
and to fire employees at will.  
A few months earlier, Salustiano Ramírez and Germán Restrepo, former coast guards on 
San Andrés, had submitted complaints about these departmental authorities to Governor José de 
la Vega. In their complaints, Restrepo and Ramírez accused departmental authorities of 
introducing contraband goods and committing other arbitrary acts. These former employees 
claimed to have been fired after refusing to participate in the illicit trade.
202
 ―Here one sees 
things that do not happen in any other part of the Republic,‖ wrote Restrepo concerning the 
activities of departmental authorities.
203
 Ramírez pointed out that the departmental employees 
who replaced himself and Restrepo had previously served as coastguards and were allies of 
Vélez, Brid, and Arias, who ―need them to facilitate the contraband trade.‖204 
Possible alliances between departmental authorities and U.S. residents on San Andrés 
also alarmed Pedro Restrepo. He suggested that departmental officials received bribes from U.S. 
merchants such as Henry and Ambrose Bradley, William and John Matheson, and Isidore E. 
Rubenstein and his son. Restrepo informed the president of leases that permitted North American 
residents to rent nearby cays for 20-year periods, paying only eight pesos annually.
205
 Vélez, 
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Brid, and their cronies were able to commit these acts because they received support from higher 
authorities in Cartagena. Governor José de la Vega, for instance, was a relative of both, and 
Lácides Segovia included them in his patronage circle.
206
 Governor de la Vega denied these 
allegations, said that he also found the leases with the U.S. residents outrageous, and called for 
their immediate nullification.
207
 
Restrepo noted frustration on the part of islanders, too. Disgusted by departmental 
authorities, the municipal council of Providence abstained from participating in the election for a 
deputy to represent them at the departmental assembly in Cartagena. The councilmen explained 
that the Colombian government appointed officials who only sought to deplete their scarce riches 
and demanded islanders‘ votes upon arrival. The San Andrés municipal council members only 
participated in the election because public employees held four of the five council seats.
208
  
Restrepo confided to the president that Colombia might lose the islands to another 
country.  ―Today one speaks with uncertainty in Colón, Panama, of these islands becoming a part 
of what the Americans and Nicaraguans call the ‗New Nicaragua,‘ or to say, the entire Atlantic 
littoral of those Republics and their neighboring islands,‖ he reported.209 The following year, a 
Jamaican newspaper reported the United States government‘s interest in securing the islands of 
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San Andrés and Providence as a coaling station, given their proximity to Panama.
210
 There were 
also reports that Japan was interested in the islands.
211
  
Even more distressing was the knowledge that there were islanders who desired to form 
part of another nation and had already tried to make this happen. In November 1903, a group of 
disgruntled islanders sent a petition to the provisional Panamanian government asking them to 
annex the islands of San Andrés and Providence.
212
 A commission arrived on the US gunboat 
Nashville to meet with islanders regarding their separating from Colombia. In the end, a 
committee of a few prominent islanders and mainland residents agreed to stay loyal to 
Colombia.
213
 Eugenio Garnica reported that islanders feared the treatment they would receive 
under racist North Americans.
214
 Despite the committee‘s refusal to join Panama, local officials 
alerted their superiors of the situation on the island, who sent an occupation force of some five 
hundred men to protect the island from any foreign incursions.
215
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Fearing the possible loss of the islands, President Restrepo decided to remove the 
territory from the Department of Bolívar. The next year, the Minister of Government, Pedro 
María Carreño, introduced a bill in Congress to create a new administrative status for the 
Caribbean islands, an intendancy to be governed directly by federal authorities. Discussion of the 
bill was postponed to the following year after representatives from the Department of Bolívar 
vigorously attacked the project.
216
 Meanwhile, the Restrepo administration prepared to send 
another commission to collect a more detailed report on San Andrés and Providence, which 
would be used to assist them in governing the island territory.  
On November 27, 1911, President Carlos Restrepo appointed Santiago Guerrero to take 
the national census of San Andrés and Providence.
217
 Guerrero was probably chosen for this 
position because he had previously served as a port inspector at San Andrés in 1909; very few 
officials in Bogotá had ever traveled to the faraway islands.
218
 Guerrero was also instructed to 
thoroughly describe the economy, history, and society of San Andrés and Providence, a project 
last performed nearly a quarter of a century ago by Francisco Javier Vergara. Pedro Restrepo‘s 
1910 report had barely discussed the island population, focusing instead on the islands‘ acute 
administrative problems. Federal authorities in Bogotá needed to know more about the 
population they intended to govern.  
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Guerrero found islanders even more angry than usual with departmental authorities.
219
 
Several prominent islanders complained of the increased tax on coconuts and their general 
unhappiness with the Department of Bolívar. Departmental authorities oppressed them daily with 
new taxes from which the islanders received no benefits.
220
 Guerrero concluded that their anger 
was justified.
221
 His report confirmed Restrepo‘s earlier conclusions. No material progress had 
been made on the islands, and there was not even a cemetery to bury the dead.
222
 The public 
schools were in poor condition. There were only four, evenly divided between San Andrés and 
Providence and staffed by Jamaicans who spoke no Spanish and knew nothing of the history of 
Colombia.
223
 Postal service was infrequent and even official correspondence from Cartagena was 
frequently lost.
224
 
Guerrero also called attention to the U.S. residents living on the islands, whom he 
perceived as an ―imminent threat.‖225 American residents were increasingly acquiring property 
on the islands, he reported, which drew the United States government directly into Colombian 
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affairs.
226
 Like other Colombians in the 1910s, Guerrero viewed the United States as an 
imperialist threat to the sovereignty of Colombia.
227
 Given islanders‘ historical propensity for 
dealing with Americans, Guerrero believed he had reasons to worry. Baptist minister Thomas 
Livingston caused further alarm with his Protestant ―fanaticism‖ and close ties to the United 
States. Not only did Livingston have commercial relations with the United States, he also had an 
American wife. His influence extended far and wide; this troubled Guerrero.
228
  
After listening to islanders‘ complaints, Guerrero informed them that the government had 
already presented a project to Congress to create a new territorial administration for San Andrés 
and Providence, which would now be governed directly by federal authorities in Bogotá. The 
proposed project would reduce taxes, improve public works, create more schools, provide 
scholarships, and build a stronger Catholic mission.
229
 Islanders had heard nothing of this state 
project, which Guerrero attributed to departmental authorities‘ efforts to prevent discussions of 
removal of the islands from their jurisdiction. He cautioned those islanders he met with that the 
project had not yet been approved, but pointed out that the government had already created new 
federal administrations for Putumayo and Caquetá.
230
 Hearing this news prompted elites on San 
Andrés and Providence to draft petitions in support of federal authorities‘ efforts to remove them 
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from the Department of Bolívar. The Restrepo administration had offered them the opening they 
needed to transform their relationship with the Colombian state. 
3.3 ELITE MOBILIZATION 
San Andrés islanders swiftly responded to news of federal interest in removing their province 
from the Department of Bolívar. Two petitions, drafted only days apart, articulated islander 
grievances. On December 28, 1911, Baptist ministers Thomas B. Livingston and Felix A. 
Howard led nearly three hundred islanders in writing a petition to President Restrepo.
231
 
Reflecting the islands‘ close commercial ties and communication with the United States, 
Livingston sent this petition to the Colombian consul in New York and asked the consul to 
forward it to the president.
232
 Fearing that it might not arrive, on January 4, 1912, islanders wrote 
another petition, with 250 signatures.
233
  
In both petitions, islanders claimed that departmental authorities cared little for the 
material progress of the islands. Poor roadways and infrequent postal service greatly concerned 
islanders. ―It is more than half of a century since we have opened up a system of parochial roads, 
and as a matter of fact, there have been absolutely no improvements made on them in all that 
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time, save by voluntary work of natives,‖ wrote the petitioners in Spanish.234 Roadways were so 
badly paved that islanders still traveled around the island mostly by schooners. Mail arrived from 
mainland Colombia infrequently, even though the departmental government routinely awarded 
mail contracts. ―We are so isolated with respect to the rest of the country … on various occasions 
the mail has been late in coming by six months,‖ they protested.235  
These situations embarrassed elite islanders, who ―had enjoyed cultural advantages 
abroad‖ and found it ―an awful thing to have to admit to any friend of another country such a 
condition as obtaining in the land of your nativity.‖236 Most troubling was the inadequate and 
insufficient number of public schools on the islands. ―We leave it to you to determine, according 
to your estimate of the percentage of youths, as to whether two small schools having buildings 
with a capacity for seating two hundred children, and with very poor facilities, at that, are 
enough; besides, we say, add that these have been in operation but three years, respectively,‖ 
they wrote. These schools were supervised by poorly qualified school teachers who did not even 
know the Spanish language.
237
  
The petitions also spoke of the elite islanders‘ concerns about taxation. The 1908 
hurricane worsened the economic conditions of the islands and provoked elite islanders to resent 
departmental attempts to exact taxes. They pointed to the export tax, which was applied too 
harshly. ―It does seem as if rather than encourage ‗Home Production,‘ they depreciate it, for the 
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present ‗Tariff‘…seems more favourable to ‗Import‘ than to ‗Export‘ duty, although itself is 
exorbitant, being 25%,‖ wrote the petitioners.238  
Islanders warned the national government not to ignore their pleas for help again, 
informing President Restrepo that they had previously sent two petitions through their deceased 
leader, Reverend Brockholst Livingston. ―Your Excellency … be it known to you that we are 
weary of this present government over us, and we will have to take steps ourselves to gain 
Freedom from this yoke of Oppression, should you ignore our Petition and not help us; as much 
as we would deplore such action.‖239 This statement appeared as a veiled threat to secede and 
possibly join Panama, largely controlled by the United States.  
That same year, a frustrated Francis A. Newball created the archipelago‘s first 
newspaper, The Searchlight, to open a public forum to discuss the future of the islands.
240
 
Publishing articles, editorials, and letters to the editor in English and Spanish, he invited all 
residents, including departmental authorities, to participate in the public forum. ―In establishing 
this Journal, our principal aim is to seek for the betterment of this archipelago, our native land. 
We shall attack all official acts which may be executed in detriment of the constitutional and 
legal rights of the islanders, whether said acts be of a national, departmental, or local 
character.‖241  
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In the inaugural issue, Newball attacked the governance of the Department of Bolívar and 
called for the creation of a national intendancy. He bemoaned that ―our people have been 
deprived, from time to time, of various rights and privileges of the Republic, by the arbitrary 
rulers of the Department of Bolívar, of which we are an integral part.‖ He repeated grievances 
against departmental authorities similar to those presented in the two island petitions, and gave 
assurance that every islander held such opinions. ―These unjust measures have brought a general 
discontent, and we can say, without fear of incurring error, that every islander favors the 
movement made by the National Government to segregate these islands from the Department of 
Bolívar, with the object of converting them into a National Intendancy.‖242  
Prominent islanders applauded Newball on his publication, and more importantly, its 
impact on the social and political life of San Andrés and Providence islanders. Victor Abrahams 
praised Newball and encouraged all islanders to contribute to its success. ―We are in the days 
when a press is of a great social, political, and moral power, one so great that it cannot be 
overlooked by any individual who has the slightest desire for an improvement.‖243 Agnew 
Duffis, a Dutch Caribbean resident of San Andrés, viewed the creation of the publication as a 
step toward progress. ―In regard to your first issue, I was much delighted in getting its contents, 
and will say that it, in my poor opinion, means a betterment [sic] to us, the people of this isolated 
island, especially those who haven‘t the privilege of learning beyond this, our benighted 
shore.‖244 The municipal council of Providence affirmed Newball as a legitimate regional 
spokesperson. ―We shall say that we believe your expressions are the genuine sentiments of the 
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people of Providence,‖ the councilmen wrote.245 However, not every islander supported Francis 
Newball. In The Searchlight, Newball accused Simon Watson of encouraging islanders in his 
district not to purchase the newspaper.
246
  
Through his publication, Newball promoted and documented island mobilization against 
the Department of Bolívar.  In 1912, islanders elected officials to represent them in the municipal 
councils, spurred on by Newball, who advised islanders ―to give their votes only to prominent 
natives.‖247 Previous councils, especially on San Andrés, had had a significant number of former 
departmental authorities. These men failed to deliver. In taking back the municipal councils, 
islanders sought to wield more influence over public administration. It was the councilmen who 
directed funds to public works and primary schools. More importantly, the council elected a 
deputy to represent the islands at the departmental assembly sessions in Cartagena.  
Newball congratulated the newly elected council members as ―men [who] have the 
country‘s interests at heart, and will not allow themselves to be carried by the current.‖248 ―We 
trust that when called upon to defend the country‘s interest, they will know how to respond as 
genuine representatives of the people.‖249 Upon taking office, the councils refused to elect a 
deputy to participate in the departmental assembly. Since Francis Newball had been elected the 
previous year as a deputy to advocate for policies favoring the betterment of the islands, and 
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having seen no results, many island notables feared a repeat performance. ―We have resolved not 
to put in our appearance, thus proceeding in accordance with the desire of the majority of the 
people,‖ explained Newball. He predicted that the absence of an island deputy at the assembly 
session would not prevent departmental authorities in Cartagena from enacting policies on their 
behalf. Newball directed the community‘s attention to these departmental measures. ―If such a 
plan is adopted, we take the liberty of warning our country folks, regarding their mode of 
procedure, as in our opinion—that would only be an invitation similar to the one the spider made 
to the fly,‖ he wrote.250  
The councilmen drafted more petitions to the president, again requesting that the national 
government remove the islands from the Department of Bolívar.
251
 Echoing the sentiments 
expressed by islanders in earlier petitions, the municipal councils accused the departmental 
government of having neglected the welfare and progress of the island population in spite of ―the 
numerous quantities of American gold islanders had produced and invested in the departmental 
treasury.‖252 The councilmen emphatically insisted on the archipelago‘s transfer to the 
jurisdiction of the federal government.   
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3.4 REPERCUSSIONS 
Islanders‘ actions did not go unnoticed: several Cartagena newspapers ran articles challenging 
islanders‘ complaints and the idea of a national intendancy for the islands. A public debate 
ensued, focused largely on issues of political autonomy and the loss of financial resources, in 
particular, the allocation of bureaucratic posts and public money. In an effort to impede the 
intendancy project, officials and concerned residents in Cartagena framed the debate over 
whether or not San Andrés and Providence should become an intendancy as a crisis—another 
Panamanian secession. Several newspaper editorials suggested that a few disgruntled island 
notables were rousing trouble for departmental officials and blaming the latter for the islands‘ 
depressed economic condition. These pro-Bolívar advocates repeatedly evoked images of 
Panama by painting islanders‘ protest against Bolívar officials as reminiscent of the traitorous 
secessionists. These public debates intensified in the summer and fall of 1912 as Congress 
deliberated on the project.  
On January 27, 1912, Gabriel Porras Troconis, the editor of El Porvenir, alerted 
Cartagena residents and higher authorities that trouble was brewing on San Andrés. An unnamed 
correspondent, likely a local official, had informed him that there was a movement to transform 
the islands into a national intendancy to be governed by the central government in Bogotá. 
Although the informant insisted that the majority of islanders were content, he did note that a 
few notable islanders desired to live under ―an honest, just, and honorable government.‖ His 
source told Porras Troconis that a ―violent campaign‖ raged on the island ―against the entire 
coast, fomenting island hatred against the Atlantic littoral.‖ Porras Troconis claimed these 
instigators were the same individuals who had petitioned the newly-formed Panamanian 
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government to annex the islands in 1903. Moreover, the federal government had sent Santiago 
Guerrero, in the guise of a census taker, to garner support for its project to create a national 
intendancy for the islands. This news alarmed Porras Troconis, who called on authorities in 
Bogotá and Cartagena to pay attention and take action.
253
 
Bolívar official Gabriel Bustos Villareal stirred up more anxiety with his condemnation 
of island ―agitators‖ such as Francis Newball who held no ―patriotic sentiment‖ and sought to 
disturb the ―healthy principles‖ and ―moral order‖ that existed on the island. Villareal described 
Newball as a man of ―mediocre‖ skills who behaved as an ―absolute lord‖ over the majority of 
the population, which he believed was drifting dangerously toward anarchy. The final words of 
his editorial urged Congress not to approve the intendancy project.
254
 
Copies of Cartagena newspaper articles arrived on San Andrés and Providence, 
infuriating several islanders. Responding to El Porvenir‘s assertions that the majority of 
islanders were content with the Department of Bolívar, Francis Newball cited islander petitions 
as evidence of their desire for a new government. In the previous 25 years, the administration of 
Carlos E. Restrepo was the only government that ―has turned its eyes toward these islands, which 
form an integral part of the national territory, and has worried about their welfare.‖255 Newball 
did not, however, address nor explain earlier attempts by some San Andrés islanders to form a 
part of newly-independent Panama. On the contrary, he insisted that islanders were loyal 
Colombian citizens.  
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Two months later, Newball once again took up the issue of the national intendancy for 
the islands. ―Shall the islands be converted into a national territory, or shall they continue under 
the domain of the Department of Bolívar?‖ Newball reminded islanders that the Minister of 
Government had already presented the bill to Congress, which planned to vote on it on July 20. 
He reiterated why the project should be passed. Besides a reduction in taxes, the islanders 
demanded it. ―The change is fervently desired by the inhabitants, who have petitioned for it, 
giving irrefutable causes for their discontent with the State Government, and we do not see any 
reason that would justify a denial…Neither do we believe that the honorable Congressmen will 
obligate the people, after putting forth their grievances, to remain under the Departmental 
Government against their will. That would not be, at all, a wise policy, as it would probably 
bring bad results.‖256 
This editorial, with its strong language and insistence on an administrative transfer, 
angered elites in Cartagena. Carlos A. Capela, editor of El Caribe, accused Francis Newball of 
fomenting separation from the Republic of Colombia. He called on the Colombian Congress to 
draft a law to severely punish any act of treason against the country, including efforts to secede 
from Colombia. Capela wrote, ―If that law had existed and had punished those Panamanian 
journalists when, as in San Andrés, they formulated the dilemma of the Canal or separation, 
perhaps that idea would not have made headway among a good number of Panamanians, and 
Panama would not display this title of quasi-Republic.‖257 Gabriel Porras Troconis of El 
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Porvenir agreed with Capela that ―these islands are a problem that should be resolved prudently, 
because if one does not proceed in that way, we will lose them forever, perhaps, in a painful 
way.‖258 
Island elites denied allegations of disloyalty. Newball wrote, ―We have never yet 
conceived the idea of separating ourselves from our beloved country … the fact that we desire to 
be under the National Government is a conclusive proof that we want to continue forming a part 
of the Colombian territory.‖ He compared the islanders‘ desire to become a national intendancy 
with the desire of the Sabanalarga residents in the Department of Atlántico, who sought to join 
the Department of Bolívar. ―Can the sons of that city be considered antipatriotic for such an 
attitude?‖ He denied rumors of an island separatist movement by insisting that islanders had 
already emigrated to nearby countries, seeking better treatment.
259
 Oswald L. Robinson, a San 
Andrés islander, also refuted reports published in the Star & Herald, a Panamanian newspaper, 
that islanders were seeking annexation to the United States.
260
  
During the months preceding the congressional debates over the bill to create an 
intendancy, officials in Cartagena scrambled to garner islander support. At the beginning of the 
departmental assembly of 1912, Governor Rafael D. Calvo announced his intention to make an 
official visit to the islands to discuss their grievances. He offered to provide more frequent 
communication between the islands and the capital and pledged to find Spanish-speaking 
Catholic teachers to instruct islanders in the nation‘s language and religion. Most importantly, he 
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swore ―to foment a love for the great Fatherland through the most appropriate means.‖261 In June 
1912, Calvo appointed a new prefect, Gabriel Jiménez, who promised islanders that the 
departmental assembly planned to reduce the export tax on coconuts. Upon arrival, he noted that 
the majority of islanders favored the project to transform the islands into an intendancy. While 
there were ―some conscious of the autonomy the region will have…the others because they 
believe it would improve [their] life conditions due to a tax reduction of 50 percent.‖ Jiménez 
hoped a decrease in the export tax would win over the bulk of islanders and convince them to 
give up their demands for an administrative transfer.
262
  
Francis Newball was not impressed by these concessions undertaken ―with the object—
no doubt—of inducing the people to desist from their determination of having ‗a transfer.‘‖ In 
response, he encouraged the ―country folk‖ to stay on the path toward a new administrative 
status.
263
 In response to the prefect‘s allegation that islanders desired an intendancy because they 
believed it would result in lower taxes, Newball reiterated the reasons listed in the petitions that 
explained islanders‘ support for an intendancy.264  
Departmental officials tried unsuccessfully to intimidate and threaten island leaders, such 
as Baptist minister Thomas Livingston, who supported the bill.
265
 On Providence, Julius 
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Robinson and Cleveland Hawkins were removed from their positions as alcalde and school 
director on Providence after they publicly supported Francis Newball.
266
 These intimidation 
tactics did not stop islanders from pushing for the intendancy. It merely intensified their desire to 
rid the island of departmental administrators.  
In pursuing this goal, the municipal councils of San Andrés and Providence appointed 
Francis Newball to serve as their representative in the debates to take place in Bogotá.
267
 
Newball‘s presence was welcomed by federal authorities, as he shared with Bogotá newspapers 
the merits of the bill. He warded off attacks from Bolívar Congressman Manuel Dávila Flores, 
Senator Lácides Segovia and others who continued to argue that this would be disastrous for 
Colombia and the islands.  
In addition to comparing islanders‘ demands for an intendancy with Panama‘s secession 
in 1903, Bolívar officials charged that islanders were incapable of self-governance. Carlos 
Capela identified a lack of competent personnel and the physical distance between the islands 
and mainland Colombia as legitimate reasons why islanders could not ―enjoy administrative 
independence.‖268 The prefect of San Andrés and Providence shared similar fears and proposed 
that the Department of Bolívar retain veto power over the selection of officials on the islands and 
over the islands‘ administration.269 Departmental authorities also charged that the islands barely 
produced enough revenue to cover administrative costs. This raises the question of why 
departmental authorities sought to retain control over the islands.  
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There are three reasons why Bolívar officials opposed efforts to remove the islands from 
their jurisdiction. First, the islands‘ value rested in their strategic location near the Panama 
Canal. In August 1912, a reporter for a Cartagena newspaper wrote of the islands‘ importance to 
Bolívar not in terms of their ability to produce revenue but as an entry point to the Panama 
Canal, which he called ―the key to the world‘s commerce.‖270 The prefect of the islands agreed 
with the reporter‘s assessment of the archipelago‘s growing importance.271 Bolívar authorities 
anticipated that the archipelago might become a coaling station and thus generate some 
revenue.
272
  
Second, Bolívar officials feared that the transfer would result in a loss in bureaucratic 
jobs and patronage. In opposing the bill, Senator Lácides Segovia charged that it would give 
well-paid jobs to Bogotá officials at the expense of local administrators. He gave the example of 
the island postal service. The central government had appointed as postmaster Eduardo Guzmán 
Espinosa, a native of Bogotá, at a monthly salary of 150 pesos in gold. Why was a native of 
Bogotá appointed to this position? Segovia asked, replying ―those nearest to the tree that bears 
fruit, have the ability to raise their hands and take from the tree‖.273  
Segovia also feared that intendants from Bogotá would abuse their power. ―It could very 
well happen that the chiefs of police will turn into dictators because they find themselves with 
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guns in their hands, in remote regions‖, he predicted.274 Segovia also attempted to frighten his 
colleagues in the Senate with fears of a revolt like that in Panama. He recalled how incompetent 
officials from Bogotá had provoked Panamanians into declaring independence in 1903.
275
 Thus, 
Segovia borrowed tactics employed by Cartagena newspaper editors and departmental 
employees who frequently compared San Andrés and Providence islanders‘ support of the 
intendancy bill with Panamanians who sought independence from Colombia.  
Third, authorities in Bolívar and other departments wanted to curb the centralizing 
agenda of the national government. Lácides Segovia claimed the bill was unconstitutional 
because intendancies and comisarías, a smaller territorial unit, were basically the same. The 
national government designated intendancies, he claimed, as a way to separate ―portions of 
territory from the departments to give them [the inhabitants] a special government independent‖ 
of departmental authority.
276
 Segovia disliked the idea that federal authorities were willing to 
grant these miniscule islands a relatively autonomous government, arguing that the president and 
his cabinet should not raise the concerns of the island community over everyone else. ―The 
islanders feel hurt. I said it because I know,‖ declared the senator. Yet islander complaints were 
not sufficient grounds for the president to remove the islands from the Department of Bolívar, 
especially since Segovia was not convinced that the national government would do a better job 
governing the archipelago.  
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Segovia reminded the Senate that federal officials had governed the islands as a national 
territory in the 1870s and 1880s and had done a terrible job, much worse than the departmental 
prefects. It was during those years of federal administration, Segovia claimed, that islanders 
learned to distrust authorities coming from the mainland.
277
 He argued that federal officials in 
Bogotá were too far away to quickly address potential problems on the islands. ―Is it not true that 
one feels the administration‘s action fastest when the authority is closest?‖ Segovia asked the 
Senate.
278
 He also was not convinced that the central government had demonstrated its ability to 
effectively govern intendancies. Segovia cited the case of the Intendancy of the Chocó, where the 
federal government had sent ―some few employees and nothing more.‖ There were no public 
schools and administration remained precarious. Would this be the future of San Andrés and 
Providence under the jurisdiction of federal authorities?
279
 In an attempt to retain control over the 
islands, Segovia implored the national government to work alongside departmental 
administrators to improve conditions on the islands.  
The Congressional debates allowed Bolívar officials like Lácides Segovia an opportunity 
to make their case against the intendancy bill. Island elites also sought a voice in the debates. 
Recognizing the importance of having an island representative present for the deliberations in 
Bogotá, the municipal councils of San Andrés and Providence appointed Francis A. Newball to 
represent their interests and advocate for their support of the administrative transfer.
280
 Newball 
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eventually won his battle to remove the Department of Bolívar—with a bit of luck. In an 
interview done in the 1950s, he recalled that the federal government had almost lost its bid for 
the intendancy. During his visit to Bogotá, Newball received news from the minister of 
government that Flores and Segovia had asked José Vicente Concha, one of the most respected 
Conservative politicians, to speak on their behalf. Fortunately for Newball and the supporters of 
the intendancy, Concha‘s mother suddenly died, and he never gave an opposing speech on the 
Senate floor.
281
 Unable to garner sufficient support, the Department of Bolívar lost its fight 
against the bill, and President Carlos Restrepo authorized Law 52 of 1912, which created a 
national intendancy for the islands of San Andrés and Providence.
282
 
The Department of Bolívar initially refused to accept this decision. With the support of 
departmental Attorney General Ricardo Ochoa González, Senator Segovia appealed Law 52 to 
the Supreme Court.
283
 Ochoa González and Segovia contended that the 1886 Constitution did not 
authorize Congress to create the administrative entity of an intendancy, thereby making Law 52 
of 1912 unconstitutional.
284
 Newball fired back, announcing that islanders were ―also prepared to 
bring suits before the Court of Justice that will deeply affect the entity, as they are determined 
not to continue as slaves of the Cartagenians.‖285 When the Supreme Court upheld the 
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constitutionality of Law 52, Segovia bitterly concluded that ―the threats of the islanders have 
triumphed over justice.‖286 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
Fears of losing the islands of San Andrés and Providence to the United States, Panama, or 
Nicaragua led federal authorities to make the decision to take charge of the islands. By 1910, 
officials in Bogotá were collecting data and learning about the faraway archipelago. This 
growing federal presence spurred local mobilization on the part of elite islanders seeking to 
remove the islands from the Department of Bolívar. Through their letters, petitions, and 
editorials, these islanders reaffirmed their Colombian citizenship while expressing their 
displeasure at being ruled by departmental authorities. Bolívar officials were notoriously unable 
to deliver an efficient administration; corruption and patronage ran rampant. Under these 
conditions, why did islanders opt to remain part of Colombia? Why was independence 
apparently not seen as a viable option?   
The leading island figure, Francis Newball, campaigned to turn over the administration to 
the federal government because he believed that under federal rule he and other elite islanders 
would finally take over the local administration. In 1903, Newball had been involved in the 
deliberations over San Andrés joining Panamanian secessionists and had ultimately argued 
against secession. Educated in Cartagena, Newball was the son of a wealthy and politically 
influential family. Perhaps he was persuaded to remain a part of Colombia by fears of US racism. 
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Perhaps he felt his personal ambitions, and those of other island notables, were more likely to be 
realized under Colombian rule than US or Nicaraguan oversight. Whatever the reasons, Newball 
waited for an opening, which occurred in 1912, with the creation of the federal intendancy.  
 On January 1, 1913, the islands of San Andrés and Providence inaugurated their new 
administrative status as a national intendancy. Writing in The Searchlight, Francis Newball 
reported that the islanders viewed the intendancy as ―full of promises and hopes for the future,‖ 
as they sought ―to demonstrate to the outside world that in this remote corner of Colombian soil 
exists a people, that while being aloof from party struggles, only aspires to its aggrandizement 
through the pacific means that God has conceded to man to labor for his own welfare.‖287  
Reflecting the islanders‘ hopes and optimism, Reverend Thomas Livingston penned an island 
anthem.
288
 The islanders were hopeful that this new government would put an end to years of 
official neglect and malfeasance, restore them to economic prosperity and bring them a just 
government. Those hopes and expectations were not destined to be realized.   
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4.0 THE INTENDANCY, 1913-1930 
On January 1, 1913, San Andrés and Providence islands officially became a National Intendancy 
governed directly by the Ministry of Government. The islands‘ chief administrator, called an 
intendant, was appointed directly by the president for a renewable one-year term. His principal 
responsibility was to execute the nineteen articles listed in Law 52 of 1912. In addition, he was 
expected to turn islanders into proper Colombians: Spanish-speaking Catholics who would be 
obedient to the Colombian state.  
Between 1913 and 1930, intendants and other public officials struggled to alter the 
political, physical, and cultural landscape of San Andrés and Providence islands. Their results 
were mixed. The new administration sought to build an infrastructure that responded to former 
criticisms of federal and departmental neglect. Islanders witnessed the construction of wharfs, 
bridges, roadways, and public schools. The intendancy also attempted to facilitate better 
communications with mainland Colombia and foreign nations, especially beneficial to the island 
residents involved in foreign commerce. Nevertheless, that infrastructure proved difficult to 
maintain and depended on the stability of financial resources and good management. At times, 
the intendant had a difficult time recruiting qualified personnel or securing resources for 
necessary equipment. Moreover, intendants‘ efforts to impose political authority brought them 
into conflict with existing islander institutions and social networks. Intendancy officials found it 
difficult to maneuver through the crosscurrents of islander politics, which often threatened their 
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claims as federal authorities. In this chapter, I examine the programs and consequences of the 
Intendancy‘s agenda for San Andrés and Providence in the years 1913 to 1930, and the political 
struggles over that agenda. In doing so, I pay close attention to the multiple ways islanders 
constructed their Colombian citizenship.  
4.1 THE NATIONAL AGENDA 
The principal objective of the intendancy was to build an effective administrative structure, 
focusing on six objectives: collection of taxes, regulation of commerce, better communication 
with the mainland, development of infrastructure, public safety, and promotion of hygiene and 
sanitation. The intendants‘ ability to enact effective policies depended on financial resources, 
administrative aptitude, and sufficient support from the federal government as well as public 
employees. In all six areas, the intendancy had difficulty performing to the expectations of their 
federal superiors and island habitants. Their official correspondence and annual reports reveal a 
weak and ineffective administrative structure in spite of the supplementary financial assistance 
federal officials in Bogotá offered to them.  
As on mainland Colombia, communication was a chronic problem for the intendancy. 
Despite the establishment of a national post office on the islands, mail service remained 
extremely slow and inefficient.
289
 This was largely due to the intendancy‘s reliance on contracts 
with sea captains who owned sloops and schooners that relied on good wind to get the mail in a 
timely manner. Although the contracts required the captains to make two round trips to 
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Cartagena per month, most made only three trips in two months.
290
 Other contractors never 
returned home and drowned at sea.
291
 The postmaster blamed the poor mail service on the lack of 
good ships, noting that most merchants sent their mail through ships passing en route to 
Colón.
292
 Officials and islanders unsuccessfully solicited the government for funds to buy a 
gasoline-powered boat.
293
 In 1932, Intendant Benjamin Moreno asked the Ministry of 
Government to consider a mail contract with the United Fruit Company or Panama Mail.
294
  
Although the postal service was inadequate, the intendancy did manage to build a 
wireless telegraph station on San Andrés in 1914. The Colombian government contracted with 
German technicians to construct the station to facilitate better communications with the ports of 
Cartagena and Puerto Colombia, as well as with Bogotá.
295
 The station closed during World War 
I and only reopened in 1920. Thereafter, it was used to communicate with the Ministry of 
Government, in particular in periods of crisis. Regular communication with Puerto Colombia 
was scheduled at 8:30AM, 1:30PM, and 5:00PM.
296
 There is no evidence that ordinary islanders 
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used the telegraph, but intendancy officials did. By 1926, the telegraph station required urgent 
repairs.
297
  
The intendancy also sought to develop the islands‘ infrastructure as part of the larger 
federal effort to modernize the nation. During the early 1900s, Colombian cities received federal 
funds to pave roads, widen streets, install street lamps and telephones, and construct streetcar 
lines.
298
 There was also much effort placed on expanding the railway system and overland 
transportation. Bogotá was finally connected to the Magdalena River, giving the capital better 
access to its Caribbean ports.
299
 Article 6 of Law 52 stated that ten percent of the revenue from 
coconut exports was to be allocated for public works. The legislation created a Board of Material 
Improvements to manage these funds and oversee projects.
300
 On July 20, 1913, the intendancy 
inaugurated a spacious building to hold its offices. San Andrés received a jail house, and a 
―magnificent‖ dock was built in Providence.301 Visiting the islands in 1915, Attorney General 
Elisio Medina noted the projects the board had accomplished and the need for future 
maintenance of those buildings.
302
  
In later years, intendants and federal officials visiting the islands questioned the efficacy 
of the Board of Material Improvements. In 1923, Intendant Joaquín Contreras called it ―purely 
decorative‖ and complained that the group rarely addressed programs for the construction or 
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repair of roadways.
303
 Despite these criticisms, the board managed to accomplish several 
additional projects. In 1929, Intendant Jorge Lozano informed the Ministry of Government that 
the road in Providence had been extended two kilometers. Moreover, a new electricity plant In 
San Andrés powered 800 street lamps, an ice machine, and a movie theatre.
304
  
The intendancy also promoted public health and sanitation. The most prevalent problem 
on both islands were the swamps harboring disease-carrying mosquitoes.
305
 Official 
correspondence and annual reports regularly noted outbreaks of disease, which had caused 
several English priests and mainland public employees to fall ill.
306
 The intendants complained 
about the lack of medicine to treat these tropical illnesses.
307
 In 1922, Intendant Manuel M. Leal 
convened a Board of Public Hygiene and Sanitation to draft and enforce sanitation and health 
policies.
308
 The board consisted of physicians Thomas Hemans, Philip Francis, and Philip 
Livingston, and oversaw a public health campaign aimed at eradicating swamps, building 
cisterns, encouraging the population to use latrines, and educating students on basic hygiene.
309
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The intendancy had a difficult time implementing the board‘s recommendations. In 1925, 
the newly-appointed official doctor, Alberto Roldán Ramirez, described poor sanitation 
conditions on San Andrés. The island lacked medicine, a hospital, and even potable drinking 
water. It was common for islanders to seek medical care in the Panamanian port of Colón.
310
 In 
1927, 143 islander midwives and nurses petitioned the intendant to build a hospital on San 
Andrés. They asked him to solicit Congress ―to grant us such an appropriation of funds as may 
be required to erect in this island a small hospital for general purposes of about four wards of 
four beds each, supplemented with the necessary appointments usual in modern hospitalization 
so that the needy such are allowed the facilities of proper treatment and attendance.‖311 A month 
later, island residents asked again for the federal government to provide them with the necessary 
funds to build a hospital.
312
 
Intendants worried little about public safety. Most federal officials commented on the 
sober, obedient, and pacific nature of the island inhabitants.
313
 In 1927, Intendant Jorge T. 
Lozano described them as having ―respect for authority, well behaved, more or less good 
customs, and alcoholic, political, and religious self-restraint.‖314 However, the alcalde of San 
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Andrés noted islanders were implicated in a number of cases associated with robbery and arson 
against local merchants.
315
 
Islanders sometimes found themselves the victims of violent crime and harassment by 
public employees. On May 15, 1916, Luis F. Troncoso, secretary to the police chief, disturbed a 
party held at the store of Philip B. Livingston which resulted in the death of Edward Bent, a San 
Andrés islander. Witnesses claimed that another police officer interrupted the party and attacked 
attendees. In the commotion, Bent was hit in the head by Troncoso.
316
 Cleveland Hawkins 
accused a British subject, most likely a Jamaican resident, of burning down his store in 
Providence. Several islanders, including Francis Newball, believed Hawkins was the target of 
violence because he supported efforts to remove Intendant Carlos Hernández from office. 
Despite these allegations, Hernández was never charged with being an accessory to a crime.
317
 
Accusations surfaced that the mayor of Providence, Guillermo Guzmán, attacked Melba Tomás 
with a knife at a wedding and Harmon Archbold with a revolver at a local bar. Islanders became 
alarmed by Guzmán‘s volatile behavior.318  
There were also incidents of police mistreatment of islanders as well as other residents. 
Zelda May, the wife of Fernando Howard, was detained for hours after police gave her a citation 
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for not allowing them to search her home without a warrant. The police believed she was helping 
her husband hide an unregistered .22 caliber rifle.
319
 The detention of a ―respectable matron‖ 
angered islander notables, for whom this arbitrary act reminded them of the abuses they had 
suffered during the departmental period.
320
 That same year, attorney Eduardo Staalman accused 
San Andrés police of arresting islanders and other residents without due process and denying 
them legal counsel.
321
 These incidents put a strain on islander-police relations.   
The intendancy also sought to secure Colombian sovereignty over the archipelago, 
especially its outlying cays. For decades, fishermen from the Cayman Islands had hunted 
greenback turtles in the cays of Quitasueño, Roncador, and Serranilla without paying license fees 
to Colombia. This outraged islanders like Simon Howard who denounced the arrival of ―fleets of 
vessels all year round, in season and out of season, carrying on fishing for the valuable tortoise 
shell and sponges; extract Guano and gather Bird eggs, without license or payment of any 
contribution whatever, detrimental to our territorial sovereignty.‖322 Intendants tried to enforce 
the requirement that foreigners obtain permission before entering Colombian waters; in 1913, 
Intendant Gonzalo Pérez warned a Cayman Island ship captain about bringing fishermen in 
search of turtle and guano to the cays without proper licenses.
323
 Despite these efforts, Cayman 
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Islanders continued to fish and hunt in the cays; intendants asked the federal government to put 
diplomatic pressure on Great Britain or purchase a motor boat to assist them with surveillance.
324
  
Bogotá officials responded to the intendants‘ calls for help, but with little success. In 
1925, Juan Restrepo Sáez, an official in the Ministry of Foreign Relations, informed the Minister 
of Government that he had communicated with the governor of Jamaica, telling him to alert all 
fishermen that they needed a license to fish in Colombian territorial waters.
325
 That same year, 
Providence islanders told the intendancy that foreign fishermen laughed at the requirement that 
they obtain licenses.
326
 A few weeks later, the intendancy captured two vessels with a thirty-man 
crew illegally carrying a total of 1,200 tons of turtle shell from Quitasueño.
327
 The following 
year, intendancy officials arrested a crew of English subjects illegally fishing in Colombian 
territorial waters.
328
 But without a warship or motor boat to watch over the cays, the intendancy 
found it difficult to enforce Colombian sovereignty.   
Intendancy officials worried about the United States or other countries making an effort 
to secure the islands for their own political and economical ends. Nine years before the creation 
of the intendancy, rumors circulated that the United States was interested in utilizing the islands 
as a coaling station for the Panama Canal.
329
 ―Uncle Sam has endeavored to obtain control over 
our Archipelago, ever since the Panama Canal became a possibility…because the canal is the 
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door with locks, and our islands are the KEYS to the locks of the doors,‖ explained the editor of 
The Searchlight.
330
 These reports resurfaced as the Americans finished the Panama Canal and 
rumors circulated of their plans to build another inter-oceanic pathway in Nicaragua.
331
  
In 1917, intendancy officials refused an American captain‘s request to dock on San 
Andrés before going on to the Corn Islands. Intendant Manuel Leal found the request suspicious 
and reported it to the Ministry of Foreign Relations.
332
 Two years later, a Panamanian paper 
reported Canal employees had visited Roncador Cay and intended to repair a lighthouse on that 
islet. This action caused the intendant to protest US aggression. In response, President Woodrow 
Wilson claimed the United States had rights to Roncador cay through the 1856 Guano Act.
333
 
Despite Colombia‘s outrage, the United States did not relinquish its claims to Roncador or the 
other cays until 1972.
334
  
Finally, the most important responsibility given to intendants and their finance 
administrators was overseeing the treasury and budget. The islands‘ revenue was largely 
confined to duties on imports and exports. According to Law 52, the intendancy had the right to 
enforce a duty of 15 percent on all imported goods of ―first necessity,‖ 25 percent on other 
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goods, and 50 percent on liquor and tobacco. Imports had to enter the port of San Andrés with an 
invoice of fixed prices for each item that had been registered by the Colombian consulate before 
departing for the island. The duty on exports, primarily coconuts, was one gold peso per 
thousand whole coconuts. Intendants also generated revenue by selling licenses for turtle 
fishing.
335
  
Although the Intendancy managed to earn significant revenue from import and export 
duties, it was never able to sustain a stable budget without the assistance of federal subsidies. 
Intendants and officials pointed out that the foreign ship captains tampered with the invoices, 
hiding the true price of their merchandise.
336
 Corruption was another problem the intendancy had 
to face. In 1926, finance administrator Dewey May allegedly absconded with over twenty 
thousand pesos from the treasury. He fled to the city of Colón, where Intendant Jorge Luna 
Ospina worked unsuccessfully to bring him back to Colombia to face criminal charges.
337
 Two 
years later, bookkeeper Luís Alejandro Ortíz fled with ten thousand pesos to the port of Puerto 
Cabezas in Nicaragua. Unlike Intendant Ospina in the May case, Intendant Lozano succeeded in 
obtaining Ortiz‘s extradition to Colombia.338  
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A final factor reducing government revenue was the changes in the coconut economy.  
4.2 THE COCONUT CRISIS 
Accounts of San Andrés during the initial years of the intendancy painted a rosy picture 
of the coconut industry. Visiting in 1913, naval officer Emilio Eitón noted that the island 
exported between six and eight million coconuts, with hopes of returning to pre-1908 levels of 
14 to 16 million. He quoted the selling price for coconuts at US$20 per thousand.
339
 Upon his 
arrival in December 1913, English priest James Fitzpatrick described San Andrés as ―fairly 
wealthy and trad[ing] chiefly in coconut with Colón and the United States.‖ In contrast, 
Providence was ―poor, particularly since the last hurricane in November 1912.‖340 In 1916, 
Intendant Manuel Leal reported that San Andrés coconuts had risen from US$20 to US$28 per 
thousand.
341
  
This sense of prosperity was short-lived. In 1921, Intendant Manuel M. Leal described 
the economy as ―unsatisfactory‖ in his report to the Minister of Government, noting that the 
price for coconuts had fallen from US$65 to US$15 per thousand.
342
 Two years later, the price 
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plunged to eight dollars.
343
 ―Cocoanuts formerly a good source of revenue, are now practically 
worth nothing,‖ an English priest residing on San Andrés reported.344 In 1925, coconut prices 
fluctuated between US$10 and US$25 dollars per thousand. That year, Intendant Jorge L. Ospina 
observed some improvement in the coconut economy, estimating that San Andrés exporters 
received about US$22. However, he was well aware that the market was extremely volatile.
345
 
By 1927, the price for coconuts had fallen to ten dollars.
346
 
Several reasons explain the downward turn of the coconut economy on San Andrés. The 
global market for coconuts had grown more competitive with the entry of new producers in the 
Caribbean as well as Africa and Southeast Asia. In 1919 and 1920, San Andrés and Providence 
islands only exported some 4 million coconuts against 19 million from Panama and 35 million 
from Jamaica.
347
 Intendants reported that competition from these new producers was driving 
down prices.
348
 Yet as islander Simon Howard noted in 1927, this did not entirely explain the 
declining prices for San Andrés coconuts.
349
 A tariff enacted by the United States in the early 
1920s collected five dollars per thousand coconuts imported into the U.S.
350
 Puerto Rico and 
other U.S. territories did not pay the tariff; in order to remain competitive, San Andrés producers 
                                                 
343
 Rafael Triana, ―Interesante correspondencia de Jimenes Triana sobre el Archipiélago de San Andrés y 
Providencia,‖ La Época, 17 February 1923; Carlos M. Hernández to Minister of Government, 9 October 1923, 
AGN, MG, SP, T. 886, F. 46.  
 
344
 Richard Turner to Francis Henry, 26 September 1926, BBR.  
 
345
 Jorge Luna Ospina to Minister of Government, 15 May 1925, AGN, MG, SP, T. 921, F. 5-6.  
 
346
 Belisario Salamanca, ―Informe del Administrador Hacienda Nacional,‖ AGN, MG, SP, T. 954, F. 487.  
 
347
 Parsons, San Andrés and Providencia, 29.  
 
348
 Rafael J. Triana to Minister of Government, 9 October 1922, AGN, MG, SP, T. 886, F. 46; Carlos M. Hernández 
to Minister of Government, 9 October 1923, AGN, MG, SP, T. 886, F. 46.  
 
349
 Simon A. Howard Britton, Report, May 1927, AGN, MG, SP, T.954, F.410.  
 
350
 Simon A. Howard Britton., Report, May 1927, AGN, MG, SP, T. 954, F. 410. 
 
 98 
had to lower their prices accordingly. Intendant Carlos Hernández called the federal 
government‘s attention to this matter and urged them to intercede. He reminded Bogotá officials 
that islanders lived on coconuts and might easily conclude that it would better to join the United 
States so as not to incur the tariff.
351
  
Moreover, a new economic actor dominated the local market for coconuts. The Franklin 
Baker Coconut Company of New Jersey
352
 had its employees scavenge the island in search of 
coconuts which they purchased at extremely low prices—sometimes three dollars per thousand 
coconuts. Islanders and intendancy officials viewed the company as having a monopoly on 
coconut exports which particularly disadvantaged smaller coconut farmers.
353
 Some local 
producers in need of cash mortgaged their properties to the Baker Coconut Company and were 
then unable to repay their loans.
354
  
Overproduction and poor care of the coconut groves also led to diseased trees and poorer 
quality of coconuts. In 1923, Intendant Carlos Hernández informed the Ministry of Government 
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that a rat infestation had damaged the coconut trees and harmed the nuts.
355
 This problem was 
aggravated by the rudimentary techniques used by San Andrés coconut farmers. Intendant Jorge 
Lozano blamed the poor quality of coconuts on producers who neither used fertilizer nor any 
other scientific method to ―keep the trees strong and vigorous.‖356 Farmers planted the trees too 
closely to each other, depriving them of sufficient water and air.
357
 Islanders like Simon Howard 
and James Barker called federal authorities‘ attention to the technique of cutting down unripe 
coconuts, which bled the trees and made them vulnerable to disease.
358
 Due to poor agricultural 
care, the island‘s coconut groves had fallen victim to pathogens and disease. This reduced the 
quantity as well as quality of the export crop.
359
  
Although none of the contemporary sources identify the disease that afflicted the coconut 
trees, their descriptions point to stem bleeding disease. This disease causes cracks in the tree 
bark, from which a dark viscid liquid oozes and turns black, staining the tree. Coconut planters 
carved away at the bark to find decay in the tree. Diseased groves continued to produce nuts, but 
of poor quality. Stem bleeding disease was prevalent in wet climates, including the Caribbean, 
where coconut producers inadvertently harmed production by making notches to climb for 
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coconuts. Similar diseases such as bud rot affected Cuba and Jamaica, reducing their levels of 
coconut production.
360
 
The decline in coconut prices had a devastating impact on the islands, leading many 
islanders to migrate to the mainland. English missionaries lamented the loss of their newly-won 
converts.
361
 Father Richard Turner commented on the multitude of islanders in Panama. ―One of 
the first things I noticed on my return from England was the many Island people on the coast, in 
Colon. There has always been a steady flow coastwise, but recently it has developed into quite a 
big rush, so that the Island population is now considerably below the estimate I gave last 
year.‖362 Public officials and island residents also observed and commented on islander 
emigration.
363
 
Despite the steady outflow of emigrants, most San Andrés islanders stayed and waited for 
the economic situation to improve. Some landowners experimented with other products in hopes 
of earning more money. A few farmers turned to the production of copra oil, which won little 
favor from the intendancy; Intendant Rafael Triana reported that the intendancy only collected 
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between 5 and 10 cents per kilo on copra oil.
364
 Other islanders turned to fishing.
365
 The rest of 
the small coconut farmers, who were the majority, ―abandon[ed] [themselves] with Muslim 
fatalism to their bad luck and limit themselves to lament and wait for the government to take 
action,‖ wrote Intendant Carlos Hernández in 1923.366 A few years later, fiscal administrator 
Belisario Salamanca called the farmers ―apathetic‖ and ―indolent.‖ He estimated that ―eighty 
percent of them do not work and the other twenty percent only works a third of the day…They 
do not want to do anything other than to live from the sale of coconuts.‖367 Municipal Judge 
James Barker reported an increase in coconut theft.
368
 Although the nuts had fallen in price, they 
still held some value, especially to the impoverished day laborer who needed cash to purchase 
goods for his family.
369
  
By the end of the 1920s, intendancy officials and island residents scrambled to restore the 
coconut economy. Some focused on improved agricultural methods, encouraging coconut 
producers to fertilize their properties and care for trees or at least not mistreat them through the 
harmful practice of cutting down coconuts with a sharp hanger tool. Intendant Lozano urged 
islanders to invest in machinery to produce coconut oil, which could be used to make soap and 
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other products.
370
 A group of ―notable island gentlemen‖, mostly local merchants, asked the 
Ministry of Government to invite agricultural experts to teach new scientific methods to San 
Andrés farmers in order to ―increase the wealth of the island.‖ They requested funds to pay for 
fertilizer to be distributed along with instructions to coconut farmers and called on the federal 
government to establish a branch of the National Agricultural Bank as in other parts of the 
country.
371
 Others encouraged islanders to seek employment in construction and transportation in 
cities on mainland Colombia.
372
  
In 1928, the Ministry of Industries agreed to send an agricultural expert to the 
archipelago, and plans were made to set up an Agriculture and Mortgage Bank on San Andrés to 
provide credit for islanders.
373
 Two years later, Rafael A. Toro and Alberto Mocco came to the 
islands to teach the farmers how to combat disease in their crops. In addition to this instruction, 
these agro-technicians studied the physical and chemical composition of the soil, introduced 
islanders to new crops, examined guano deposits, and facilitated a first-class meteorology station 
to work with nearby countries in the Caribbean. Islanders still waited for the establishment of an 
agricultural bank.
374
 
Despite these efforts, by 1930 the coconut economy on San Andrés had collapsed. 
Writing to the Minister of Government, Intendant Alfonso Rincón proclaimed the demise of the 
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coconut trade, noting that only a single steam boat visited the island every two months to take 
coconuts to the United States.
375
 The next year, agro-technicians discovered that the rat 
infestation had destroyed most of the coconut trees.
376
 Exports never recovered the levels of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. With a faltering economy, the intendancy had a 
difficult time fulfilling many of the promises that the federal government made to islanders. This 
may well have intensified internal conflicts among island elites.  
4.3 POWER STRUGGLES 
In January 1923, President Pedro Nel Ospina appointed General Eugenio Garnica as intendant of 
San Andrés and Providence. Garnica was a former departmental prefect who had advocated for 
the creation of an intendancy in 1912 and subsequently played a divisive role in local politics. He 
was appointed to replace Rafael Jiménez Triana, who had died a few months earlier during an 
official visit to Providence.
377
 The president‘s decision to select Garnica had dire consequences, 
as a group of island residents and public employees refused to allow the newly appointed 
intendant to take office. Their responses ignited real concern in the federal government over its 
inability to govern the tiny archipelago. The incident also suggested islanders‘ refusal to permit 
former departmental authorities to exercise authority once again over the islands.  
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Cartagena newspapers traced the development of this story, which reignited the debate 
over how best to govern the islands. The most detailed account of the events that led to the 
resignation of General Garnica came from Julio Grosso, a Cartagena merchant returning from a 
business trip to San Andrés. Grosso told his version of events to the Diario de la Costa. Garnica 
had announced his plans to take office on January 3, 1923; in response to that announcement, 
several prominent islanders and public employees gathered at the home of Arthur May, a 
wealthy San Andrés merchant. Those in attendance included Francis Newball, the telegraph 
manager Mr. Elliot, the port captain Pablo Serrano Plata, and the finance administrator. These 
men vehemently opposed Garnica as intendant and demanded that he resign. Grosso reported 
that Serrano even made a veiled threat, suggesting that the intendant should be murdered if he 
refused to step down from his office. News reached General Garnica of opposition to his 
appointment as intendant and he offered to meet with his opponents. At that gathering, General 
Garnica offered to select a secretary of their choice to run the day-to-day affairs of the 
intendancy. According to Grosso, the opposition did not receive this proposition well. Within 
days of Garnica‘s accepting the post, ―unknown hands‖ set fire to the intendancy office, 
damaging the mayor‘s office located on the ground floor. 
A few days later, the island community started holding meetings to discuss Garnica‘s 
appointment as intendant. At one meeting, General Garnica tried to appease his detractors and 
nominated Juan de J. Castro, a former departmental employee, to serve as interim intendant. 
After long deliberation, islanders agreed to Castro‘s appointment.378 Soon afterwards, Garnica 
informed the Ministry of Government of his resignation. His appointment had made a ―bad 
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impression on the island people,‖ he said, and he hoped to avoid any further conflict over this 
issue.
379
 Juan de J. Castro took over as secretary of the intendancy in Garnica‘s absence.380  
Grosso described the situation on the islands as ―shameful and sad.‖ ―All the employees 
have abandoned their obligations and on the archipelago there is neither government nor 
administration, nothing.‖381 His account of the Garnica fiasco and portrayal of the intendancy 
resonated with Cartagena editors, who had forecast the intendancy‘s failure since its creation.382 
El Porvenir criticized the federal government for not upholding Garnica‘s authority or doing 
anything to correct this situation. ―To be frank, none of our [past] governments has concerned 
itself with colonizing this portion of our territory, in which separatist sentiment exists, which one 
day may cause a new affront against Colombia.‖383  
The reasons islanders objected to Garnica‘s appointment as intendant were revealed a 
year later. In a memorandum to former President Carlos Restrepo, islanders Cleveland Hawkins, 
Julius Robinson, MacArthur Hawkins, Jonah Archbold, Ellit Robinson, and Miguel Dawkins 
expressed their disappointment that the federal government had ignored their nomination of 
Francis Newball for intendant and had instead given the office to Garnica.
384
  Further proof that 
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this disappointment was widespread was a petition of 187 Providence islanders led by Reverend 
Felix Howard, Julius Robinson, and Cleveland Hawkins, sent to the Ministry of Government 
several months earlier.
385
  
Ten years earlier, Newball and Garnica had been allies, working together in the effort to 
remove the islands from the Department of Bolívar.
386
 In 1913, Garnica had worked alongside 
Newball in the intendancy.
387
 However, by 1914, a split had occurred between the two men, for 
reasons that remain unclear. That year, Eugenio Garnica publicly criticized interim Intendant 
Newball for his handling of an alleged uprising by Baptist minister Thomas Livingston, who 
ignored a judicial order to perform an autopsy on a local boy. He also lambasted the interim 
intendant for appointing only a few non-islanders to positions within the intendancy and for slow 
progress on public improvements.
388
  
Garnica‘s struggles with Newball continued into the term of Intendant Antonio Sánchez 
(1914-1915), who sided with Newball. Writing to President Miguel Abadía Méndez,  Sánchez 
charged that Garnica and his ally, Maximiliano Vélez, had cared more for enriching themselves 
than for local governance and had left a horrendous impression among the islanders regarding 
public administration. Islanders despised ―panyas‖, Spanish-speaking mainlanders, who violated 
their homes, seduced their daughters, and imposed heavy taxes on them.
389
 Sánchez reminded the 
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president that it was this contempt for departmental authorities that had provoked some islanders 
to attempt to separate from Colombia and join Panama in November 1903.
390
 He also charged 
Garnica and Vélez with not supporting the work of the Catholic missionaries, an integral part of 
the intendancy agenda. He warned that future intendants would have to deal with the 
machinations of Vélez, who used money to buy respect and friendships.
391
  
Antonio Sánchez‘s relations with Eugenio Garnica came to a head in May, 1915, when 
Garnica was arrested for embezzlement of public funds.
392
 Garnica and others accused Sánchez 
and Newball of fabricating those allegations and forced the intendant to leave the islands.
393
 As 
he prepared for departure, Sánchez informed the federal government that former departmental 
officials sought to undermine the efforts of the intendancy and recommended that Francis 
Newball be reinstated as interim intendant.
394
 His departure disappointed the English priests as 
well as prominent islanders such as Francis Newball, Eduardo de Armas, Pastor James Smith, 
the municipal council of San Andrés, and nearly one hundred others who congratulated him on 
his good works.
395
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These power struggles between Newball and his allies against Garnica, Vélez, and their 
supporters continued until 1924. In 1923, the Ministry of Government appointed Carlos Manuel 
Hernández as the next intendant, granting him free rein to govern the islands as he saw fit.
396
 El 
Porvenir applauded his ―intelligence and prudence,‖ which would be necessary in administering 
the islands that ―until now have been ungovernable.‖397 Hernández reported a warm reception 
from islanders: ―Yesterday I was the object of an important celebration unprecedented on the 
archipelago; ladies presented me with flowers, a multitude cried ‗Long live Colombia‘ and sang 
the national anthem, and speakers declared their love for Colombia and respect for the 
authorities.‖398 Islanders assured Hernández that they had never participated in any act against 
the government. They professed love for the nation of Colombia and enthusiasm for his 
appointment.
399
 Despite this warm reception, Hernández soon lost favor with a number of 
prominent islanders. The intendant had given out administrative positions to a select number of 
native islanders and members of the Liberal Party. These individuals held multiple jobs that drew 
salaries from the treasury, which drew condemnation from former intendancy officials belonging 
to the Conservative Party.
400
 Beginning in 1924, a series of petitions surfaced that asked the 
federal government to intervene and remove Intendant Hernández.  
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On January 10, 1924, a group of prominent San Andrés islanders lambasted Hernández in 
a memorandum to former Minister of Government Pedro Carreño. They informed their old 
political ally of their unhappiness with intendants selected since the creation of the intendancy 
and asked him to tell federal authorities not to appoint any more intendants from the Department 
of Bolívar. ―We are convinced that for the island to progress, we need a man more in harmony 
with the principles of the majority of islanders,‖ and this man could ―not be from the Department 
of Bolívar.‖401 These calls for a native islander as intendant were echoed in other 
communications and petitions.
402
  
Intendant Hernández fired back. In a letter to the Minister of Government, he explained 
that the petitions came largely from disgruntled former public employees seeking to return to 
office. Hernández admitted that they had succeeded in fooling some islanders by taking 
advantage of the latter‘s ―good nature.‖ However, he dismissed their charges as efforts to attack 
an intendant unwilling to cooperate in their fraudulent actions. ―As you know, every previous 
intendant has been in the same position,‖ he explained, citing the most recent case of General 
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Eugenio Garnica, who ―was deposed by force; Juan de J. Castro, whom the government had not 
appointed to exercise the post, was in charge when I arrived.‖403  
Hernández did have supporters, who sought to defend him. A group of public employees 
composed both of native islanders and mainland-born residents questioned the motives of the 
opposition. Manuel Almonacid, Guillermo Garcia, and Rafael Prins—all former departmental 
employees—claimed that Hernández‘s opponents—they mentioned Francis Newball, Pablo 
Serrano Plata, and Cleveland Hawkins—sought to satisfy their own personal ambitions by 
exploiting the ignorance of the people.
404
 Another petition signed by islander employees and 
long-time residents argued similarly that Newball and others sought to keep the people ―eternally 
in ignorance‖ by not allowing them to learn in ―our schools the language of our country, so that 
the rising generation will comprehend for themselves the duties of a loyal citizen and not be 
deceived by persons that are not animated by real patriotism, but rather cherish the idea of 
deceiving the people for there [sic] own benefit.‖405 By casting a shadow on the true intentions of 
well-known figures like Francis Newball, these employees forced Bogotá officials to question 
the efficacy of appointing native islanders who seemed to be against the Intendancy agenda.  
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 Despite these voices in his favor, Carlos Hernández stepped down as intendant on 
September 5, 1924.
406
 Although his opponents may have seen his departure as a victory, in the 
years that followed federal authorities in Bogotá tightened their reign over the islands and 
continued to appoint non-islanders to the position of intendant. These actions angered elite 
islanders, who grew more vocal and agitated over their marginal role in the administration of the 
islands.
407
 Between 1924 and 1930, there was a surge of memoriales and petitions from islanders 
demanding changes to the intendancy. Although it is not entirely clear what drove this 
discontent, the written complaints do offer insight into the ways islanders constructed their 
understanding of Colombian identity and citizenship, and how they viewed their marginal 
position within the nation.   
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4.4 SUBJECTS OR CITIZENS? 
In the minds of many islanders, the creation of the intendancy in 1912 had signaled a positive 
change. Island elites envisioned playing an important role in local and perhaps even national 
politics. In a 1914 editorial in The Searchlight, coconut planter Simon Howard appealed to the 
government to ―acknowledge that we are intelligent human beings, with laudable ambitions and 
aspirations like other citizens of the Republic; and yet what is more important, that we are 
justified in having them.‖408 His tone reflected the hopes and aspirations of many islanders n 
those early years of the Intendancy. But this hopefulness turned to discontent as the federal 
government brought in officials from the mainland to teach islanders how to take part in local 
politics.  
Beginning in 1924, a growing number of islander petitions began to arrive on the desks of 
the minister of government. In these memoriales, islanders presented themselves as loyal 
Colombian citizens who sought to strengthen the ties between the islands and mainland by 
bridging the gaps in distance, culture, and language between the two regions. In so doing, the 
petitioners sought to counter public images, found primarily in the Cartagena press, depicting 
them as separatist and ungovernable.
409
 In order to convince Bogotá authorities that they were 
not agitating for personal ambitions, and that their pleas for better governance were rooted in 
demands for citizenship, islanders adopted a rhetorical strategy that emphasized their Colombian 
identity. Unlike the government, they did not define this identity in terms of the Spanish 
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language, Catholic religion, or Hispanic ancestry. Rather, islanders emphasized their allegiance 
and loyalty to Colombia and their desire to participate in the political affairs of the nation-state.  
Writing in April, 1924, Dewey May and 141 additional signers spoke of their ―sincere 
patriotism‖ and described themselves as ―lovers of the progress of Colombia and her national 
integrity.‖ They contrasted their obedience and loyalty to Colombia with that of Francis Newball 
and Cleveland Hawkins, who, they said, cared nothing for promoting the intendancy agenda. 
They praised Intendant Carlos Hernández ―as a man sent to us by Colombia, our country, and 
who has come to these shores with the firm intention of teaching us to be Colombians in 
reality.‖410 San Andrés islander Carlos Federico Lever echoed their sentiments. ―We have been 
Colombians by right, but not by fact…I would like you to love us as true children of Colombia. I 
would like for you to identify with us as with yourself, and for our cause to become your 
cause.‖411  
Although these petitioners identified themselves as Colombians, they also suggested that 
it was not an entirely solidified identity. Rather, it depended on the person who was governing 
the islands and his adherence to or support of the intendancy agenda. A group of San Andrés and 
Providence islanders residing in Panama underscored this point in their memorial to the minister 
of government. They dreamed of a day when ―greater Colombia‖ and her institutions would 
rectify the poor state of public affairs on the archipelago.
412
 By presenting themselves as 
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Colombians who sought to fulfill the tenets of the intendancy project, native islanders hoped to 
capture the attention of Bogotá officials, who continued to make all the administrative decisions 
about the islands.  
Many of their complaints about the intendants in these years focused on the moral 
uprightness of island society. Islanders accused Intendants Jorge Luna Ospina and Jorge Tadeo 
Lozano and their employees of disrupting the moral fabric of San Andrés and Providence 
society. Perhaps one of the most common islander grievances against intendancy officials was 
their sexual impropriety. For instance, Ashkelon D. Francis and his wife testified in an affidavit 
that the intendant‘s brother and police chief, Miguel Lozano, had seduced their daughter, 
Cresencia Francis. Her parents were distressed by the fact that she still ―live[d] in that state of 
moral turpitude up to this date, to the disgrace of our family, absolute disregard for public 
opinion, a scandal to public morals, and in dishonor to public authority.‖413 This was a sore spot 
for the Francis family because fourteen years earlier another daughter had been identified as the 
mistress of Maximiliano Vélez.
414
 By accusing mainland employees of ―seducing their women,‖ 
islanders construed themselves as a morally sound society threatened by immoral mainland 
officials.
415
 
                                                 
413
 Ashkelon D. Francis, Ellen D. Francis, William B. Forbes, and Frank Smith, 21 February 1928, AGN, MG, SP, 
T. 973, F. 345. 
 
414
 Joab Escalona, Wellington Howard, D. Augusto Errán, Wallace Hayes Jr., Ernest M. Taylor, Ira Taylor, Eloy 
López, Carlos Vélez, E. Britton, D. Robinson, Napoleon Cayaso, Roosevelt Hayes, Eduardo M. de Armas, Reginald 
Archbold, Cardinal Dawkins, Robert Steel, William Verner, Granvil Mitchell, Gideon Howard, Hayward Archbold, 
William Brown, Dazzar Archbold, Emerson Bowie, Pribe Hawkins, Neri Fox, Thomas Bent, Cotral Forbes, 
Orephael Bent, L. Robinson, F. Howard, C. Alamilla, M. Olivero, A. Guitierres, and O. Bonilla to President Miguel 
Abadía Méndez and Minister of Government, ―The Cry of a People,‖ 15 September 1926, AGN, MG, SP, F. 89.  
 
415
 Carlos Federico Lever to President Pedro Nel Ospina, 16 August 1924, AGN, MG, SP, T. 906, F. 314. 
 
 115 
Islanders also claimed that intendants and their employees abused alcoholic beverages 
and displayed drunken behavior in public.
416
 Islander sobriety was not necessarily a strategic tool 
used to garner the support of Bogotá officials, but a part of the moral code of behavior promoted 
by island religious groups. The First Baptist Church was particularly strict in its observance of 
alcoholic temperance. According to the church‘s records, members found using, selling, or 
drinking alcoholic beverages lost their membership. ―It‘s contrary to Christian morals, injurious 
to personal, piety, and hindrance to Gospel.‖417  
For many islanders moral issues were so important that they even chastised members of 
their own community for unsavory behavior. A group of islanders and long-time residents 
rejected Julio E. Gallardo as a spokesperson on behalf of their grievances. He ―is the actual 
concessionaire and exploiter of the gambling business of the island, in company with his uncle 
Eduardo de Armas.‖ The petitioners explained that Gallardo and de Armas‘ establishment held 
public dances ―every Saturday night until dawn of Sunday morning, with the attendance of 
women of evil repute with its accompanying orgies of immorality…even those who are 
passersby cast a passing glance.‖418 By attacking these two particular islanders, the memorandum 
suggests a genuine concern that islanders remain moral and respectable beings; though, it might 
also indicate their envy of Gallardo.  
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These rhetorical strategies failed to persuade Bogotá officials to make the changes 
requested by the islanders. Intendants continued to come from the mainland, much to the 
islanders‘ chagrin. Consequently, islanders grew more vocal in their demands for change, and 
their memorials, petitions, and editorials took on a more threatening and less conciliatory stance. 
In 1929, Julio E. Gallardo gave an interview to a Cartagena newspaper in which he spoke about 
the turbulent atmosphere on the islands. ―We are tired, annoyed, [and] desperate about the 
current administration because we can only tolerate so many humiliations and so much ridicule 
and arbitrary treatment.‖419 ―We do not impose, expect, threaten, nor demand more than a 
governor conscious of his rights and duties,‖ the islanders pleaded.420 Another petition called on 
the federal government to intervene ―for the first and last time, and finally resolve the string of 
poor administrators.‖421  
Islanders demanded that the federal government appoint a native-born intendant, and by 
1930, several petitions had nominated Francis Newball.
422
 Support for Newball may have been 
yet another tactic to get Bogotá officials to come to their aid. It was, he after all, who had led the 
campaign for the creation of the Intendancy in 1912. Perhaps he would again be able to win 
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favor with Bogotá officials. Pedro Carreño also endorsed Francis Newball and Carlos Federico 
Lever as candidates for the intendancy in correspondence to President Miguel Abadía Méndez.
423
 
However, neither man received the appointment.  
After seventeen years of intendancy rule, elite islanders realized that their dreams of full 
participation in local administration and acceptance as Colombian citizens had gone unfulfilled. 
The federal government viewed the island population not as citizens but as subjects who needed 
to be transformed into more acceptable members of the national polity. This transformation 
required intendants from the mainland to educate island inhabitants in the ways of Colombian 
political culture and to carry out a policy of national acculturation, turning islanders into 
Spanish-speaking Catholics. It is to that project that we now turn.  
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5.0 THE CULTURAL INCORPORATION OF THE ISLANDS, 1913-1930 
5.1 THE CHALLENGE 
State officials commented repeatedly on islanders‘ retention, well into the twentieth century, of 
Anglophone Caribbean culture and Protestant religion. Despite the archipelago‘s formal 
incorporation into Colombia in 1822, islanders remained ignorant of the Spanish language, 
Colombian history, and Hispanic customs. In 1873, Prefect Eduardo Mamby called on the 
Secretary of Foreign and Interior Relations to hire good bilingual teachers for the archipelago‘s 
public schools. ―English is the only language known in this territory,‖ he explained, and ―it is 
incompatible to be a citizen of a nation without knowing its language, because one knows neither 
the country‘s laws nor one‘s duties‖ as a citizen.  The federal government needed to ―nationalize 
the inhabitants of this territory,‖ Mamby argued, ―through the teaching of the national 
language.‖424  
Nearly a decade later, Javier Vergara y Velasco drew similar conclusions. In 1888, the 
federal government commissioned Vergara to conduct a survey of the islands. Like Mamby, he 
reported that ―the population of both islands speaks corrupted English…some islanders, though 
few, know Spanish that [is even] more spoiled than English.‖ In the area of religion, the majority 
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of islanders were Baptists ―with a small number of Methodists in Providence.‖425  ―Islanders lack 
a true education that is in line with the Catholic religion… This makes it impossible to judge or 
govern this people in the same manner as in the rest of the country.‖426  Vergara also saw the 
islanders‘ racial background as problematic.  Like mainland Colombians, islanders were a hybrid 
of ―black blood mixed with the English.‖ Vergara had a difficult time even identifying the 
characteristics of the islanders‘ ―race.‖ He did not know what to make of the ―passionate black 
blood and the cold and Positivist English [blood]‖ which had made ―a people who are not yet 
definitively formed and whose character is very difficult to specify.‖427  
Similar observations regarding the islanders‘ cultural identity were repeated into the 
twentieth century. In 1902, an Adventist missionary on San Andrés described the island language 
as ―nondescript, neither Spanish nor English, though the latter approaches it.‖428 Nine years later, 
another missionary confessed his ―inability to master West Indian English…find[ing] it more 
difficult even than Spanish.‖429 In 1904, itinerant priest Albert Stroebele described the island 
inhabitants as ―composed of Jamaicans, some Spaniards, English, Irish, and Scotch.‖430 It is 
unclear whether or not Stroebele meant to say that Jamaican, English, Irish, or Scotch nationals 
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resided on the archipelago, or if he was using the same ethnic terminology that islanders 
employed when describing the population. Catholic priest James Fitzpatrick was astonished to 
find Afro-Caribbean islanders speaking with pride of their Scottish and British ancestry. ―But 
what would really stagger a proud son of the British Isles would be to hear the older people relate 
with glowing pride that their grandfather or some great-great ancestor came from England or 
Scotland.‖431  
In 1912, federal census-taker Santiago Guerrero reported to the Minister of Government 
that ―there is nothing that constitutes civilization or progress either on San Andrés or 
Providence… everything remains in a state of deep and lamentable backwardness.‖ Guerrero 
went on to name the first and most important task facing the government. ―There is much to do 
on these islands, principally teaching the inhabitants that they are Colombians as many do not 
know it. The language, religion, customs—everything is absolutely contrary to ours.‖432 He 
reiterated the same program of incorporation that Vergara and Mamby had articulated: find 
competent bilingual teachers to give instruction in Spanish. Guerrero suggested Catholic priests 
who ―have already been in Colombia for many years, know the language and the nation‘s 
customs and traditions.‖433 
Naval officer Emilio Eitón elaborated further on Santiago Guerrero‘s proposals.  . 
Arriving in 1913 to San Andrés, Eitón met with long-time residents and prominent island figures 
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and wrote to the government to report his findings. Like Guerrero and other previous officials, 
Eitón supported the teaching of Spanish and Colombian customs. And like Vergara, he viewed 
the Catholic Church as an essential component of the project and spoke of islander inclusion as 
guided by the moral teachings of Catholicism. In many ways Eitón‘s analysis and proposals 
anticipated the government‘s Colombianization program of 1913-1930.  
After meeting the interim Intendant Francis Newball, who impressed him with his 
impeccable command of the Spanish language, and with other island elites, Eitón concluded that 
many islanders were ―patriotic‖ men interested in linking the islands to the mainland.  ―They 
love Colombia in spite of the indifference with which for many years [the government] has 
looked upon this territory. The love of a far away Fatherland is almost by divine law; under that 
law, there is veneration here for Colombia but not because Colombians have fulfilled our 
brotherly duty.‖434 Islanders knew little about the mainland because departmental officials had 
never implemented a program to teach them of ―our traditions, our glorious feats, [and] our 
history…the genuine representation of a people.‖435 He urged federal officials to build schools, 
find competent teachers, and build Catholic churches to counteract the Protestant, Anglo-focused 
education received by most islanders. ―They know nothing [of Colombia] because children do 
not have schools in which to learn Catholic dogma in the vibrant words of Spanish.‖ Island 
children knew of ―Wellington and Nelson, of Washintong and Linconl [sic], they know how to 
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read the Bible and to listen respectfully to the word of the minister, [Martin] Luther‘s disciple.‖ 
But they knew nothing of Simón Bolívar, of Colombian history, or of Catholicism.
436
  
Eitón called on the federal government ―to hispanicize the territory… to Colombianize it, 
bringing [our] religion, language, and customs.‖437  He recommended that Catholic priests be 
brought to the archipelago to staff Catholic-run public schools in which islanders would learn 
both Spanish and English. ―We only desire that the language that in Colombia rules, also 
someday rule on the islands…This is just, it is rational.‖438 Perhaps thinking of his fellow 
Cartagena residents, Eitón dismissed claims that islanders were not interested in Spanish 
language instruction. He pointed out that, in speaking with mainlanders, islanders often used the 
few Spanish phrases they knew. He also opined it was an error to believe that ―islanders profess 
some fondness to a specific nationality‖ such as the United States or Great Britain. ―The United 
States and England send written learning products in English and as English is what is spoken on 
our archipelago, [it is] natural for the natives to be in greater contact and greater intimacy with 
those nations.‖439 Again, he blamed this situation on ―our indolence, our lack of sound judgment, 
and even charity.‖440  
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Eitón recognized the limited ability of state institutions to achieve such changes.  ―Laws 
and decrees cannot accomplish the transformation to which we refer. Laws and decrees must 
come, yes, naturally; but only as developing elements of a just and honorable plan.‖441 ―We must 
not impose on the islands the mainland‘s religious practices…Listen well: we will not impose 
them but, yes, teach them. Let the islanders see [the Catholic practices] and if they believe them 
holy and pure, teach them to their children. That is all. Let them compare and choose.‖442 Eitón‘s 
Catholic faith led him to believe it superior to other religions and thus to be confident in its 
eventual success on the islands.  
However, in order to ensure that success Eitón urged Bogotá officials to bring in 
bilingual Colombian clerics. While he recognized the efforts of the English Catholic missionaries 
on Providence, who had just arrived in 1913, Eitón also worried that they might not cultivate 
islanders‘ patriotism toward Colombia. Patriotism, he felt, ―should be intimately linked to the 
religious‖ project. Moreover, he was confident that Colombian and/or Spanish priests had the 
intellectual capability and missionary experience to work in religiously and linguistically diverse 
communities, as they had done on mainland Colombia. ―In the various [religious] communities 
that exist in Colombia there are numerous priests skilled in the study of languages; and it is those 
priests that we call on to employ their linguistic skills‖ on the islands.443  
                                                 
441
  ―Con decretos ni con leyes no se lleva a cabo la transformación a que aludimos. Las leyes y los decretos han de 
venire sí, naturalmente; pero solo como elementos desenvolventes de un plan justo y honrado que en unos cinco 
lustros se ejecute.‖ Ibid. 75.  
 
442
  ―No vamos a imponer en las islas las practices religiosas que en el continente tenemos nó. Oigasenos bien: no 
vayamos a imponerlas pero sí a enseñarlas. Que los isleños las vean y pero sí las creen santas y puras, se las 
inculquen a sus hijos. Eso es todo. Que ellos comparen y que escojan…‖ Ibid 75.  
 
443
  ―Insistimos en creer que el clero colombiano es el llamado a dar principio a la obra que, con apremiamente 
necesidad, se impone en nuestra conciencia de hermanos en el patriotismo. En las diversas comunidades que hay en 
el país existen numerosos religiosos que tienen predilección por el estudio de idiomas; y es a esos religiosos a 
quienes especialmente nos dirigimos denunciándoles un amplio campo para poner en vigor sus aptitudes lingüistas. 
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Emilio Eitón returned from his short visit to San Andrés with a determination to elucidate 
the cultural differences between island and mainland Colombians and call the federal 
government to action. Like previous Colombian authorities, he had little to say about the 
islanders‘ blackness or their African ancestry. His account made only one reference to skin color, 
when he used the term ―of color‖ to describe an island dock worker.  If anything, he was more 
focused on the islanders‘ British ancestry.  ―Let‘s not speak of race because we must accept, 
painful as it may be, the differences of genealogical origin between the archipelago‘s inhabitants 
and the rest of Colombia… Hispanics were not the first to come‖ to the islands.444 As a result, 
the islanders‘ most important characteristics (for the Colombian government) were their English 
language, Protestant religion, and cultural affinity to the United States and Great Britain. In 
response, federal officials enforced an incorporation project based on the Spanish language, 
Hispanic customs, and Roman Catholicism. 
5.2 THE CATHOLIC MISSION 
On January 2, 1913, the British priests James Fitzpatrick, James Rogan, and Herbert Keane 
arrived in San Andrés to take over the Catholic mission on the islands.
445
 It had been nearly a 
year since the Vatican had started to make arrangements for the priests from the St. Joseph‘s 
                                                                                                                                                             
Sacerdotes que no conozcan perfectamente el ingles y el español no tendrán todas las facilidades que los que 
dominan dichos idiomas tiene para laborer con el debido provecho.‖ Ibid. 77.  
 
444
  ―No hablemos de la raza porque hay que aceptar, por doloroso que sea, la diferencia de orígen genealógico de 
los habitants del archipiélago con el resto del país colombiano…No fueron los hispanos los que primero vinieron.‖ 
Ibid 61. 
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Foreign Missionary Society, located north of London at Mill Hill, to take over the mission.
446
 
Their appointment was a response to repeated calls from the Apostolic delegate in Bogotá to the 
Vatican regarding the need for English-speaking priests on the islands.
447
 Colombian authorities 
sought to replace the Mill Hill missionaries‘ American predecessors, the Josephites, who had 
supervised the Catholic mission since 1910.  Many presumed that the Josephites‘ removal was 
due to the sour relations between Colombia and the United States over the Panama Canal.
448
  
 The Baltimore-based Josephites had inherited the Catholic mission from an old itinerant 
priest, Timothy St. John, who had labored as a missionary on Providence for some seven years. 
St. John learned of these distant islands from his friend Father Albert Stroebele, the first to 
establish a Catholic mission on the archipelago. An Austrian priest, in early 1901 Stroebele was 
proselytizing to African Americans in Louisville, Kentucky, when he read an article informing 
readers there was no established Catholic presence on San Andrés and Providence. ―I resolved to 
go there and devote the rest of my life to the missionary work among the poor ignorant natives of 
these islands and bring to them the light of the true Faith,‖ recalled Stroebele.449 He received 
permission to leave his post in Kentucky and set off for the islands in August 1901.  
 Stroebele soon discovered why Catholic missionaries had never succeeded in 
proselytizing to the islanders. Upon his arrival to San Andrés, a passerby questioned the captain 
about the purpose of Stroebele‘s visit. Upon learning that Stroebele was a priest, the islander 
exclaimed, ―We don‘t want no priest!‖ During his stint on San Andrés, Stroebele encountered 
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significant obstacles largely coming from the strength of the then Baptist minister, Brockholst 
Livingston. Despite Baptist opposition, the missionary managed to build a small chapel named 
after Saint Anthony, which was mostly attended by mainland officials and a handful of islanders 
that Stroebele converted.
450
 Such converts were few. The Baptist Church maintained a strong 
hold over its congregation, repeatedly denouncing, both privately and publicly, at community 
functions, the dangers of the Catholic faith.  
The following year, in 1902, Stroebele relocated to Providence, where he was better 
received. He even managed to obtain invitations to preach at a few of the local Baptist churches. 
One of them was the Bethel Baptist Church, with Eusebio Howard as its pastor. Howard‘s father 
and brother were both ministers, and Eusebio had separated from his childhood church, East 
Baptist, after his father, Simon Howard, appointed Eusebio‘s brother, Simon Howard Jr., as 
pastor. Eusebio Howard felt his brother underserving of such a position, since Simon Jr.‘s 
daughter, Caroline Howard, had a common-law marriage with Maximiliano Vélez. Eusebio and 
a number of the church‘s members left the congregation when Simon Howard Jr. refused to 
expel his daughter for her sinful actions, as was customary among Baptists on both islands. 
Eusebio and his followers had already established a small church, where he agreed to permit 
Albert Stroebele to give a few sermons.
451
  The sermons must have been successful: by the end 
of the week, Howard and his flock had converted to Catholicism. The congregation renamed the 
church Mater Dolorosa, becoming the first Catholic chapel on Providence.
452
 While the reasons 
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for their conversion are not entirely clear, the members may have believed it was better to 
connect themselves with a foreign, white priest as opposed to an island-born colored minister.
453
 
With a new-found congregation, Stroebele focused his attention on increasing 
membership there. As a result of internal struggles within local Baptist churches, he continued to 
win new converts. Soon after Eusebio Howard and his congregation joined Stroebele, Baptist 
deacon Lemuel Newball left Smooth Water Bay Baptist Church.
454
 In contrast, Brockholst 
Livingston was more successful at keeping Catholic encroachment at bay on San Andrés.  
 In 1904, Albert Stroebele departed for the United States in hopes of raising mission 
funds, leaving two itinerant priests to continue his work on San Andrés and Providence. Walter 
Yates soon left San Andrés after his alcoholism hindered his efforts to proselytize the islanders 
and he was later called to return to the United States.
455
 Timothy St. John did a better job at 
maintaining the congregation on Providence but rarely visited San Andrés. ―To neglect two 
hundred faithful children here, some of whom may die in my absence [,] simply for a chance for 
people who rarely go to church in San Andrés and never to take the sacraments,‖ made no sense 
to St. John.
456
 Moreover, he had to defend himself against unsavory attacks from First Baptist 
Church and its members.
457
 He battled age, illness, poverty, and resistance from Baptist and 
Adventist islanders who thwarted his attempts to strengthen the Catholic mission. 
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 Timothy St. John was largely responsible for bringing the Josephite priests to the islands 
in 1910. He maintained regular communication with the religious order Saint Joseph‘s Society of 
the Sacred Heart, whose mission focused exclusively on African Americans in the United States. 
The order was an extension of the Missionary College of St. Joseph in London, which in the 
1870s sent five of its missionaries to Baltimore to proselytize emancipated blacks. Within twenty 
years, the Mill Hill order had established an American branch with sixteen men serving in over 
eight different churches.
458
 While it is unclear whether Stroebele or St. John were members of 
the order, or just sympathetic to its mission, records show that the American Josephites had taken 
an interest in the islands, providing funds to Stroebele to support missionary work.  
By 1910, Stroebele had moved on to Cuba and other parts of the Caribbean to evangelize, 
leaving St. John alone on Providence. St. John regularly expressed to Reverend Justin McCarthy 
at the Saint Joseph Society his hope that they might send priests to manage the mission.
459
 He 
also put McCarthy in communication with Adam Brioschi, the Archbishop of Cartagena.
460
 
McCarthy promised to send help. Timothy St. John died before McCarthy and Brioschi had 
finalized their plans of sending a pair of missionaries to San Andrés and Providence.
461
  
 Father John Albert agreed to continue the work that Albert Stroebele and Timothy St. 
John had begun. His youthfulness helped to keep some of the new converts, one islander 
describing him as ―more ‗sportified‘‖ than St. John.462 Together with his brother James, during 
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their first two years on the island the two priests baptized a total of 96 islanders, including 11 
from San Andrés. This was a great improvement over previous years, when the highest number 
of baptisms performed was in 1905 and 1906, with 26 islanders each year. John Albert urged his 
superiors to send additional priests to work on San Andrés, where ―a herculean task awaits 
us.‖463  
 The Josephites‘ greatest opposition may have come from Colombian officials, especially 
those from the mainland. While visiting Archbishop Brioschi in Cartagena, Albert spoke of the 
police chief ―eyeing me closely,‖ suspecting that he ―might be a United States spy disguised as a 
cleric.‖ He heard a Liberal lash out at the ―government for not washing out with blood the insult 
which our government had offered in the Panama affair.‖ Albert explained, ―It is said by many 
that the United States of America is cordially hated by many of her little Latin American sister-
republics.‖464 It is unclear to what degree islanders and mainland authorities shared this 
sentiment. Yet it seems plausible that one or more of the departmental employees would share a 
similar distrust of Yankee missionaries and may have played a role in pushing for the removal of 
the Josephite priests in 1912.  
By all accounts, the transfer of the mission from the American missionaries to the British 
went smoothly. Josephite priest James Albert greeted the Mill Hill missionaries upon their 
arrival. Although sad about his impending departure, Albert was relieved to know that the 
mission was being transferred to British priests.
465
 Only months before, the newly appointed 
Intendant Gonzalo Pérez had requested that he and his brother John Albert continue to direct the 
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mission on Providence while leaving San Andrés to the new missionaries.
466
 Their Josephite 
superiors told them to decline the offer and return to the United States. In fact, John Albert had 
already returned to Baltimore, leaving his brother in charge of the mission.
467
 James Fitzpatrick, 
the leader of the Mill Hill mission, learned that the Albert brothers had acquired four houses and 
other property that they planned to transfer to the Mill Hill priests.
468
 Fitzpatrick expressed his 
discomfort over taking over the mission, especially since the Josephites appeared to be doing 
good work, and hoped the Mill Hill Order might convince the Vatican to allow the Albert 
brothers to keep the mission.
469
  
Despite his reluctance to replace the Josephite priests, Fitzpatrick did take charge of the 
mission and soon recognized the significant work left to be done toward the evangelization of 
San Andrés. This island was the administrative seat of the intendancy, with ―a population over 
2,000 inhabitants‖, Fitzpatrick explained to his superiors in England.470 There were about 30 
Catholics, ―mostly Colombian officials‖ who were more ―a hindrance than a help [and] 
absolutely nothing in the way of church, house or school.‖471 Despite the poor state of the 
mission on San Andrés, Fitzpatrick appeared hopeful and gave an optimistic assessment of the 
potential for growth on the island. ―There seems to be a better feeling towards the Catholic 
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Church at present,‖ he explained.472 Nevertheless, he decided to postpone serious efforts to 
evangelize. ―We are dependent on the charity of the people back home and no serious attempt 
can be made to convert the people until we possess a church, house, and priests in San Andrés…. 
Our work must be limited to at present a few periodical visits to San Andrés for the benefit of a 
few Colombians there.‖473 
The Catholic mission on Providence was more active. The island had a population of 
1500; most were Baptist, but some 350-400 islanders belonged to the Catholic Church. The 
mission had a parsonage, a church in St. Isabel, and several additional chapels in the villages of 
Baily, Lazy Hill, and Southwest Bay, where there was a Catholic stronghold. The Mill Hill 
priests credited the progress on Providence to the Josephite fathers.
474
 Under these conditions, 
the Mill Hill priests decided to concentrate their initial efforts on Providence. In addition to 
holding mass every Sunday and on holidays, the priests also held services and religious 
instructions in the satellite chapels. During the week, the priests toured the island trying to visit 
the sick in every Catholic and, if possible, non-Catholic household.
475
 These activities were 
necessary in maintaining previous converts and gaining new ones. 
The Mill Hill priests faced several challenges. First, they had to overcome an initial 
shortage of priests and financial support. Without sufficient priests and money, the British 
missionaries had to struggle to pay for the church-related services that would attract islanders to 
the faith. Second, the Mill Hill priests needed to form relations with intendancy officials, who 
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often distrusted them. Third and finally, these Catholic missionaries had to find ways to attract 
islanders to Catholicism while maintaining a hold over their newly converted flock.  
Soon after his arrival, in 1913, Fitzpatrick requested two additional priests and financial 
support.  He needed more help ―not so much on account of the number of Catholics, but because 
the work over the rugged mountain roads is very wearing and if their strength must last a series 
of years in this country, it is necessary that their work be divided.‖  Fitzpatrick reminded his 
superior that it was a Society rule not to station missionaries alone and that the other priests 
―claim that right chiefly as a safeguard for themselves on these isolated islands.‖ Lastly, 
Fitzpatrick envisioned their efforts expanding to San Andrés and thus, a ―necessity for two 
priests on each island and for a Superior who should remain free in his movements.‖476 James 
Fitzpatrick asked the Society to pay for the additional priests‘ services, since the mission‘s 
finances were not secure.  
The Colombian government had agreed to financially support the Mill Hill priests with 
an initial start-up payment of 3,000 francs followed by an annual stipend of 3,000 francs.
477
 
While it was not clear whether the priests ever received that amount, Fitzpatrick thought this 
―grant is too small if ever it is given.‖478 The priests also believed it impossible to collect 
donations from the island population. ―A great many calls are made upon our slender resources 
by our own people and we cannot possibly ignore the distress of some of our Catholics.‖ These 
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calls for help were brought on by the latest hurricane to hit Providence, in November 1912, 
impoverishing the majority of islanders.
479
  
The Mill Hill priests went in search of money. In 1914, James Fitzpatrick reported 
fundraising efforts in Europe and the United States.
480
 His efforts paid off, and the priests used 
these funds to build a church in San Andrés, Holy Family, which opened in 1915.
481
 Moreover, 
the Catholic mission welcomed two additional Mill Hill priests. One of them resided on the 
island and helped to offer services on Sundays and holidays in the villages of San Luís and North 
End, the location of the Holy Family Catholic Church.
482
  
While intendancy officials publicly supported the Catholic mission, their actions were 
inconsistent and suggested a lack of support of the Mill Hill priests. For example, in 1913, the 
Board of Mission pledged to allocate funds for the building of a church on San Andrés. After 
learning this, Intendant Gonzalo Pérez authorized the erection of a church ―on ground seized 
from private persons and tried to force the building‖ on the Mill Hill fathers. He asked them to 
repay the intendancy 1,000 pesos for constructing the church, but Father Fitzpatrick refused his 
offer.
483
  The church was ―within ear-shot of the rowdiest public house in the two islands, where 
every second word is a curse or a blasphemy.‖ In the end, the property was converted into a 
police barracks.
484
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This incident dampened relations between the Mill Hill priests and local officials. Soon 
thereafter, Father Fitzpatrick learned that Intendant Pérez had spoken to authorities in Bogotá 
asking for the missionaries‘ removal from the islands, arguing that ―Spanish priests were a 
necessity and that he (Dr. Pérez) would only consent to return to the island [if] I was removed 
from the Superiorship, for I might make a good teacher, but I was a failure as a missionary.‖485 
While Fitzpatrick considered the intendant‘s statement to be revenge for his refusal to accept the 
property, Pérez‘s accusations did provoke inquiries from the Apostolic delegate and Vatican 
authorities. Bogotá officials, the priest explained, ―always score a point, if they can depict both 
to the Apostolic Delegate and the government spiritual desolation of San Andrés, whose only 
hope they say lies in Catholic regeneration.‖486  
Local authorities‘ immorality and sexual impropriety also infuriated the British 
missionaries, who deemed intendancy officials‘ actions to be impediments to the mission. ―Many 
of the officials came from good families in Bogotá, but were ‗exiled‘ to the islands because of 
some ‗indiscretion.‘ Their conduct left much to be desired and their Catholicity was no advert for 
the Church.‖487 After obtaining posts in the intendancy, ―they [intendancy employees] throw 
away all restraints and spend this time in gambling, drunkenness, and debauchery of every 
kind.‖488 The worst offender was former departmental employee Maximiliano Vélez, ―who at 
present has three concubines and about 50 illegitimate children.‖489 While it is unclear whether 
                                                 
485
 James Fitzpatrick to General Francis Henry, 6 June 1914, BBR; Gonzalo Pérez to Minister of Government, 
November 1913, AGN, MG, SC, T.721, F.89.  
 
486
 Report on Catholic Mission of San Andrés and Providence, 1 January 1915, MHA.  
 
487
 James Winstanley, ―Mill Hill and the Caribbean Islands (An Oral History Interview),‖ 1978, MHA.  
 
488
 Richard Turner to Superior General Joseph Biermans, 28 July 1924, MHA.  
 
489
 Herbert Keane to Antonio J. Sánchez, 2 August 1915, AGN, MG, SP, T.734, F.327.  
 135 
Vélez fathered that many children, Baptist birth records do indicate two children born to him and 
different women in consecutive years.
490
 This behavior outraged the British priests and 
motivated one of them to refuse Catholic funeral services to a deceased former employee who 
was a notorious womanizer.
491
 ―Of course everyone is not bad,‖ explained priest Richard Turner. 
A few mainland Colombians were ―very honorable men whose way of living inspires islanders to 
truly love God and respect the fatherland. However, being in the minority, this healthy example 
almost entirely destroys the bad example of the rest of them.‖492  
The priests worried that former employees and intendancy officials served as 
representatives of Catholicism and that their actions directly impacted missionaries‘ ability to 
attract islanders to the faith, especially in the face of anti-Catholic resistance by Protestant 
islanders. Writing in 1914, Father Fitzpatrick credited an anti-Catholic campaign by Baptist and 
Adventist churches for the reduced numbers of conversions that year. He explained that the 
Baptist and Adventist ministers had aligned with former officials ―in a secret campaign of 
calumny and slander against the priests of malicious opposition to anything Catholic.‖493 During 
church services and home visits, Protestant islanders received sermons on the dangers of the 
Roman Catholic Church. Pastors, deacons, and other prominent figures disseminated anti-
Catholic literature such as the Watchman, Protestant Magazine, and the works of Pastor Charles 
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Chiniquy.
494
 Protestant islanders even spread rumors regarding the moral character of the 
missionaries to their neighbors and relatives. ―No calumny or lie is too base for their plan to ruin 
Catholic influence.‖495 This sort of opposition was reminiscent of that faced by Timothy St. John 
several years earlier. In 1909 Adventists and Baptists on San Andrés slandered St. John with a 
falsified article supposedly written by the elderly priest criticizing the island population. ―It was 
going on for 2 or 3 weeks, and I wondered at the frowns and black looks where formerly things 
had been friendly, until some outside people told their Catholic relatives & then all came out,‖ 
wrote St. John.
496
 Protestant resistance was ―aided by the network of relationship all over the 
island, where almost every family is more or less connected to every other family.‖497 
When these actions failed to stop the Catholic advance, the Adventists and Baptists 
employed other strategies. Baptist churches on both islands assigned members more leadership 
roles, thus elevating some islanders‘ social status in the community. On Providence, Reverend 
Howard extended leadership roles to ―each head of household‖ within his church as well as 
every member ―of his own household.‖ This was done to retain his members‘ ―allegiance to the 
Baptist faith.‖ In addition to parceling out religious authority, Baptist ministers offered more 
church activities including Sunday school and Christian Endeavor societies; on occasion the 
                                                 
494
 Charles Chiniquy was a French-Canadian Catholic priest who became an anti-Catholic Presbyterian pastor. He 
claimed Catholicism was a pagan religion in which believers worshipped the Virgin Mary and its theology anti-
Christian. Ibid. 
 
495
 Report on the Catholic Mission of San Andrés and Providence, 1 January 1916, BBR.  
 
496
 Timothy St. John to Justin McCarthy, 22 October 1909, SSJA.  
 
497
 Timothy St. John to Justin McCarthy, 5 February 1910, SSJA.  
 
 137 
church even became a music hall. ―Lest their religious services not prove sufficiently attractive 
every form of social accruement has been enlisted to retain the adherence of their members.‖498 
These measures did not go unnoticed by the Mill Hill priests, who reported that the anti-
Catholic campaign ―cannot fail to weaken the adherence of newly made converts, eliminate the 
sympathy of possible neophytes and create an atmosphere of distrust of men, whose sole purpose 
is to the good of the people.‖ Their fears were legitimate. Island Catholics even stirred trouble 
for the missionaries with unsettling rumors, ―simply because they think we show more charity to 
some people than to others.‖499 As a result, the Mill Hill priests only baptized a total of 34 
islanders in the first two years of their mission.
500
 
Despite Protestant resistance, the mission did gain islander converts. In 1914, the Mill 
Hill priests baptized only four islanders on San Andrés; two years later, they performed sixteen 
baptisms.
501
 The following year, 1917, the British missionaries announced plans to build a 
second chapel in the district of San Luís on San Andrés to accommodate a growing number of 
Catholic islanders.
502
 ―A few years ago a priest was a very unwelcome personage,‖ the priests 
reported in 1918, and ―open hostility was shown him at every turn. Today friendliness prevails 
and a good hearted welcome everywhere extended to him.‖503 Between 1921 and 1925 baptisms 
averaged over 40 per year, for a total of 205.
504
 The ―work may seem small numerically 
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speaking, but the thousand Catholics of today, together with the complete change of feeling 
toward the priests of the mission[,] mark a decided advance in the little Caribbean mission.‖505 If 
the Mill Hill priest counted correctly, Catholics comprised one-fifth of the total population on 
both islands.  
The mission may have benefited from the instability of the Baptist churches, especially 
on Providence. Writing to General Superior Biermans, Richard Turner acknowledged that 
Baptist inactivity partly explained the good condition of the mission. On Providence, Reverend 
Felix Howard of the Santa Isabel Baptist Church fell ill and dissension arose around his 
replacement. ―It is openly said that within a few years there will be a big secession from the 
Baptist Church, for now it is only family connections and a certain amount of fear that keeps 
them together.‖506  
Despite the growth of the Catholic mission, Bogotá officials decided to seek a 
replacement for the Mill Hill priests. Officials and visitors commented that the British 
missionaries had not made significant progress in turning the islanders into Spanish-speaking 
Catholics.
507
 Postmaster Raimundo Ayure claimed the British priests failed to ―speak of the 
patriotic love for our country.‖ He requested Colombian priests who knew both English and 
Spanish to not only counteract the British priests‘ ill-advised presence but also to instill in 
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islanders ―patriotic and religious sentiments and assist them with the learning of Spanish.‖508 A 
visiting Claretian vicar echoed his concerns.
509
  
The national government‘s ultimate goal was to transform islanders into Spanish-
speaking Catholic citizens who enjoyed and celebrated the same cultural activities as their 
mainland counterparts. While the British missionaries proselytized and addressed the religious 
needs of the people, they were unable to represent the nation‘s culture and language as Bogotá 
officials had envisioned. Thus, central authorities had to identify a group of missionaries better 
able to realize their overall vision for the islands.  
In 1926, Vatican officials appointed the Capuchins, a Spanish religious order, to take 
over the Catholic mission on San Andrés and Providence Islands. These missionaries already had 
substantial experience in Colombia. They included two veteran and two young priests along with 
a friar: Eugenio de Carcagente, Cristóbal de Canals, David de Castellfort, Carlos Vicente María 
de Orihuela, and Antonio de Novelda. De Carcagente was chosen to lead the mission. He had 
arrived in Colombia in 1891 from Spain and had spent twenty-six years working as a missionary 
in La Guajira, Barranquilla, and Bogotá. Father Cristóbal de Canals, another veteran Capuchin, 
had been a missionary since 1896, primarily in the South Pacific. Castellfort and de Orihuela 
were ordained in 1926.
510
 
Cristóbal de Canals arrived on San Andrés on November 3, 1926. He was initially 
surprised by the cultural differences between islanders and mainland Colombians, which made it 
                                                 
508
 Salomón Correa forwarded this letter by Raimundo Ayure to the Minister of Government. Salomón Correa to 
Minister of Government, AGN, MG, SP, T.780, F.75-76.  
 
509
 Eastman Arango, ―Colombia y el Archipiélago,‖ 64-65. 
 
510
 Manuel Benlloch Castellar, San Andrés y Providencia: cincuenta años de misión bien cúmplida (Bogotá: 
Editorial Andes, 1976), 36. 
 
 140 
difficult for him to view the islanders as Colombians. ―The [mainland] Colombians have visited 
me, since they are all very dear and good and more so with us. The Colombians only speak 
Spanish; the others, English. The natives are in everything Yankee. This explains such a cold 
character that we must change with our mission to make them love Colombia and the Catholic 
religion.‖511  
With their prior experiences in the Colombian Caribbean, the Capuchin priests were well 
positioned to take on the challenges of converting an anti-Catholic, English-speaking population. 
Capuchin priest Cristóbal de Canals believed he and his spiritual brothers would bring about 
positive changes to the Catholic mission. ―The pearls of change come from Spanish missionaries 
who love Colombia as a second motherland, who share the same language and who for Colombia 
have sacrificed the best years of their youth.‖512 The Capuchins‘ commitment to 
Colombianization was seen in a public attack they made on the Mill Hill priests, who the Spanish 
missionaries blamed for the poor progress of the cultural project.  
In December 1926, Capuchin Eugenio de Carcagente traveled to Bogotá to solicit 
financial support from the government.  While in the capital, he gave an interview to El Tiempo 
that outlined the Spanish priests‘ agenda for the islands. Calling San Andrés and Providence 
―one of the most important missions‖ in the country, de Carcagente made clear that, in their 
efforts to evangelize the island population, it was the duty of the Capuchins to support the 
intendancy. Unlike the Mill Hill priests, the Capuchins had good working relations with the 
intendancy employees. ―The English priests do not sympathize with the Colombians nor do they 
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understand or want to understand them. They each complain about the other.‖ This resentment 
was exemplified by Intendant Jorge Luna Ospina‘s complaint that, on his most recent visit to 
Providence, he was neither received nor greeted by the Mill Hill priests.
513
 
  This interview outraged the British missionaries and almost delayed the transfer of the 
mission to the Capuchins. In a letter to de Canals, Richard Turner rebuked him for his public 
statements. ―I am not surprised about your views of the Mission as expressed to your Superior, in 
so far as they are an entirely one-sided report based on information given by our supposed 
friends.‖ He went on to say that the Mill Hill priests ―resent the attitude on the part of officials 
and likewise your moral support of their conduct.‖ Turner then informed de Canals of his refusal 
to relinquish the mission until the arrival of the Capuchin superior de Carcagente.  
Despite this clash, Turner agreed to stay on for a few weeks more and assist the 
Capuchins with the transfer of the mission. Although Father de Canals supposedly spoke 
English, ―neither Colombian, native or ourselves can hardly understand a word he says…the 
other three priests know nothing of the English language.‖ As a result, the Capuchins had no one 
to take on the daily responsibilities of listening to confession, leading catechism, visiting the 
sick, and recruiting islanders to their flock. Fearful of losing the gains won ―in the last fifteen 
years,‖ Turner agreed to ―carry on the work of the old lines, and at the same time give what 
lessons I can in English.‖514  
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By mid-1927 all of the Mill Hill priests had departed and the Capuchins had taken full 
control of the Catholic mission. They decided to concentrate their efforts on island children and, 
therefore, on the public schools.  
 
5.3 EDUCATION 
With the transfer of the islands to the intendancy, local authorities insisted that the schools 
promote the cultural incorporation of the island population. Bogotá officials envisioned schools 
as spaces where islanders learned to be Spanish-speaking, patriotic citizens. But most teachers 
were ―native‖ islanders or Jamaicans515 who reinforced islanders‘ Anglo cultural heritage by 
emphasizing the geography, history, and culture of Great Britain, the United States, and the 
British Caribbean. Nearly all were Protestants, with the Baptists in the majority, and stressed the 
basic components of Baptist moral education: seriousness, good manners, cleanliness, and 
discipline.
516
 Federal officials viewed this situation as an impediment to their effort to 
hispanicize the island population.  
In 1913, Intendant Gonzalo Pérez increased the number of schools on the islands, thus 
addressing one of the principal concerns of island petitioners: the lack and poor quality of 
schools on the archipelago.
517
 In San Andrés, he opened two schools in the districts of San 
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Andrés and San Luís, two of the most populated areas on the island. The intendant also created 
four schools on Providence, one in the district of Santa Isabel and three in the rural villages of 
Bottom House, Lazy Hill, and Southwest Bay.
518
 Within a year, there was a total of eleven 
schools.
519
 By 1915, the total number of island public schools had grown to fifteen, eight on San 
Andrés and seven on Providence.
520
  
In addition to the creation of new schools, intendants tried to standardize the school 
curriculum, including lessons on the Spanish language, Catholic teachings, and Colombian 
history, geography, and civics.
521
 This project proved difficult to accomplish. In their official 
letters and reports, intendants and school officials complained about incompetent teachers, poor 
facilities, and islander resistance to their efforts. Intendants actively sought bilingual teachers,
522
 
but the majority were Protestant native-born islanders who spoke no Spanish and were 
unfamiliar with Colombian history and geography.
523
 Consequently, teachers replaced 
Colombian textbooks with American ones.
524
 ―The biography of Washington, taken from history 
of the United States, and the commercial geography of that country, were the most interesting 
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points for school lessons here,‖ reported a school inspector.525 Only the few schools supervised 
by the Mill Hill missionaries on Providence instructed island youth on Colombian history from 
texts that priest Richard Turner had translated from Spanish to English.
526
 
Although the bulk of schoolteachers were either unable or unwilling to instruct in 
Spanish, there were some exceptions. Roberto Angulo, the school inspector, identified Lorna 
Aibuid as the only qualified teacher on San Andrés. Unlike the other teachers, she had received 
pedagogical training and learned Spanish as a student at the Normal School in Cartagena.
527
 
Another exception was the boys‘ school teacher in San Luís, Bernabé Watson. The school 
inspector credited his school as ―without doubt the best that we have in the entire archipelago, as 
much for the number of enrolled students as for the visible signs of progress that they have 
made.‖528 His admiration for Watson had been reported to the minister of public instruction the 
year before in the school inspector‘s annual report. ―In these moments of the exam I felt happy to 
be among those children who spoke to me in Spanish and to whom I replied in the same 
language…Then I felt as if the flag of my fatherland, was flying defiantly in [the face] of the 
northern enemy‖ i.e., the United States.529  
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Intendants and school officials complained about inadequate school facilities and 
supplies. In 1915, Roberto Angulo assessed the poor school facilities, largely housed in rented 
buildings, and called on the government to provide additional funds.
530
 Two years later, he again 
alerted the minister of government to the poor condition of the schoolhouses, which ―are the 
object of curiosity of many foreign eyes.‖ Julio Gallardo, a native-born islander and local 
official, also called for financial assistance. Noting the lack of good buildings for the schools, he 
wrote, ―in the winter they are impossible to use.‖ He also pointed out the lack of supplies, 
particularly ―chalkboards and maps for the study of geography, especially Colombian.‖531  
San Andrés and Providence public schools suffered from fiscal penury, but the biggest 
challenge facing intendants and school officials was islander resistance. In 1913, Antonio R. 
Espinosa and his wife, Amalia de Espinosa, came to run the boys‘ and girls‘ schools on San 
Andrés. Upon their arrival, Espinosa met with prominent islanders such as Philip Livingston, 
who was pleased that Espinosa spoke English as well as Spanish. Yet after the first week of 
classes, the schoolteacher was disappointed to find his school nearly empty. No parent would 
leave their child with him because ―they did not want their children forced to change the religion 
into which they were born.‖ Also, ―for them it was important to learn Spanish and English 
grammar.‖ Espinosa promised to win over the parents, and then the students, by convincing them 
of Catholicism‘s superiority to other religions.532 But four years later, Intendant Leal admitted 
that most of the public schools on the archipelago had low attendance. He blamed island parents 
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who refused to send their children to the government schools. Leal reported to the minister of 
government what had happened when he decided to remove a Catholic mainland teacher to 
appease Protestant islanders. ―As soon as I appointed an islander teacher, this school that barely 
functioned with more than five students, in a few days grew to seventy.‖533  
Protestant parents removed their children from public schools and often placed them in 
religious schools. Private religious schools already had a history in the Baptist community with 
Pastor Brockholst Livingston‘s establishment of reading rooms in the 1890s that focused on 
Bible reading.
534
  The Adventist churches were very successful in recruiting new members with 
the opening of their schools, which were directed by American missionaries and supported by 
the United States Foreign Mission Board. ―The Adventist schools, particularly, of which there is 
one in San Andrés and three in Providence, are better organized and provided for than the public 
schools,‖ acknowledged a school inspector in 1924. However, he found their instruction to be 
―extremely Americanized‖ and failed to bring islanders closer to understanding and appreciating 
Colombia.
535
 
These religious schools attracted a large number of island children. In 1916, Intendant 
Manuel Leal reported that the government-run boys‘ school only enrolled an average of five 
students, in contrast to the Baptist school with some 80-100 students, so many that ―the teachers 
do not even know the [students‘] names.‖536 Yet parents consistently opted for the Protestant 
schools. In 1928, the public school for girls in the village of The Hill on San Andrés began the 
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year with fifty students but dropped to ten after the opening of a Protestant school.
537
 The 
following year, a Protestant school opened in the village of Santa Isabel on Providence and 
subsequently, enrollment dropped at the public school there. School inspector José Munévar 
explained, ―it is only for religious reasons [and] not because the government-run schools are 
inferior to the Protestant ones; completely to the contrary.‖ He returned to the example of the 
Baptist school in The Hill, which had opened the previous year. ―I am convinced that [its 
success] is no more than momentary enthusiasm.‖ Munévar insisted that private schools could 
not ―compete with ours and in the end fail because most poor people cannot pay the monthly 
tuition.‖538  
Intendancy officials set out to address the challenges facing public schools. In 1916, 
Intendant Leal made the teaching of Spanish, Colombian history and geography mandatory, and 
hired Lorna Aibuid to visit each school and teach Spanish to all students. The intendant even 
prepared a notebook of the most important events in Colombian history, along with geographical 
information, to be translated into English and distributed in all classes.
539
 Roberto Angulo was 
pleased to see the intendancy had taken this action. ―One looks with special attention to the 
teaching of Spanish, for it is one of the most effective ways to Colombianize these islands.‖540  
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In spite of these efforts, most students, and their teachers, remained unfamiliar with 
Spanish, Colombian history, and geography, concluded a school inspector in 1924.
541
 Two years 
later, Intendant Carlos Hernández once again declared the teaching of Spanish to be obligatory. 
All teachers were to prove their fluency, and students were required to enroll in a Spanish course 
if unfamiliar with the language. In that course, students would also be given instruction on 
Colombian history and geography. Hernández also sought to promote patriotism among the 
students by requiring monthly flag celebrations at which teachers would discuss the significance 
of the flag, important events in Colombian history, and sing the national anthem. The best-
performing students would raise the flag and lead the pledge of allegiance. Students were also 
required to recite the national anthem at the end of each day.
542
  
Adventist and Baptist islanders had opposed the intendancy‘s attempts to place public 
schools in the hands of Catholic missionaries. After assessing the mission in 1913, priest James 
Fitzpatrick predicted a fierce fight over public instruction.  
  There are several schools on the islands…with teachers paid 
  lavishly by the Colombian government…the Baptists fear the  
  priests‘ interference in religious education. The priests are  
  supposed to be directors of the schools and give religious  
  instruction, but we have limited ourselves to claiming the right 
  of instructing all our own Catholic children.
543
 
 
Despite Father Fitzpatrick‘s pledge to concentrate only on the Catholic students, he and 
his colleagues soon realized that efforts to convert the population rested in the children, 
especially those in the primary schools. Their unsuccessful pleas to include catechism as a part of 
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the daily routine at school were met with great resistance. ―Here again the work is unsatisfactory 
owing to the poor administration of the schools and the superior numbers of Baptist children.‖ 
Aware that it was just an ―idle dream‖ due to the poor finances of the Catholic mission, Father 
Fitzpatrick was determined to pursue ―schools for Catholic children under the direction of the 
priests.‖ He understood that Catholic-run schools would help the priests retain their newly-
converted flock and ―would further extend our influence to non-Catholic children, for the 
parents, in spite of their objections to priests and Catholic teaching, see the superiority of 
Catholic training.‖544  
The Mill Hill priests did make some gains in their supervision of public schools. By 
1921, a Mill Hill priest in Providence had served for several years ―as local inspector of Public 
Schools under the direction of the National Inspector of San Andrés.‖ Bogotá officials had 
responded to the priests‘ pleas about their exclusion from public schools by appointing a 
National Inspector to ensure that no one religious denomination had full control. However, the 
public school system on the islands was in a poor state. ―The Government lacks competent 
teachers, suitable schools and suitable textbooks…private dwellings served as schools and 
textbooks are such as each child can find for himself,‖ complained Turner. He also blamed 
Bogotá officials for poorly selecting the National Inspector, a former islander teacher who had 
been dismissed for incompetence.
545
  
In an effort to capitalize on islanders‘ preference for private religious schools, Father 
Turner proposed a plan to open a Catholic school. He recognized that this would not only be an 
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expensive project but might also elicit animosity from Colombian officials.
546
 Two years later, 
Mill Hill priests continued to contemplate the idea of opening a Catholic school as they lost 
another battle in the fight for control over the public schools: the Protestants still ―retain a fair 
percentage of teachers and have succeeded in having the Catechism entirely eliminated.‖ Turner 
blamed Colombian authorities who kowtowed to Protestant islanders. ―They supported the 
Government in the last election and deem it their right and privilege to acquire complete control 
over every branch of administration, and as far as we can see, will not rest until they get it.‖547 
The Mill Hill priests never opened their own Catholic school.  
The Capuchin priests also focused on public schools. They believed island youth to be 
the future of the Catholic mission and recruited Colombian nuns to assist them with public 
schools. On May 26, 1927, five Capuchin nuns arrived from mainland Colombia and three more 
the following year.
548
 These Capuchin sisters concentrated on the girls‘ schools in San Andrés. 
The Capuchin priests focused on the boys‘ schools. The work was not easy. The island children 
―do not understand anything of Spanish and the work that awaits us is arduous and heavy to be 
able to teach the language of Colombia, their fatherland.‖549 Despite the arrival of the nuns, some 
island parents still opted for the privately run Protestant schools. Florence Smith, who taught at 
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one of the girls‘ schools in San Andrés, reported her class was reduced from 50 to 40 after ten 
students went to attend one of the Protestant schools in 1928.
550
  
The nuns and priests introduced Catholic teachings infused with patriotism and civic 
pride in Colombia. They took every opportunity to observe patriotic and religious holidays and 
promote Colombian culture. The Capuchins commemorated Colombian Independence Day by 
helping their students to prepare a play an entitled ―Day of the Fatherland.‖ Students sang songs 
and performed a dance, which was conducted ―entirely in Spanish.‖551 One nun recalled, ―The 
community showed enthusiasm and admiration, since never had anything similar been presented 
[to them].‖552 This pageantry extended into the mission‘s religious activities, in the form of 
public processions. By 1930, the entire parish came out to participate in the observances of saint 
days, marriages, baptisms, and other religious holidays.
553
 These activities not only attracted 
potential converts, but also tied their flock to the Catholic mission.  
The strides made by the Capuchin priests provoked a strong Baptist reaction. Following 
the departure of Pastor Thomas Livingston, the First Baptist Church hired Noel Gonçalves, a 
native of British Guiana who accepted the post in June 1926.
554
 In his position as pastor, 
Gonçalves was responsible for reigniting Baptist opposition to the Catholic mission—a point not 
lost on the departing Mill Hill missionary Richard Turner. ―For several years the Protestant 
church has been entirely disorganized and a few more years would have completed its 
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destruction…[but now they have] begun to reorganize and up to the present have collected quite 
a large sum of money to open private schools so that their children may be withdrawn from all 
Catholic influence.‖555  
By 1930, the intendancy aggressively attacked Baptist churches and schools and viewed 
Noel Gonçalves in particular as a threat. Local authorities targeted Gonçalves for speaking 
against the Catholic Church, and police appeared in front of his church to catch him attacking 
local officials or the Capuchin priests in his sermons.
556
 School inspector José Múnevar argued 
for the closure of private schools, on the grounds that they refused to teach Spanish and 
Colombian history as dictated in article 13 of Law 56 of 1927. Moreover, these schools impeded 
the Colombianization agenda.
557
 The intendancy snubbed island children who attended private 
schools by not permitting them to participate in official parades or celebrations. They did not 
even consider non-Catholic children for scholarships to study on the mainland.
558
  
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
Colombian officials‘ efforts to assimilate the island population had mixed results. While on both 
islands there was a growth in numbers of Catholics, the majority of islanders remained Baptists 
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and Adventists. The British priests complained of sabotage from intendancy authorities; their 
removal, in 1926, was a culmination of their strained relations with local officials. The Spanish 
Capuchins also faced Protestant resistance and some difficulties with island parents over public 
schools, but their mission seemed to have had the support of intendancy officials. For example, 
intendancy officials refused to recognize Baptist marriages. This resulted in many islander 
children becoming illegitimate, threatening their inheritance and claims to land.
559
 Some 
islanders became Catholics to circumvent these discriminatory acts; they were called ―job 
Catholics.‖560 Even under the Capuchins, however, Catholic evangelization did not replace or 
greatly reduce Protestantism on either island.  
In addition to Catholicism, Bogotá officials also sought to promote the national language 
of Spanish. The results were a disappointment. Despite a series of laws on school curriculum, the 
majority of children spoke very little Spanish and only a handful spoke functional or fluent 
Spanish. As it had been prior to 1913, Creole remained the language for most islanders at home, 
work, and play, and English was spoken during Protestant religious services. Visitors to the 
islands in 1930 were just as likely as those seventeen years earlier to comment on the dominance 
of English in the islands.  
San Andrés and Providence islanders showed through their actions that they had not 
accepted the government‘s cultural project. While there is no evidence to reveal their personal 
thoughts on the foreign Catholic missionaries or mainland school teachers, we do see their 
refusal to accept the program given to them. The majority of San Andrés and Providence 
islanders were Protestants who refused to lose their children to Catholic evangelical efforts. 
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Their decision to pull them from schools or to send them to privately-run Protestant schools was 
a rejection of Catholicism, though not necessarily of the Spanish language or Colombian 
nationality. The Baptist churches, particularly those following Pastor Gonçalves, continued to 
promote the tenets of Baptist faith and provide education in English, refusing to accept the notion 
of Colombian citizenship only in terms of a shared language and religion. 
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CONCLUSION 
On October 26, 1962, the San Andrés Bilingüe, an island newspaper, celebrated the fiftieth 
anniversary of the formation of the Intendancy of San Andrés and Providence by devoting that 
day‘s issue to articles on the history of these Caribbean islands. In so doing, the newspaper‘s 
editors were constructing their version of the islands‘ past. In one article, U.S. geographer James 
J. Parsons stressed the islands‘ deep connections to other English-speaking communities in the 
western Caribbean. He spoke of the English Puritans who first settled on Providence and, later, 
the eighteenth-century Jamaican and Caribbean sojourners who sought better lives on San 
Andrés and Providence.
561
 Ali Omar interviewed Francis Newball and Timothy Britton, two 
native-born islanders who had served in the capacity of intendant, in 1913 and 1941, 
respectively. Both recalled their struggles to establish an administration free from corruption and 
respectful of island culture.
562
 Fray Fidel de Benaguacil recalled the efforts of the American, 
British, and Spanish Catholic missionaries who worked to convert the island population. He was 
careful not to claim a complete victory in winning over the bulk of San Andrés islanders, many 
of whom remained Protestants.
563
 Finally, other articles focused on the archipelago‘s historic 
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links to Colombia. One article listed the names of former island administrators —the majority of 
them mainland Colombians—while another denounced recent Nicaraguan claims to the 
islands.
564
  
Fifty years after the creation of the intendancy, the archipelago of San Andrés and 
Providence remained a national territory governed by presidentially appointed administrators. 
These included a few native-born islanders such as Francis Newball, Timothy Britton and 
Frederick Lever, but the majority of intendants were mainland Colombians. In 1953, President 
and General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla declared San Andrés a free port in which imports paid no 
tariffs. At this time, Colombia, like other Latin American nations, had instituted import-
substitution-industrialization (ISI) polices aimed at protecting domestic markets; these included 
high tariffs that raised prices on imported goods several times higher than the global market. The 
decision to make the island a free port turned San Andrés into an attractive tourist destination for 
mainland Colombians seeking to purchase consumer durables such as electronic appliances, 
perfumes, and televisions at a fraction of the cost on the mainland.
565
 The increase in the number 
of Colombian visitors to San Andrés also brought Colombian and foreign investors, who took 
control of the tourist industry and reaped many of the financial benefits of the free port.  
By the 1960s, San Andrés islanders had grown frustrated with the state of the 
archipelago: poor communication systems, insufficient electricity, lack of inter-island 
transportation, native islander marginalization in the tourist sector, battles over land titles, and 
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overpopulation.
566
 They also resented the treatment accorded them by visitors from the mainland. 
Antonio McNish, secretary of the Club Archipiélago Unido—a Bogotá-based organization 
focused on the social improvement and cultural life of islanders—recalled an official visit from 
the governor of North Santander and the mayor of Cali, who called islanders ―pseudo-
Colombians.‖567 Mauricio McNish, a San Andrés lawyer and activist, encouraged islanders not 
to trust mainlanders and explained to Luís Carlos Vásquez—one of the early pañamen 
(mainlanders) to arrive to San Andrés—his feelings about mainlanders. ―You and I are 
fundamentally different. You are from the mainland, Catholic, white and speak Spanish; we are 
islanders, black, Protestant, and speak English. You will continue being pañamanes.‖568 Marco 
Polo Britton Archbold echoed similar words in an interview he gave to the newspaper El 
Espectador and agreed with Colombian anthropologist Nina de Friedmann‘s assessment that the 
Colombian government had not successfully remade islanders into Spanish-speaking, Catholic 
nationals.
569
  
Meanwhile, Colombian politicians were still concerned about the nation‘s sovereign 
rights over San Andrés and Providence and about the national identity of the island inhabitants. 
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Part of this was due to the Nicaraguan government challenging Colombia‘s territorial claims to 
the archipelago.
570
 In 1969, Marco Polo Britton Archbold, a Providence-born naturalized United 
States citizen, submitted a proposal to the United Nations and the United States Vice President 
asking for their support in helping the islanders to separate from Colombia and form an 
independent nation. Britton claimed that islanders living in the United States and Panama 
supported his efforts.
571
  
Most islanders, reporters, and Colombian officials considered Britton‘s proposal to be 
―craziness‖ and labeled him as ―senile.‖572 Other observers cautioned, however, that Britton was 
expressing resentments that were widespread in the islands. While dismissing his bid for 
independence, Britton‘s uncle, former Intendant Timothy Newball Britton, warned Colombian 
authorities to take seriously threats of secession, especially if they did not act to rectify the errors 
of past administrations. ―The islander demands respect and the right to participate without 
hateful discriminations in all aspects of national life.‖ Antonio McNish echoed Newball‘s 
warning.
573
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Baptist Minister Rodwell Morgan also dismissed the idea of island separatism. ―Native 
resistance is not against the government nor authorities, nor a violent resistance…We islanders 
are very Colombian and respectful of our government because it has not done anything against 
us. Here one respects the law and authorities more than other places.‖574 An anonymous San 
Andrés islander pulled aside Minister of Government Carlos Augusto Noriega to dismiss 
Britton‘s proposals and affirmed that ―We [islanders] are Colombians. We are proud of it and 
deeply love Colombia.‖575 Cristóbal Whitaker believed that talk of separation was simply a 
strategy to get Bogotá officials to pay attention to islanders‘ concerns. ―But in truth, we were 
born and will die Colombians.‖576  
These patriotic sentiments echoed those of Vernon May, a San Andrés community leader 
and former intendancy employee who four years earlier, in 1965, offered a rebuttal to concerns 
regarding islanders‘ patriotism by tracing their loyalty to Colombia over the years. May proudly 
recalled how island men had joined their compatriots on the mainland in the nation‘s fight 
against Peru in a 1932 territorial dispute, some losing their lives. He drew further from the past 
in recalling how islanders had refused to secede along with Panama in 1903. ―The islander, with 
no [feeling of] difference whatsoever, has always felt Colombian. In spite of the central 
government‘s neglect and abandonment, [the islander] showed exemplary patriotism. In 1903, 
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when Panama separated from Colombia, the islander could have done the same thing, but 
because of his patriotism, he stood firm.‖577  
Islanders continued to use the same rhetoric and political strategies in the 1960s as they 
had in the 1910s and 20s. Vernon May‘s words echoed those written by Francis Newball and 
other islanders who made similar appeals to the nation when they tried to broker a new 
administration to govern the islands. Yet May‘s editorial, the articles on the separatist movement 
in 1969, and the celebratory issue commemorating the creation of the intendancy, all suggest that 
the nation-building project on San Andrés and Providence was not finished.  
 
Between 1890 and 1930, Colombian nation-builders sought to incorporate the country‘s 
vast frontier areas: the Llanos Orientales, Amazonia, the Chocó, the Guajira Peninsula, and the 
islands of San Andrés and Providence. Those regions accounted for ―nearly half of Colombia‘s 
national territory but less than 3 percent of its 7,851,000‖ people (as of 1930).578 These regions 
were populated primarily by indigenous and African-descended people; following the 
reconciliation of the Colombian state and the Catholic Church through the Concordat of 1887 
and the Convention of Missions of 1902, the Colombian government assigned responsibility for 
those populations to Catholic missionaries. Those missionaries, most of whom were foreign, 
were to work with civilian authorities to promote evangelization and Christianization, better 
sanitation and health conditions, literacy and civic education, colonization, and infrastructure 
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development, ―with the goal of making Colombian rule over these lands more effective.‖579 
However, Colombian control over these areas remained tenuous, as seen in this dissertation and 
other recent studies of frontier regions.
580
  
An overarching theme in all of these incorporation projects was anxiety over race and 
ethnicity. In the Chocó region, officials from Bogotá, settlers from the highlands, and foreign 
visitors all viewed the region‘s black residents as a counter-force to national progress and 
modernization. A federal commission concluded in its report that Chocoanos lived ―with little 
more civilization than their ancestors had when they were taken out of the forests of Africa.‖581 
Officials held similar concerns about the black and indigenous populations in the Guajira 
Peninsula of the Caribbean coast, where sanitation and health policies were aimed at preventing 
further ―racial degeneration‖ along the coast, ―the face of the nation.‖ Elites‘ attempt to 
restructure and transform the Caribbean coast into a modern society required both biological and 
moral renovation, inspired in eugenics and targeting black and mulatto workers, who became the 
center of the region‘s incorporation project.582   
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Colombian nation-builders 
applied ―scientific‖ notions of race to the black populations of the Chocó and the Caribbean 
coast.
583
 When they arrived in Providence and San Andrés, however, those officials seemed to 
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leave notions of race behind.  In their official reports and correspondence, they spoke very little 
about the racial character of the island population. The British and American missionaries were 
far more attentive to the racial character of their new converts than were the newly arrived public 
officials.
584
  
Perhaps mainland authorities were silent on this point because of their inability to 
categorize the islanders‘ ―race.‖ This was the case with Francisco Javier Vergara y Velasco, who 
considered them a racial hybrid ―who are not yet definitively formed and whose character is very 
difficult to specify.‖585 Or perhaps for Colombian nation-builders on the islands, race loomed 
less important than nationality, language, and culture. Even more than on the mainland, the 
nation-building project on San Andrés and Providence was spurred by Colombian authorities‘ 
desire to curb the growing geopolitical presence of the United States. And even more than on the 
mainland, islanders‘ linguistic, religious, and commercial ties were with the United States and 
the Anglophone Caribbean, not Colombia.   
In the face of this challenge, Bogotá officials sought to correct decades of neglect and 
poor governance and consolidate their authority on the islands through nationalization. Mainland 
authorities called it ―Colombianization‖, which was a program aimed at converting the island 
population to Catholicism, teaching them the Spanish language, and instilling civic pride and 
Hispanic customs. Officials entrusted this agenda both to intendancy employees and to Catholic 
missionaries whom they placed in charge of the public schools. The term ―Colombianization‖ 
underscored Bogotá and other mainland officials‘ questioning of islanders‘ Colombian identity. 
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Mainlanders and islanders shared neither a common history, nor language, nor religion, nor 
culture, nor racial character. But state officials believed that these characteristics were malleable 
and that islanders could be taught to be Colombian nationals and thus, good citizens.  
For nearly thirty years, departmental and intendancy authorities used foreign English-
speaking Catholic missionaries to impart Catholic religiosity, the Spanish language, and 
Hispanic customs to islanders. Yet Colombian officials eventually concluded that they could not 
rely on British and American missionaries who did not share a love for the Spanish language or 
Hispanic culture. By 1930, another foreign missionary group had arrived, but now one with the 
same language and arguably the same culture as mainland Colombia. Yet despite their decades 
of experience with indigenous and black communities on mainland Colombia, the Spanish 
Capuchins did only marginally better than their English-speaking counterparts, and even this 
modest success was largely due to their better relations with intendancy officials.  
The Catholic missionaries‘ limited success was the product of islander resistance. 
Islanders actively participated in the process of creating an intendancy and bringing the 
archipelago into a closer relationship with the Colombian state. However, their desire for 
administrative change had more to do with ridding the island of poor administrators and taking 
part in the nation‘s modernization project—the construction of roads, bridges, and schools and 
promotion of commerce and export trade. In their petitions, island elites like Francis Newball 
claimed islanders were Colombian because of their loyalty and obedience to the laws and 
political authority of the state. Newball and other island notables rarely made claims to a shared 
culture, language, or religion and in only a few cases did they demand to share the culture of 
their mainland counterparts. Protestant island families succeeded in minimizing the impact of the 
Catholic mission on the islands, but not completely eradicating it. Their opposition to Catholic 
 164 
conversion raised questions about islanders‘ fitness as Colombian nationals which are still 
circulating into the contemporary period.  
By 1930, Bogotá officials had warded off potential outside threats from the United States 
and Nicaragua toward sovereignty over San Andrés and Providence. But as we have seen, 
Colombian officials could never be completely confident that they had consolidated their 
authority over these faraway islands. Fears of island separatists still haunted Bogotá authorities 
into the later part of the twentieth century. Bitter memories of Panamanian secession became 
directly tied to San Andrés islanders‘ demands for autonomy or redress of grievances as 
newspaper headlines stirred up controversy and sparked debate.  
Between 1924 and 1930, most island complaints centered on ill-treatment from 
intendancy employees and on the intendancy‘s numerous administrative failures. Islanders 
complained of poor schools, roads, and other island infrastructure projects—the same demands 
islanders had made in the early 1900s when seeking to remove departmental islanders from the 
islands. Islanders believed it was the government‘s responsibility to address and resolve these 
problems; only in a few cases do we find islanders threatening to secede or ask another nation to 
intervene. In spite of their linguistic, religious, and ethnic differences from the mainland, 
islanders saw themselves as belonging to Colombia and entitled to the benefits of membership in 
the nation. San Andrés and Providence islands thus offer historians an opportunity to reevaluate 
our understandings of national belonging and citizenship and an alternative model of state- and 
nation-formation. 
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